

Молю вас, таветависите,  
Каждому порвите,  
И вражого злою кровью  
Волно окропите.  
И мене въ семьи великій  
Из семьи волбній новій  
Незабудте помилути  
Незгнать тихиль слово.

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22\*\*

2001

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Many people are trying to give an answer to the question «What is going on in the country and society? Where are we going?» ten years after the proclamation of independence. Among these people are politicians, who cannot be expected to be objective; analysts, who are more objective but usually narrowed down to their particular sphere of specialty; and finally, people of creative professions whose descriptions are sometimes extremely accurate but other times – extremely far from the truth.

In this work, we tried to put them together and present to the reader polyphony of opinions of the leading experts, politicians, and workers of culture on the situation in the present-day Ukraine. As editors and publishers of this work, our selection of texts and authors to be included have been by no means neutral. We ordered key expert articles from specific authors, whom we view as leading experts in the fields of history, economy, sociology, and culture. We turned to concrete politicians, analysts, and workers of culture, since it is them who have authority in our eyes and in the eyes of our readers. We asked them provocative questions (an expert opinion poll in the terms of sociology), tabulating their answers according to directions important for learning the truth.

Finally, from their texts we selected only the most significant (from our point of view) ideas and thoughts and put them together in this book.

The book turned out, in the opinion of many, to be a unique mirror of the Ukrainian society on the edge between two centuries.

Then the infamous «tape scandal» broke out, and many thought that answers to the complex questions of our post-Soviet modernization will be found on those tapes. This never happened, however, neither could it happen (although it was an important «moment of the truth» for all of us), and we returned to the more traditional methods of learning. In this connection, we – editors and publishers – made a decision that it is very important to prepare an English version of the book. We failed to wake the interest of foreign publishers in this idea. Nevertheless, we are still determined to publish this book in Ukraine. We realize that on this path we are going to face language problems, and we ask our readers to forgive us in advance. Maybe in the future it will be easier for us to solve such problems.

*Leonid Finberg,  
Taras Voznyak*

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n a t a l i a   y a k o v e n k o

# on the historical memory and historical traditions

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П о х о в а й т е ,   т а   в с т а в а й т е . . .

тавсетаваите  
history

1. Does the sovereignty (independence) of Ukraine is a value for you personally?
2. Which of your social dreams or expectations at the beginning of 1990eth became reality and which not? What did you manage to do during these years? Why does the public expectations do not correlate with the present realities?
3. Which facts or events became the symbols of life of those years for you?

The time period that one can access as the past that one has experienced, the past one can remember, falls within the lifetime of three generations, which is approximately seventy-five years. So-called «actual memory» doesn't go any further. That's why when we talk about events of distant past we turn to a «historical memory», which is a cultural convention. It is not the attribute of a single person, but of a collective ego – the particular community that connects this distant past to victories and losses of previous generations, heroes, legends, and so on. Actually, the collective experience that this kind of memory renders is one of the central foundations of the national identity of those millions of egos that are connected by invisible bonds. They consider themselves to be a part of those common («our») historical roots and do not have any doubts that those roots are connected to the present. The feeling of «common roots» leads to a common tradition, i.e. certain behavioral and cultural stereotypes that are passed from generation to generation and create an illusion of historical continuity, which in turn is reflected in «historical memory».

It's often thought that differences in the interpretation of «historical memory» and «historical tradition» become aggravated in times of unrest, when points of reference change rapidly. Historical events start «competing» for the right to be included in the new canon of «historical memory». This is not exactly true. Differences in interpretation exist in every period of interpretation. Often they are engendered by the very goal of interpretation, which views «historical memory» not as an object for research but as a substance with which to glue together the national identity and as a repository of examples that must demonstrate the «historical role» of the nation.

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#### LEGITIMIZING THE NATIONAL MYTH

According to Mykhailo Hrushevsky «two great creative forces in the life of every nation, «narodnist'» (nation-ism) and territory, met on the threshold of the historical life of our people and became the initial foundation for its further development». This is the introduction to an «understanding of Ukrainian history as an indivisible wholeness that has existed from the beginning or even from before the beginning of historical time through all the complexities of its historical development...». With these words from the preface to the first volume of «The History of

#### Ivan DZYUBA, Ukrainian National Academy of Science

1 For myself, the existence of an independent Ukrainian state is an indisputable personal value for one simple reason: I cannot imagine living outside what one could call the «Ukrainian world», and this «Ukrainian world» can only freely evolve its entire potential in an independent Ukrainian state, and only if there is an independent Ukrainian state, the «world of mankind» will not lose the «Ukrainian world» as one of its values.

2 History consists of ever so many efforts and desires of ever so many people. The results sometimes come unexpected to everybody and often they are quite the opposite of what people intended in the first place. Therefore, what happened in Ukraine (socio-cultural regress instead of progress) is tragic but not accidental, and by no means a unique phenomenon in the history of mankind. Why did it happen? This is too difficult a question. All I can do is refer to some of the circumstances. After the sudden collapse of the totalitarian system many decade-old negative qualities of society and its people, which had formerly been disguised or partly restrained, came to the surface: corruption, extortion, irresponsibility, boorishness, licentiousness in compensation of slavish obedience etc. These negative qualities, rather than the idealism of the «dissidents» or the

self-contained industriousness of the working people, became the forming (or deforming) forces of social development in most post-Soviet countries. It is not by chance that the term «new Russian» (the same as its loan translation, «new Ukrainian») connotes all kinds of negative qualities. Indeed, all the mechanically adopted Western recipes for building market relations yielded results which were quite the opposite of what had been intended. No reliable normative base had been created and society did not meet the socio-psychological, moral, and professional preconditions required for such a transition. However, the social organism has a great potential of self-healing so that today we can observe the first signs of recovery. What gives us hope is, more than anything else, that we do have political freedom and freedom of speech, albeit not in the same measure as in Western democracies, but still to a degree unimaginable not long ago. And although subjectively we do not value this very highly (having managed to forget what it was like 15 or 20 years ago), objectively this fundamental fact works towards the creation of a constructive perspective for society.

