The Independent cultural journal “Ї”

Taras Wozniak

The EC March to the East. Outlook of Ukraine

– Considering a problem of cooperation and possible Ukraine's entry into the European Community to begin with we have to define general problems and outlooks of the EC.

– Firstly it should be noted that the EC is largely not a reality but a task – even the members of the community do not know many answers to the European integration questions. These questions are as follows: the integration level, the problem of keeping different kinds of identities, the limits of interests and borders of the EC.

– As to civilization limits it is possible to extend Europe from Vancouver up to Vladivostok with some warnings. But do the Europeans intend to extend the borders of the EC to the Pacific Ocean? Which way should the integration with Russia take place? Perhaps we leave it alone and cooperate as far as Ukraine? Though this country is too huge and doesn't still correspond to the European standards. Its interests and virtual needs have reached now far from the Old continent to the East. The existence of independent Ukraine depends on Turkmenian gas and Azerbaijan (Iran's and Iraq’s in future!) oil, at the same time on military cooperation with some countries of this region and it is not possible to ignore it.

– Probably to find the answers we can ask the pretenders – Ukraine or Russia? But for this sake both countries have to define their own standings first of all and orientation in the political field of the modern world. Such Central-European states as Poland, Czech, Hungary have defended their Central-European standings at once and for certain and they are going to join all European institutions and NATO, but Ukraine and Russia had some problems. Though Russia still has ones.

– Russia can not give up its great-power arrogance even on the level of the state ideology, and eventually it is a great country, for which it is difficult to agree with an unusual role of a member of the EC. Its actual geopolitical, economic and other interests reach the limits far from the nearest and future interests of the European Community. Recently more and more it reorients its interests to the Asian East which looks like the answer to NATO's extend to the European East. Together with Peking Moscow is working out and trying to realize the doctrine of multiple worlds. Certainly, it is clear what it is being done for. It makes attempt to oppose again to the American domination in the world. India is not less active Russia's partner here. Even Iraq – especially in oil mining. And Iran – in energetic. So it looks like Russia tries to integrate around itself so-called anti-American forces. It is very well that they are only attempts. Taking into account all these factors and economic, financial and political Russia's parameters even the EC does not speak about Russia's membership in it. From the other side the EC is to have regulated relations with Russia.

After all Russia's official standing has been indefinite. It is of great importance to take into account its own interests and interests of others in this stage of contacts. Unfortunately concerning Russia the EC does not always keep to it. Though not very good behavior especially in economy can provoke an unexpected reply. Something like this has happened this summer when the EC refused to take of limits on the Russian textile import. In reply Russia threatened with counter-limits and quotas on the European goods. The Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin literally said that – ''We can not accept the situation when a lot of our products are opened and quotas are imposed on our goods.'' At the same time Russia took care of the fact that the European Commission would recognize it as a country with ''market economy'' in the talks in Brussels. It could open the way for Russia to join the World Free Trade Association (WFTA) even next year. But Russia was refused in such standing in spite of declarative assistance in this problem. At present the main paper which regulates RF and EC relations is the Treaty of Partnership and Cooperation signed on June 24, 1994. But more pragmatic Russia's position towards the EC should be expected in the near future. The shock after the USSR's collapse has passed and Russia starts to realize and defend its new interests.

– But even Ukraine could not and was not socially and politically prepared to determine its place on the geopolitical world map and the EC. The Eurasian development variant (according to the Russian model and mechanically) had been discussed for a long time and only recently Ukraine's integration to Europe (as long as it is possible in the near future) was talked about more or less concretely. Gradually Ukraine has changed from the political novelty to one of the most important Central-European policy link. Especially it concerns the European security problem. If Ukraine does not integrate in this or that form into Europe or NATO the European security will not be guaranteed. Ukraine and the EC relations were formalized after the Treaty on Partnership and Cooperation was signed on June 14, 1994 (ten days earlier than with RF). One of the major items of this cooperation was creation of the free trade zone between the EC and Ukraine. A few agreements have been signed since that time. And yet on September 14, 1995 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Hennadiy Udovenko declared that the strategy aim of Ukraine is to join the EC. But the nearest aim is to achieve a standing of associated membership in this structure and formation of the free trade zone.