3 For Ukraine, of course, the declaration of the independent Ukrainian state, the general elections of 1 December 1991, and the adoption of the Ukrainian constitution have become events of great historical significance and symbols of social relevance. The negative symbols are symbols of our dependency: the ill-fated

Ukraine-Rus'», the author set forth the goal of his ten-volume work, which he wrote over more than a quarter-century (the last volume was published after Hrushevsky's death in 1936). It was and still is an unprecedented example of historiographical erudition. His goal was to tie together a collection of individual events snatched from the dark of the past, and to present them to a reader as an «indivisible wholeness», i.e. as a foundation for the «historical memory» of Ukrainians, based not on legends but on science, beginning in prehistoric times. This goal was attained at a time when no Ukrainian state existed – an unimaginable achievement (? – z horoiu). This is obvious not only from today's school textbooks, where this conception is still an axiom, and not only from retrospective assessments. For example, the scholar of Ukrainian nationalism John Armstrong called Hrushevsky's work «a brilliant Ukrainian legitimization» of a national myth. An elderly villager from the Cherkasy region, sending in his small contribution for the publication of «The History of Ukraine-Rus'», wrote that he was sending money «to publish our Ukrainian History-Bible». But even in Hrushevsky's time his contemporaries<sup>1</sup> were able to comprehend the quasi-scientific role of his work, which is a rare occurrence.

So which territory, then, should be treated as native for Ukrainians; where has the «historical life of the nation» been unfolding? According to M. Hrushevsky and his followers, this area more or less coincides with today's Ukraine (although without the Crimea but with the Kuban and Zakerzonnya).

The «historical life» of Ukrainians starts with settlement in this area that, according to Hrushevsky, took place in the fourth and fifth centuries. The obvious contradiction between this statement and later realities is moderated by the metaphoric «high and low tides» in Ukrainian colonization. For instance, all of the Steppe Ukraine from the Danube to the Kuban falls into the zone of one of the «low tides», though in this case there was no «high tide» beforehand. The future Ukrainian Steppe – the western appendage of the Great Plains of Eurasia – had been controlled continuously by Iranian and then Turk tribes for three thousand years, since the time of the Cimmerians, made famous by Homer, until the final dissolution of the Crimea Khanate in 1783. Thus, if we can talk about «high» and «low tides» at all, it can only be as Slavic enclaves in a Turkish Sea. The proto-ethnic base of the Left Bank is just as mixed in its non-Slavic nature. The base of «Polyanskyi» Kyiv is multiethnic at best, and that of the Buh region and the Carpathians is

prolonged building project of the Odesa oil terminal, St. Andrew's banner in Sevastopol, and the occupation of Ukraine by Russian mass media.

### Leonid KRAVCHUK, national deputy, first president of Ukraine

<sup>1</sup> It is not only a value but the highest value. It is the meaning of my life. As the politician who at that time held the highest position in the state I certainly had a hand in creating this state. A powerful nation with a huge intellectual potential, a favourable natural environment, and rich resources had not had its own state for centuries, serving various masters instead. Two attempts at creating a Ukrainian state were unsuccessful. Bohdan Khmelnytsky was slyly outwitted – first they made him feel secure and then they took everything away from his successors. The bolsheviks crushed the second attempt at creating an independent state after 1917.

God loves threes, the Ukrainian saying has it. I am certain that the third birth of an independent Ukraine will be forever. I believe that the new generation of Ukrainian citizens will be wiser and uninfluenced by imperial dogmas. They will truly love their country, protect her and work for her.

<sup>2</sup> The greatest dream came true – Ukraine became an independent state. She was recognised by the world community. Diplomatic relations with almost all countries in the world were established in 1991 and 1992. The organs

of state power were reformed, armed forces were set up etc. We built the foundations of a new state and defined its philosophy.

It is very important that no blood be shed in Ukraine in international or other conflicts and that no guns be fired. Not a single Ukrainian mother shall blame me for sending her son to war, in the interest of who knows who.

What we did not manage to achieve? I was president of Ukraine for only three years. For a state such a tenure is just a short moment. To make serious social and economic improvements over so short a period is very difficult. However, the companies were working then, people received their salaries and pensions punctually.

Social and economic disintegration, unfortunately, happens very quickly, whereas changes for the better often take many years. But things have to be improved. There is no other way.

<sup>3</sup> The symbol of my life, as of the life of any person, is life itself. I would like it to be peaceful, rich, democratic, and civilised.

### Vyacheslav BRYUKHOVETSKYJ, president of the national university «Kyiv-Mohyla Academy»

<sup>1</sup> I am deeply convinced that Ukraine has become an independent state for the first time. Before now, there have only been shortly-lived attempts at creating an independent state.

debatable. More questions arise when the specialist looks at Podillya, often singled out as a singular historic and geographic region – corridor to the Romanian Danube region. The melting-pot character of the Nogai Steppe in the Azov and Black Sea regions, recolonized in modern times, is also indisputable.

Thus, this notion of the «original Ukrainian territory» – rather peculiar for a professional historian – can only be explained as a product of intellectual speculation aimed at strengthening the idea of «sobornist» – the idea of political and cultural unity of Ukrainians within the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empire that emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.<sup>2</sup>

What kinds of differences in interpretations follow from the above concept of «the original Ukrainian territory»? We can give many examples of scholarly debates about the interpretation of «the original territory» by means of «sobornist», and even more examples of attempts to use this interpretation for political purposes. But is it necessary? The adversaries of «sobornist» – the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires, and then the Soviet Empire – have all vanished, but we keep shouting quasi-scientific hundred-year old proofs that this territory is rightly ours, and not theirs. There is even an opinion

that the more such proofs you can find, the better you serve the noble case of the «revival» of «historical memory», so distorted in Soviet times. It was the Soviet school, however, that put into the mind of each Ukrainian pupil the map of Ukraine with its «original territory» in almost full entirety (although without the Kuban and Zakerzonnya, but with the Crimea).

Thus the problem of the hour is not to revive, but to reformulate the very idea of sacred national territory. The latter by definition cannot be too grand, or too degraded, or too overlaid with scientific argument, because «historical memory» is not equal to history as a science. It is a set of vivid symbols appealing not to «knowledge», but to irrational «emotion». And as concerns emotion, the role of Kyiv – the nucleus and the starting point of a nation – is obvious and does not require proof. After all, its initial canon was fixed in the era of the creation of early modern national ideology, i.e. in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. At that time, a much more flexible interpretation of «our land» was advanced – a dual entity that encompasses both a) the expanded territory within the Ukrainian settlement in that time – «where the language and the faith reach», and b) the hinterland and the heart of the nation – the Dnipro region with Kyiv at its center

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NATALIYA  
YAKOVENKO  
ABOUT  
«HISTORICAL  
MEMORY»  
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Or was the Kyiv Rus a state in the full sense of that word?

2 I could not name single dream of mine from the 90s that has not come true. Probably, I am twice as happy because I had no great illusions, knowing and understanding that it would be necessary to work a lot.

And the dissatisfaction we can nowadays observe in Ukrainian society is to a great extent due to the discrepancy between the economic expectations raised by some national-democratic politicians and the realities of life people find themselves in.

This is caused by a few fundamental facts which we must not take offence in. The thing is that coming out of that society, we are all ill. Our consciousness is distorted. This concerns not only partocrats but even the most daring dissidents, for both the partocrats and the dissidents are products of the Soviet epoch. The intolerance cultivated during the Soviet era is peculiar to all of us.

3 I feel dissatisfied with the present state of affairs both in the spiritual and in the material spheres. It hurts me that our young generation does not receive what it deserves. However, I think that this is a question of time. At the end of the end everything will fall into place. There are many examples in history. It took Prague 50 years to develop from a German-speaking city into a Czech-speaking one. When Spain had been freed from Arab rule, it took 200 years to reestablish proper Spanish. And we want Ukraine to return to its own language within ten years?

I think that for our state another process is important now. For myself, the symbol of our independence is football. In Soviet times only now and then, when Dynamo Kyiv were playing, two or three red-blue flags of the Soviet Ukraine would be seen at the stadium, in order not to be mixed up with the Russkys. Nowadays, 80,000 supporters, most of whom speak Russian, bring several thousand Ukrainian flags. Nobody forces them to bring these flags. The young people who bring them have grown up with them. And for me this is a very powerful symbol, because for these youngsters independent Ukraine is nothing exotic.

**Mykola PLAVYUK, head of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists**

1 The independent Ukrainian state is a huge value for me. It made it possible for me to return to Ukraine and become her citizen after 48 years abroad.

All that time I was politically active in the Ukrainian community and tied knots with political circles in countries of the Western world, proving to them that the Ukrainian nation, although enslaved by the communist centre in Moscow, deserves to have its own independent state.

2 I was absolutely certain that the Ukrainian nation would be able to develop in all directions in the resurrected Ukrainian state. My desire was to see the Ukrainian state really being governed by the people – with the active Ukrainian citizen as the source of power, in a truly European

(the «Rusian Land» of old chronicles). This is the area that the Cossack historian Samiylo Velychko called «the primordial homeland of ours that has shined with true and imperturbable faith since the time of Saint Prince Volodymyr of Kyiv, who enlightened Rus' with baptism». For Velychko, as for his predecessors, the source of piety was not merely the act of baptizing but the sacred antiquity of the «eternal city,» its mysterious force of attraction that even today exerts its force, the force of the unifying nucleus, on all members of Ukrainian society.