As for me awareness of the fact that it will be very difficult to build a steady European house without Ukraine has strengthened. The European Community has even adopted a special program of activities concerning Ukraine (it is the third programmed document of the EC devoted to Ukraine during the last three years). However the members of the EC have not, probably, yet defined the role of Ukraine. The Treaty on Partnership and Cooperation between the EC and Ukraine signed in 1994 has not yet been ratified by many countries. Besides the EC opinion on many problems is clear as well as not clear. From the one side the EC perhaps declares its wish to integrate into the Central European region but at the same time it defends its market from the Eastern European black metal, chemical products, coal, some kinds of fish, agricultural production which are made not only in Ukraine and Russia but even in Poland. This is the reason which does not give an opportunity to modernize their economies by self-financing and to prepare them to integrate into the EC.

One more aspect which causes the EC's indefinite position towards its expansion to the East is the expense which have to be paid by the EC members. If we spoke about integration of Czech, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia assistance to these countries for adaptation of their economy should total 8 bln. ECU (according to the data of the London Economic Policy Research Center); when we add Romania and Bulgaria to this list the total sum will be 13 bln. ECU. Is the EC ready to pay such a price for the extension of its opportunities? Especially taking into account that the main EC engine – the German economy – is skidding and can not get out from the Prussian swamps. In the cause of integration it is very important not only to go in a definite direction but not to loose the pace and the initiative because firstly the political and economic vacuum can not exist a long time, it is first of all, quickly filled up with other matter from the East or the South, or from behind Atlantic. Secondly, it is not possible to count for a long time on the masses of people waiting irritated with the economic collapse who evidently will reorient their political and economic reference-points even if they are illusive but perhaps closer. Thus the time of positive interpretation of the EC integration idea is not endless. The markets of Ukraine, Russia and other countries of the region are being captured by other competitors and then integration into them is getting more complicated. Finally it can cause the formation of anti-European economic and political lobbies; there are already some examples of this.

However the greatest achievement of Ukraine now is our own designation. In 1996 the official Kiev for the first time drew its position about the general European integration processes concretely and accurately: the strategic aim of Ukraine is defined as integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures with the priority to join EC. It was not easy for the Ukrainian society to make such a choice. And it is clear that it is neither politically or economically and psychologically ready to it. Though the Ukrainians realize themselves as the Europeans more than the Russians do. The identification with the Europeans consists of 51% among the Ukrainian elites, in Russia it is 26%. 77% of the Ukrainian elites treat the EC membership positively, in Russia it is 26% only. But it is only elites; in general this index is only 51% in Ukraine and 20% – in Russia. Actually EC as well does not consider that the Ukraine's entry in the EC is absolutely necessary. Russia is not even mentioned. But the decision to march to the EC has brought Ukraine together first of all with its direct neighbors – Poland, Hungary, Czech, and Slovakia. At the same time an important positive aspect is that both the Ukrainian elites and people in general become more European orientated.

Determining the main directions of Ukrainian policy after the summit of NATO in Madrid (1997) the President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma said, '' I shall put the problem accurately: the main objective of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other related institutions should be to make foreign policy more oriented in economy. The Charter signed with NATO is a good thing but if there are not any changes in economy and EC contacts all the work may be in vain. It is necessary for us to activate economic relations first of all with Germany, France, and the Great Britain. Certainly we do not work with the EC the way we can. It is necessary to form a separate department, which is responsible for the European Community relations. However these are words only. The political and diplomatic resource in the Ukraine's march to Europe is almost limited almost all positive statements are made – economy and real changes should act next. But achievements here are not so great.

At present for example Poland is one of the countries developing in Europe as fast as possible. There are such evidences of this fact: comparatively low and more stable index of inflation, an actual drop of the unemployment level, and growing number of working places; two thirds of the export production are made in the private sector which dominates in trade, service, agriculture; the private sector covers half of the whole industry, the rapid increase of capital investment, as RP is considered to be stable and great market for Europe.

Ukraine was not as lucky as Poland, Czech and Hungary. During the independent period till the middle of this year Ukraine has got the total of 1.66 bln. USD of foreign investments which is hardly compared to dozens of billiards of other smaller countries in the central Europe. The fact is that now all possible structures are created in Ukraine, which have to stimulate investments. These are the National Agency of Ukraine for Reconstruction and European Integration, the President Advisory Council for Foreign Investments, the Joint Commission of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on Investment Projects, Chamber of Independent Experts of the President of Ukraine on Investment Problems. But at the same time there is unforeseen Ukrainian law-making process, sudden liquidation of privileges for foreign investors, no certain clearness how to stimulate investment processes; up till now the activity of foreign banks and financial organizations which are involved in investment process are not regulated at all. The main investment is made not by the EC but by the USA and by the Southern Korea.