#### THERE IS NO «LAND» WITHOUT A GUARDIAN

Very schematically, the concept of the «Ukrainian History-Bible» can be summarized in the following sentence: a history of Ukraine is a history of the efforts of the Ukrainian ethnos to preserve itself in «strange» countries – to save itself, its material and spiritual culture, faith, and traditions from the conquerors. This concept can be expanded into several statements:

a) The Ukrainians have always (since the dawn of history) inhabited their own land, where they cultivated agricultural traditions and honored the faith of their ancestors – Christianity of the Greek rite. Among the peaceful peasant people, the deference and submission to a military aristocratic elite did not

take root. On the contrary, the yearning for communal self-governance with its ideas of equal rights and autonomy, which are the central ideas of the Ukrainian national aspirations, has prevailed. This is the idea that has survived over all those centuries, under all those various political and cultural circumstances;

b) The absence of natural borders (the «fatal geography») and aggressive neighbors destroyed the Ukrainian state and political life in its early stages, and the Ukrainian territory became the was seized as spoils by foreign invaders: Mongols, then Lithuanians and Poles, and then Russians.<sup>3</sup>

c) The necessity to defend Ukrainians from the its aggressive neighbor, the Crimean Khanate, gave birth to the Cossacks, who had settled on the borders of the Khanate Steppe. The only collective that was not under the control of foreign powers, the Cossacks continued to cultivate the idea of «sovereignty of the people.» After becoming stronger and expanding, Cossackdom entered the struggle for the political, social and national liberation of the Ukrainian people from «foreign powers». But the powers were too unequal. As a remedy, the protection of the Russian Tsar was accepted, which led to the dissolution of Cossack autonomy.

manner, with civilised relations between the organs of state power and the citizens.

Unfortunately, not enough has been done for me to be able to say that these dreams have come true. I am not saying that nothing has been done. On the contrary, I highly appreciate the achievements of the Ukrainian state in the international arena, the approval of the constitution, the establishment of various state structures which had not existed in Ukraine before. These unfulfilled dreams and desires, together with the cultural, scientific, social, and economic confusion, are, in my view, due to the fact that the political elite of present-day Ukraine consists predominantly of people of the past, who were educated according to Soviet standards and who do not know how to lead independent Ukraine as a European-style nation state.

<sup>3</sup> The resignation of the president of Ukrainian People's Republic in favour of president Leonid Kravchuk, becoming a Ukrainian citizen, and moving the OUN headquarters to Kyiv in 1999 symbolize interesting and positive events in my life during those years.

I regard the adoption of the Ukrainian constitution in 1996 as the greatest success in the development of our state. The onesidedness and complete subordination of the mass media either to state structures or to economic circles is a great threat to the Ukrainian state.

#### Oleksandr MOROZ, member of Parliament, head of the Socialist Party of Ukraine

1 As time goes by, more and more people in Ukraine lay claim on having sacrificed their lives or at least their health on the altar of independence and on having incessantly and for a long time raved about an independent Ukrainian state. It pays off to join these fighters and say, «So have I.» But no, I, for one, have not. I have always loved Ukraine in my own way, without pretending to be unique but not allowing anyone to lecture me about patriotism.

As it happened, Ukraine did not fight for its independence, it simply got it. People got it. I am one of them. Having been voted by people to represent them in the highest legislative organ, I understood how important it is to cope with this legacy. It became impossible to blame the centre, far away in Moscow, for the mistakes that were made. As soon as we had gained independence, all the good and bad decisions became our own decisions, i.e. to a great degree my own decisions, too. Therefore, as far as I am concerned, the value of the independent Ukrainian state is proportional to my own responsibility for what condition it is in and how it develops.

2 The state very nearly exists. I am saying this because there are so many shortcomings, so many sores on the social organism that I am ashamed to have my own people and strangers look at it. There were dreams about a modern state which would serve its citizens. But we got... The state behaves towards its citizens like an army of conquerors in

Now that we have briefly described the «historical memory» legitimized by Mykhailo Hrushevsky and even today unquestioned not only by common people but also by the majority of scholars, let's try to find the principal junctures where differences of interpretation appear.

Let us start with the initial statement. Is it true that the «democratic idea of equality and popular sovereignty» has been illuminating the aspirations of Ukrainians for all these centuries? Indeed, in the nineteenth century it did, though not for everyone, but only for a small segment of intelligentsia, fascinated by slogans of romantic idealism or, later, liberalism. From here, or more specifically, starting with the works of the Polish historian Joachim Lelewel, who greatly influenced the young Mykola Kostomarov, the search began for «proofs» of «popular sovereignty» that might be typical for Ukrainians, the most obvious example being Cossackdom.<sup>4</sup>

This vision has been illustrated to such an extent in Ukrainian historiography and so pervades fiction and art that every time when we hear the word «Cossack» we immediately see the half-naked democratic «brotherhood» busy writing a letter to the Turk Sultan. But if we go back a century or two before the liberal nineteenth century, I am afraid it is a waste of

time even to try finding people who shared the idea of «popular sovereignty.» This is true not only for those who ruled, but also for those who were ruled.

Since the position of those who rule is more or less obvious, let us try to find the endorsement of «democratic values» among the «silent majority of history» – the common people.

The «common people» have not left any written heritage. Thus we can reconstruct their «normative world» only with a help of indirect evidence.

As you know, Ukrainians do not have their own ethnogenetic legend (or they lost it after becoming Christian). There was no Prometheus that would have made us from clay like Greeks, or a god who would have shook his spear over the Ukraine, conceiving us as he did the Japanese. There was no she-wolf to help us survive like there was for the Romans, Mongolians or Turks. On the contrary, all the legends of ethnogenetic nature mention the strong and belligerent people who came, settled, and began to protect the weaker and non-belligerent people who were already there. This «parade of arrivals» interlaces with the common medieval idea of peoples settling in new territories in the search of a land promised them by God.

9



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occupied territory. The hopes of society and reality drifted apart, because reality is determined by a small circle of people, whose egotistical, mercantile interests often differ wildly from the interests of society and the state. There is also a wide range of objective and subjective reasons. They could be summed up in the words: we never had a state of our own. Unfortunately, we had no proper elite either. We have merchants in our temple. They can speak about lofty aims but their words do not come from their hearts. Thus, they cannot warm their hearts of the multitude. But this is what Ukraine really needs today.

3 The three successive majorities I have won in my voting district; the two campaigns as a presidential candidate I have taken part in; Ukraine's membership in the Council of Europe; the births of my three grandchildren; the publication of six books; the change of my hair colour.

### Vitali PORTNIKOV, journalist

1 The declaration of the independent Ukrainian state remains for me a wonderful illustration of an opportunity taken at the right moment. Neither the logic of the development of the national liberation movement nor the general atmosphere in society made it possible for us to declare our independence. However, we were helped the breakdown of the empire, which was provoked not only by its economic collapse but also by the resistance of the peoples of the Baltic states and the power struggle in Russia.

2 Of course, today's Ukraine is not the country we were hoping for in 1991 (then again, what were we hoping for?). Our mentality is still much closer to the Soviet zone than to Central Europe. Our elite is much rather a parody of Russia's than resembling Poland's or Hungary's. Our mass media still remain surprisingly provincial. Our economy is still degrading, never mind the optimistic promises of the authorities. Leonid Kuchma's regime has become a symbol of weak-willed and irresponsible autocracy allowing no alternatives to itself...

I could go on. But in fact, this is not important. What is important is the potential that was created by the very act of declaring independence. This potential will hardly be realized by the generation of our parents, which is in power today, or even by our generation. But we should not ignore that the young generation is growing up under the conditions of an open Ukraine, of new information technologies, and of common patriotism.

Even in comparison with other former Soviet republics, there have been quite a few positive developments in Ukraine: some sort of democracy and a multi-party system has appeared, an illusion of freedom of press has been created, a certain level of relations with the West is maintained, there are opposition politicians, journalists, even businesspeople, and even outside the prisons. Of course, under the existing conditions Ukrainian society will develop very slowly, rather in a «buffer zone» than in Europe,

Here this process started with Polyany, those people who, according to a twelfth century chronicler, «came and settled along the Dnieper» after the fall of the Tower of Babel and the dispersion of peoples. Later, a new cohort of belligerents appears – the Rus'. These new characters of unclear origin «liberated» the Polyany and their still wild neighbors from tribute to the Khazars<sup>5</sup> by making this tribute their own.

With this act, they secured something resembling the love of the whole nation, confirmed by the «great weeping of all the people» at the funeral of the heroic Oleh, who died after being stung by a viper.

Several more centuries pass – and the legends of the Sarmatians appear. According to these legends, the pedigree of the knighthood and the common people was founded by the sons of the forefather Noah: the former by Jafeth and the latter by Ham. As though after a long journey, the warlike descendants of Jafeth settled in the conquered lands of Ukraine-Rus' and Poland. In the process, the «Sarmatian tribe of Roksolans or Rusy» acquired Ukraine. The Ukrainian elite (or «Rus'» – as they called themselves then) thought that they were descendants of this tribe, «natural» defenders of peace, and authors of the well-being of the assimilated Roksolania.

The next characters in the «parade of arrivals» are Cossacks. Do their banners carry the slogans of «equal rights and popular sovereignty»? They do, but not for everyone, only for themselves – the warrior class. At first, these new «strong and belligerent» conquerors do not remember much about themselves – only that they are the «knights from the Jafeth's seed» (not Ham's but Jafeth's!) who conquered Constantinople together with «Oleh, King of Rus'» and were baptized together with «Saint Volodymyr the Great, King of Rus'». But in time the birth certificate acquired more details. Cossacks, after all, are the descendants of the «Scythian tribe of Khazars» that left Western Asia, came Ukraine through battle and conquest, settled here and after centuries assimilated into the «Russian (Ukrainian) people» as warriors, in the process changing their name from «Khazars» to «Cossacks». Cossack publicists of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries (i.e. when the canonical «historical memory» of the Cossacks was developing) distinguish two strata in the Russian population: the warriors (Cossacks of noble origin) and the common people («the rest of the Russians»). As in previous schemes of relations with the arriving heroes, the first were supposed to shed their blood defending their «very own land», while the second were

rather with a state-controlled economy than a real free market – but it will develop, it will drag along!

Can this process be speeded up? I am not a revolutionary and I do not think that any abrupt change or explosion or social revolt will result in rapid improvements. Any Ukrainian government, even a very reformatory-minded one, will have to deal with the lack of qualified staff, especially of qualified managers. It will be our task to make sure we will have qualifications in the future.

I have been observing the political processes going on in Russia for two decades and I can assert that we should be happy we have managed to break away, even if the fruits will only be enjoyed by future generations. Russian society will be struggling with its historical complexes for many generations and will regard these complexes as advantages... Over the years of imperial success a peculiar understanding of good and evil was created, which is reflected not only in the political or moral but also in the economic sphere. So whereas in Prague or Warsaw you ask yourself why we live the way we do, when you come to Moscow you sort of calm down... And when you go to the Russian provinces, you calm down for good...

Of course, this does not mean that we are much better off but I insist that the tendency is in favour of us. Things must work out and they will.