One of the integration aspects of Ukraine into the EC is a process of legislative field creation, which would correspond, to the all-European ones. That is why Ukraine takes part in the Council of Europe. Since 1990 nineteen new members has joined it what resulted overcoming the political split on the continent at least by means of declarations. However the creation of the united legislative field has met a certain resistance in Ukraine. Including the problem of capital punishment. It costs the Minister of Justice of Ukraine his portfolio, and it can cost Ukraine its membership in this organization, theoretically.

But nobody knows what kind of position Ukraine could have towards the EC. At least this collaboration at present looks like special partnership but it is something ephemeral, even more a declaration than a reality. Perhaps to begin with it is worth synchronizing its place to the European Community with the other countries of the Central Europe, and RP, CzR and Hungary too. The form of the new Ukrainian-Polish-Czech-Hungarian and etc. relations on all levels depends on the level of this synchronization. In case these countries finally join NATO, and in due course the EC – these relations have to be limited by relations NATO/ Ukraine and the EC/Ukraine, but not only RP/-CzR/-Ukraine. Now Ukraine and RP and CzR etc. look more sovereign in these problems though later the new members of the EC will have to delegate a part of their sovereignty to these structures, and then to coordinate their policy and cooperation models with Ukraine with them. From the other side in the very far future in case Ukraine joins these structures they will have to expand mutual contacts within the NATO and the EC. The tandem RP and Ukraine or a kind of opposition based on economic interests opens up new vistas.

At present the cooperation between Poland and Ukraine on the highest political level is the best. Evidently both parties follow different objectives. As to Ukraine they are one of the alternatives to Russian influences which is not declarative as if in the case of the Great Britain but quite real confirmed by close economic and human contact which had become long ago not only a good wish but a reality for both countries especially in the borderland where hundreds of thousands if not millions of people are involved. Moreover comparing contacts with other Central-European countries we can observe some quality hitch. Quantity threatens to modify into quality in that case. The cooperation with Hungary, Slovakia and Czech is active too but not on such a scale. – One of the conditions to join the EC is regional cooperation development when cooperation is not much between countries as large political-economic formations but between their regions. Evidently it reflects the conception of European regions, its transformation into Europe of regions. These regions paradoxically wash away national and sate boarders and obviously will have to homogenize Europe in all aspects in the future. Legally the EC development trend is fixed in the Charter of Regionalization that has led to set up European Regions Council in 1985 along with its parliamentary conformity the European Region Assembly. We can mark out such types of regions as natural, economic, administrative, cultural. These regions exceed the boarders of modern states. They can be such as Ukrainian-Polish Halychyna, Czech – Polish Silezia, Ukrainian – Moldavian Bessarabia, and Ukrainian – Romanian Bukovyna and Romanian – Hungarian Transylvania. The future pretenders do not always interpret this national position and term of the EC. Especially by those who feel a treat of their independent existence from the side of their neighbors traditionally or well-grounded. Unions between countries but not between their regions are more often formed in the Central-European region. Their trend is not based on the cooperation but on the opposition. The Vyshehradska three/four and the Baltic-Black Sea Arc, and the Central-European Initiatives, the conception of Trymoria or the new Black Sea economic cooperation organization. Moreover, struggle for leadership is observed in the very beginning of their formation. Particularly Russia fights for leadership in all those unions where it is a member like in the last one that greatly hinders the process of regional integration. From the other side Ukraine starts to pretend to play the leading part and become an integration center but acting against Russia though not directly. The Poland's approach often looks the same way. Finally it often has all reasons for it. In the early stage after the USSR breakup the cooperation in the Central-European region was not organized and even structured. Firstly, there were political leaders, parties and groups contacts. Then they were transformed into the symbolically declarative cooperation between the border administrative unities and the towns, and then it brought to formation of Euro-regions and even common economic structures – like international stock exchanges and banks. However all these steps were made on the enthusiastic elation without taking into account the European and world experience, that is why they often remained declarative only. Though they achieved their objective on that stage – the region was not transformed into a conflict zone as Yugoslavia. But on this stage we have to realize these cooperative forms. And what is more, the real projects are worked out in which all countries of the region are taking part. Such as: construction of Lisbon-Krakow-Kyiv highway N 4, an Odesa-Brody-Gdansk pipeline, etc.