### Roman BEZSMERTNYJ, national deputy, representative of the President in the Verkhovna Rada

1 I cannot imagine separating the problem of independence from the problem my own existence as a person and a politician. What chances would a country school graduate have had to make it into parliament at 27 and become the representative of the President in parliament at 29, had it not been for the independence of Ukraine? In fact, it gave me the possibility to develop as a person and as a politician. All my achievements – intellectual, moral, and material – are to a great extent due to the independence of Ukraine. I am not an exception in this respect, this is true for about 30 per cent of the Ukrainian population.

2 I did not expect any great miracles because as a historian I was aware in 1990 that it would take at least 20 or 25 years to establish decent state institutions and that only then we would begin to climb towards a high level of social prosperity. Other than decent work, in which I could find self-fulfillment, I did not expect anything, and this is perhaps why I took the hurdles of the 90s quite easily.

The transformation from socialism to capitalism is achieved through a change of motivation. Today's Ukrainian society can be divided into two parts according to the motivational principle: the young, who will never return to the old system, and the elderly, who will never fully adopt this new motivation.

supposed to work and to feed the defenders, in awe of their munificent knightly way of life, defiance of death, spirited horse and sharp saber.

In this form, the «historical memory» of the Cossacks tested the age-old division of society into «people of war» and «people of work,» which had appeared long before Christianity and was then endorsed by its doctrine as the unquestionable will of God. But it is obvious that if the world is divided like this, there is not even the least bit of room for the «ideals of equality» that the new liberals dreamed about. Everything here is built on the rigid distribution of functions, wherein by the inscrutable will of God some people are born to fight, some to worship, and others to work; all of them must honor the ruler who is entrusted by God to guard «their land».

The extent of sovereignty in that «land» is the concern of the ruler, not his subjects. He is the one who carries the burden to decide which of the strongest lords will swear allegiance and which will go to war. The subjects do not care and, after all, their position is not influenced by these decisions. Of course, if the God-given dynasty dies out, they will feel like «orphans,» but later on they will recover.

That is all true because there is no «land» without a

guardian. Thus, the coming of a new dynasty meant for them not «foreign conquest», but merely a change in guardian, to whom they transfer their «loyalty» and «love» together with their oath (and if one doesn't like it he is free to leave in search of «another beloved lord»). One more thing to add is that the knighthood was not at all interested in the national origins of the rulers. Their strength and generosity, their fame and justice – these were the things that mattered.

So, as we can see, there is no point in referring to the uncompromising struggle with «alien powers», because this struggle is actually a conflict of interests within a class of warriors (or, to be more accurate, with its highest ranks) about choosing the most favorable master. After all, the classic example of how the «warrior class» chooses its patron is the seventeenth century Cossack revolution. The Cossacks rose in rebellion against the Polish king because he was not fulfilling his obligations to protect them from the magnates who coveted the «old knightly liberties» of the Cossacks. For several years, the highest ranks of Cossacks hesitated whom to choose – the Turkish Sultan or the Muscovite Tsar. After the death of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Ukraine was being torn apart by the civil war between advocates of different alignments – possibilities as to



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For seventy years the genetically and mentally efficient and productive population of Ukraine was educated to be a typical consumer. From 1991 to 1995 we kissed the consumer philosophy goodbye. And today parliament is no longer wasting money, which demonstrates that we are heading in a new direction.

3 I associate my life during those years not with symbols but with the people I was working with. I have been working in the president's team for four years, and although all kinds of things have happened, I am happy to be able to work with this man. It is evident that the little progress Ukraine has made is due to the president's active interaction with the state institutions, which he makes sure do not fall asleep.

### Yury BADZYO, former political prisoner

1 For myself, the independence of Ukraine is the essence of my whole life, my destiny as a citizen and as a person. In the 1970s, during the imperial rule of Russia in Ukraine, I publicly addressed the authorities, expressing my conviction that Ukraine should leave the USSR and that the Ukrainian nation had no future unless it created its own independent state.

Ukraine remains independent, Russia did not manage to swallow it up again. The symbols of the independent Ukrainian state have gained great significance, we have become more psychologically independent, the internal enemy – the revanchist «fifth column» – has been noticeably

weakened, the philosophical and economic base of the totalitarian ideology has been destroyed, a political framework has been created (a multi-party system, the foundations of parliamentarism and participation of the public) – all this gives rise to some degree of optimism. Only to some degree of optimism because the Ukrainian achievements are rather due to external pressures than due to our own efforts.

The weakness of the Ukrainian national revival is depressing, the power and ubiquity of bureaucracy is amazing, and so is the irresponsibility of the authorities, which results in the degradation of the productive and moral powers of society and in the impauperisation of a big part of the population contrasting with the luxurious life of the ruling cliques. Why did this happen? Because we were so thoroughly infected by the Russian communist occupation (if we consider only this period of Ukrainian history). Our people received their new independent state at a time when they did not have a full-fledged political elite of their own which would have been able to adequately understand the situation, control the circumstances, and create a viable historical process working in favour of the Ukrainian people.

2 What did I personally manage to achieve? I tried to intellectually grasp the situation. Unfortunately, my thoughts and conclusions did not find any adequate application in Ukrainian politics. But that is not my fault.

3 The Ukrainian declaration of independence, the

the new patron and master. And, for the last time, we can see the customary act of choosing a new patron in place of the one who did not keep his promises in the actions of Ivan Mazepa.<sup>6</sup>

For a long time Mazepa, as a true man of war, «was strong in his loyalty and ardently loved His Majesty the Tsar» (it is interesting that Pylyp Orlyk, who wrote these words, used the two words central to the knightly ethos – loyalty and love – as late as 1710). While contemplating the dangerous step, Mazepa, as a person who was «entrusted by the highest force to look after the land», starts by reporting his decision to «the omniscient God». Mazepa swears that he does it not for his own benefit but for the «common good of my motherland poor Ukraine» in his «power and reign». «The dear motherland» is the territory of the Zaporizhzhyan forces, and its «good» is the protection of Cossack liberties. Unlike his liberal descendants, the hetman does not yet suspect that the «pospolytyi lyud», i.e. the common people, may claim a part of this «good».

So which details out of the past, so interpreted, are likely to enter the «historical memory»? The details that everywhere and always were quickest to make their way into the nation's heart: chivalrous figures of heroic masters and their loyal and fearless vassals. The simplicity of the knightly ethics – loyalty,

bravery, honesty, fairness, irrational impulsiveness – easily turn such figures into symbols. How these symbols are interpreted in various circumstances depends upon the specific psyche of a cultured society. On the other hand, the «carnival» character of the knight, with that romantic flair around his deeds, easily becomes the «symbol of the nation», the embodiment of the «national fortune», thus strengthening the feeling of connection to the cultural experience. Actually, one of the most useful things to do now could be a series of practical efforts – textbooks, movies, literature, and so on – aimed at stopping Ukrainian boys from playing Texas rangers and getting them to play princes, «Sarmatians» and Cossack leaders, even if we have to hand missiles to them.

#### A NATION «WITHOUT A MASTER»

The principal obstacle to the above is the modernization of the past that started as a «historical tradition» in the nineteenth century and was taken to extremes in the twentieth. The idea that the «fundamental principle» of Ukrainian ethos is a «democratic principle» is based on the view of Ukrainians as a nation «without a master»<sup>7</sup>, or an agricultural nation (according to the logic of the twentieth century).

preparations for the referendum of 1991, and the impressive victory of 1 December. Later, the historical (national and political) behaviour of the Ukrainian people turned into a pretentious fuss camouflaging individual and corporate interests.

#### Heorhij KRYUCHKOV, national deputy, Communist Party

1 No doubt the independent Ukrainian state is a significant value, because this is my country and I want it to be independent and rich and to guarantee its citizens a normal life.

I do not want it to be dependent on anybody and I do not want it to be given any orders by anyone. I do not want America to dictate the president, the Ukrainian government, and our parliament what we are to do. Neither do I want the Russian president or anybody else to determine the policies of our state.

2 My hopes of the early 1990s have not been fulfilled at all, and for me personally this is a tragedy. I could not imagine that our economy would be destroyed and that our living standard would be so much lower than in the early 1990s. I did everything to open people's eyes to the destructiveness of the present political direction. I did not really succeed. I think that the hopes of the early 1990s have not been fulfilled because a regime has been set up in Ukraine which effectively opposes freedom of speech and freedom of

action. The turning point after which the present regime could appear was August 1991. At that time, the authorities could no longer guarantee normal development for the country and power was seized by nationalistic right-wingers who determined the further course of events in Ukraine.

3 One significant event, but a negative one, was the election of the first president as head of state, then of the second one, and later his reelection.

I do not see any positive events for Ukraine. For our state all these ten years have been a great tragedy, the size and consequences of which we have not yet fully realized. But we are still heading in the same direction and so I am sure that people will face even harder times.

#### Laryssa SKORYK, head of the International Economic Foundation, national deputy during the 12<sup>th</sup> convocation of the Verkhovna Rada

Over the centuries the Ukrainian nation paid too high a price for having no state of its own. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century we faced a sacramental question: to be a nation or not to be a nation. In the face of total colonial subjection, the decay of the Ukrainian language, mass extinction, dispersion, assimilation, the destruction of the spiritual institutions, and the perversion of national history, achieving state independence became the only way of national salvation for Ukraine.

Unfortunately, power was taken by people who, instead of patriotic intentions, strove for personal enrichment and

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The latter statement is well-founded if you remember that according to the census of 1897, 93% of the population were peasants, the state and administrative sector employed only 5,5%, and a mere 0,7% worked in trade. Accordingly, the Ukrainian language was a language of peasants, and almost all culture, with rare exceptions, was traditional peasant culture. According to the memoirs of Yevhen Chykalenko, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Kyiv boasted only eight intelligentsia families where Ukrainian was spoken:

the Antonovych, Hrinchenko, Kosach, Lyssenko, Lutsenko, Starytskyj, Chykalenko, and Shulhin families. The absolute domination of everything Ukrainian by Ukraine's peasant origins strengthened the position of intelligentsia. As romantics, they believed that «all power is in the people», but those people were enslaved and in the dark. The goal of the nationally conscious intelligentsia was to «revive» those people and to turn them into a «nation». Here the people are first of all peasants: according to Mykhailo Hrushevskyj «in the peasantry and only in the peasantry lies the Ukrainian renaissance and the future of Ukraine itself (...) Ukraine will arise only when this titan, thrown into the abyss of darkness, arises...»