At the same time the national prejudices have taken place, as between Hungary and Slovakia, Romania and Hungary, Russia and Ukraine. It is impossible to activate the cooperation within the framework of the declared Euro-region ''the Carpathians''. But the excessive hypertrophy of these regions (''the Carpathians'' has 10 million population and ''the Bug'' region – 4 million) as well as their obvious declarative outline prevent from making the cooperation of ''the Bug'' and ''the Carpathians'' regions specific. Different levels of regional power freedoms impair their unity. It is large enough in Poland, but it is inadequate in Ukraine and Romania. Major problems of Euro-regions activity are solved mainly in Kyiv, Bratislava and Bucharest. Sometimes it is an evident opposition for example Slovakia ignores the Carpathians Euro-region as a form of demarche relating to Hungary. However the legislation of Central-Eastern European countries more and more reckons with the regional interests and turns to the principals of self-regulation but sharply increasing opportunities of the borderline regional cooperation.

To ensure security of this region is an important problem for all European integration. Obviously the main organization which protects de facto security of the North Atlantic region is NATO. In this case NATO seems to go ahead of the EC and all kinds of European institutions and standards. Exactly it takes under the umbrella not only separate countries but the process of the European integration. The appearance of this security ''umbrella'' can explain partially even the economic successes of some our neighbors – investing is done more willingly in the secure zone. It is clear that the alliance has different positions if Germany wants only to create ''a security belt'' around itself, the USA arrogates to influence the All-European and even Atlantic integration.

Some countries are invited under the NATO's umbrella and this fact has reflected on the level of their investments. Some countries are not. As to Ukraine it could be mentioned that our country had left a gray security zone and joined the Central Eastern Europe after signing the Charter on special partnership between Ukraine and NATO (1997). Regulating the relations of Ukraine with its neighbors serves as a preface to it. The Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation, the Russian-Ukrainian and the Romanian– Ukrainian treaties have been signed. The Charter has summed up this process and closed a circle of the formal security round Ukraine. However it is a declaration only. Actually much more cooperation does according to the program Partnership for Peace (PFP). But having economic difficulties Ukraine has realized 38% of programs proposed by NATO. Obviously the Charter is a document, which shows Ukraine the perspective, and it greatly depends on Ukraine how to use it. As to regional military cooperation it goes on in accordance with PFP and within the framework of Ukraine and Poland bilateral actions.

– Ukraine seems to be anxious about the issue of placing nuclear weapon on the territory of NATO's new members. Though Ukraine with or without assistance refused this kind of weapon not so long ago. The changes of defensive doctrines of our direct neighbors are observed who transfers a great number of their military formations to the Ukrainian border, which is still considered the old Soviet or Russian. Finally this kind of strategy in the case of Byelorussia has proved its value.

The Ukrainian perspective to get into the NATO break seems to be anxious too, when two pro– and anti-America groups have been formed. Ukraine gets into the break between the left wing headed by France, which is in sympathy with Russia as an opposition to the USA and the Northern-American-German wing of the alliance. All these things take place during the period when Russia and Ukraine compete to win leadership in the post-Soviet space.

– At the same time the USA new flirtation with Russia arouses anxiety after the Vice Prime Ministers' change (Chubais and Nemtsov) when the role of Ukraine is also going to be changed because lately the USA had used Ukraine actively as a trump against Russia. Then the USA support to Ukraine's march to the EC will not be so high as it was during the period of savage opposition to the Russian hawks.

Another new aspect, which can influence the approach of Ukraine and the EC, is the first attempt of the EC and the USA opposition in an embargo problem as to the countries accused of terrorism. For the first time the Europeans all together were against the USA position. But Ukraine stands in front of the similar problem too. The reason is not only that Ukraine cooperates closely with the USA, the reason is also because Ukraine starts to consider all its interests in military service cooperation and sales of arms where Ukraine has been achieving a great success for the last two and two and a half years. Sales of arms have been increased ten times. Iran, Pakistan and China (especially in the common tank production) play the role of a partner together with Israel and Poland. It causes geopolitical effects. The Ukrainian policy is based on the triangles Poland-Germany-USA in the West and Iran-Pakistan-China in the East and this configuration has more questions than answers.

The approach strategy of the EC and Ukraine is not worked out yet by Ukraine itself that is also a problem. It was caused by too rapid development of events in the region and Ukraine. At the same time there is an uncertainty of foreign political directions. Up to that time there was an opinion that the Central-European region could be rather independent. That is why the main regional problem was to arrange cooperation in this region. There were made some attempts to specify forms and framework of cooperation with all countries in the Central-European region. In turn they acquired different forms such as the Vyshehradska group of three/four, the Baltic Black Sea Arch, the Central-European Initiatives. Different countries saw their own parts in all these models in a different way. However the main link or leader in its way was Poland in the Central Europe on that stage. Eventually Poland began not only to pretend to this role but also to become a real leader – coordinator in the region. The main financial channels, channels of information and influence, international activity mechanisms directed at the East and also at Ukraine were localized in Poland. In fact it was politically reformed into a peculiar ''leader'' of the region, eventually Ukraine also began to pretend to the leading role though it could not boast of such successes as Poland.

Thus the Central-European region as an independent geopolitical unit was not realized and began to divide actively into zones of influence of the West and Russia. That is why its leading role of ''a dispatcher of the West'' in the Central Eastern Europe acts programmatically and marches to NATO and the EC. The Poland dispatcher role is growing more evident. But Ukraine is late and playing into its own hand.

On the other side PR began to work as an engine of some Ukrainian interests in the western institutions. But here as mentioned above there is a threat to take in excess that can meet misunderstanding from the side of Ukraine. Poland can be instigated to it by a great temptation to speak in the name of this strong and great tandem in perspective. It is very important that each partner plays its own part and then this model would be very effective. Sometimes the other countries of the region take similar stand. Sometimes Hungary reminds that Slovakia can not be forgotten in the march to the EC.

Ukraine has to be well prepared to PR, CzR and Hungary joining NATO and then the EC on this stage. It is of great importance for Ukraine before this act to confront NATO and EC with a fait accomplice the largest real contact between two countries; real and economic link which forces to give Ukraine a particular standing in the future. In my opinion it is very significant to discuss an opportunity of special rate in the borderline between these countries and Ukraine, to fill in a general form of particular partnership with PR and cooperation with CzR, Hungary etc. as full as possible. Political and economic cooperation PR and Ukraine and their synchronous marching to the West could be a model of constructing the EC in the East on this stage.

The fact of having common military formations (Ukrainian-Polish battalion), wide-spread economic cooperation (arms production too) will make us to look for a particular standing not only in the PR and Ukraine relations but in the relations of NATO and the EC with Ukraine. At the same time PR can find its role of "the representative of Ukrainian interests" of its extraordinary place in new Europe. Perhaps to join the EC the other candidate can find similar roles for themselves. Even if they will cope with Ukrainian and other Eastern-European markets. This is one of the main arguments for making the eastern policy of Poland, Czech, Hungary and Slovakia more active. The Eastern markets and raw sources attract them very much now and then. Thus even now significant export streams from Poland and Hungary go to Ukraine or pass through Ukraine.

The great interests of PR, CzR and Hungary in the East (in spite of popular admiration of the West) have caused an evident disproportion in relations of the PR-Ukraine tandem. Poland is looking for and is proposing models of co-existence, operating offensively. We have something like this with other partners.

The Council of Europe approved the plan of absorption six countries ratified the EC membership in the Essen Summit in December 1994. One of the main part of the absorption is mechanisms of stimulating transformation seized by PHARE, TACIS programs. A lot of other programs are referred to it, which are not likely to be of European origin. It is often the North Atlantic one. However they aimed to assist countries – challengers both in transition to market economy and to create horizontal links between them according to Euro-regions models. Unfortunately these funds often are spent ineffectively and it is not only the countries-acceptors' fault but they are often eaten by EC expert organizations. One of the various organization relations the West and Ukraine and Russia can be the variant of ''institutional web'' (as Richard Kugler said from the Research Corporation REND). This foresees to establish various connections with these countries through NATO, the EC, financial organizations, ''the great seven'', etc.

The main cooperation forms of Ukraine and its western neighbors are cooperation within the framework of such specialized institutions as the Central-European free Trade Association (CESTA), the Central-European Initiative. It is of great value that after their joining the EC they will be connecting links between the EC and Ukraine though formally they are to leave it. The fact of economic integration will not give them an opportunity to separate completely from CESTA.

The main partner for Ukraine is usually Poland in this integration. At the same time this is an well-organized regional cooperation school. Thus the practical extend and even the extend in perspective of the EC and NATO to the East have brought conspicuous positive results in the form of an old opposition regulation. For example between Romania and Hungary, Romania and Ukraine, Romania and Russia, Bulgaria and Turkey.

And now a few words about dangerous models which can regulate the EC and Ukraine relations. Two of them can be obvious and dangerous;

– the transformation of Ukraine into the Russia's actual satellite (possible formal independence) which turns to its imperial past. And then the model will consist of the new opposition paradigm the East and the West;

– in the case of the transformation of Ukraine into a buffer zone between Russia and NATO, Russia and the EC, contacts between Ukraine and the EC will consist of the paradigm of indefinite mobile, local and accidental treaties. This model is insecure of its instability, reduction of economic, investing activity in midst of the country.