Among other things, in the brochure «On the Threshold of

the New Ukraine» (Kyiv, 1918) M. Hrushevskyj argues against the «prophets of the super-culture» who in the wake of revolution «threatened Russian citizens» with the ghost of an «approaching savage» who would be given birth to by the masses. Unfortunately, these prophets turned out to be more long-sighted than the great scholar. Whatever details of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917-1921 we consider, whatever proportions or ratios of political or social forces we discuss, we have to agree that the main reason for its defeat was the uncontrollable peasant jacquerie – the mass riot that destroyed the romantic-liberal hope that the peasantry would become the bearer of the «Ukrainian future». Introducing the ideas of revolution into the ancient peasant lifestyle resulted in an explosion of brutality and violence, when the peasants answered any alien force (the metaphoric city) – old landowners, the Central Rada, the hetmans, the Germans, the Directory, or the Bolsheviks – with blind destruction or chaotic rebellion<sup>8</sup>.

As we know, in the end no peasants, no idealistic intelligentsia, no young Ukrainian political parties won the prize. The peasantry, which was assigned the role of the main ally of the proletariat, was dealt the very first blow. But at first it had to

never saw themselves separated from Russia. It was obvious for me that Russia, as the successor of the Soviet Union, would either not allow unwelcome persons to become president or remove them from power. All the more so because this is much easier to achieve with a single person than with a whole parliament.

I thought then and I still think now that if Leonid Kravchuk, under whose leadership the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada passed the resolution which prohibited all activities of the Communist Party in Ukraine, had remained speaker of the Rada and if there had not been any presidential elections at all, a lot of things would be different in Ukraine...

When late in 1993 during the adoption of the election law there were heated debates in the Verkhovna Rada about majority and proportional voting, I gave from the rostrum another, very concrete definition of the principle according to which future elections would be conducted in Ukraine: money. And that is what has happened. Those who have the money have the power.

**Hennadij UDOVENKO**, national deputy, head of the Narodnyj Rukh of Ukraine, former president of the UN General Assembly

<sup>1</sup> For me, as for any other citizen, Ukraine is a state which I respect, and I also take an active part in its development as a party leader and national deputy.

<sup>2</sup> Personally, I have managed to achieve a lot during this

time. I was permanent representative of Ukraine at the United Nation, then I was additionally appointed deputy foreign minister so that, being in New York, I could negotiate the establishment of diplomatic relations between Ukraine and other countries. Then I was the first Ukrainian ambassador to Poland, where I could do a lot for the development of Polish-Ukrainian relations. When I was foreign minister, treaties of co-operation were signed with all our neighbours – with Byelarus', Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Moldova. Ukraine became a member of the European Council, a treaty of special partnership between Ukraine and NATO and many other documents which I can be proud of were signed.

Then I was elected a member of parliament, became fraction leader and head of the Narodny Rukh of Ukraine. Now I am doing a lot for the ideas of the pioneers of our independence to be put into practice.

There are many reasons why today's reality is so far removed from the hopes of that time. The main reasons is that we inherited the Soviet economy after its collapse. The second reason is that Russia, on whose economy we are still dependent, immediately raised the prices of oil and gas, which led to hyperinflation. The third reason is that we have been unable to run our own country. We did not have people who were qualified to do so. Those who rose to power turned out to be unable to govern a state, they were afraid of independence.

be cleansed of well-to-do landowners, the carriers of «counter-revolution and thuggery,» who on the eve of the revolution made up more than 42% of peasant landowners in Ukraine (30% of moderate means and 12% «kurkuli»). In 1927, after the redistribution of gentry lands, the proportion of medium income households increased to 65%. The confiscations of the so called «excesses» were not easy from the start. In 1919, the Soviet commissar Shlichter wrote in his memoirs that «every pood of the grain we were able to store up was stained by blood». But the true bloodshed had not yet begun.

In December 1927, the Fifteenth Communist Party Congress (VKP(b)) announced the collectivization that in 1929 resulted in the «Great Turn», when it became forced and widespread, by the spring of 1930 hitting about 3,2 million peasant households. Many families were deported to Northern Russia. From 1929 to 1932 about 200,000 households were wiped out in this manner. As a result, the areas suitable for sowing were reduced by one-fifth, and the most productive cohort of workers was lost. As for children, the ill and the elderly, they perished in masses in the process of deportation. Roughly one-third out of the 850,000 deported peasants died. The amount of marketable grain crop was reduced dramatically, but the plan

for producing grain for the newly established collective farms increased by 44%.

The «battle for grain» was proclaimed a «battle for socialism». This meant that all the harvest was supposed to be expropriated from the storage of the collective farms, and since it was not enough, the rest had to be taken from the «kurkuli parasites». This was the preamble to one of the most horrific events in the Ukrainian history – the «Holodomor» or Great Famine of 1932-1933.

In autumn 1932, the grain-collecting commission of Molotov-Kahanovych arrived in Kharkiv. It announced that there were whole regions of «malicious saboteurs». Fences were put up to encircle these regions, and military troops confiscated the grain. In the mass expropriation they were taking away all the food. It was not only about grain anymore – it became a question of life and death<sup>9</sup>. The tragedy peaked in the winter of 1932-1933. Whole villages were dying out. There were numerous cases of starvation psychosis and cannibalism. No one counted the Holodomor victims. Very roughly, their number is 5 million according to Robert Conquest, 3-3,5 million according to Stanislav Kulchytskyj, and 4 million according to Arnold Perkovskyj.

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### Oleksandr BAZYLYUK, head of the Slavic Party

1 The desire by all means to separate from Russia and to immediately achieve the status of a «European state» resulted in catastrophe. First of all, the Ukrainian economy could not handle the breakdown of the highly integrated economic complex of the USSR. In addition to that, we heavily relied on our processing industry, which existed at the expense of cheap Russian energy sources. Our economy was absolutely unprepared for the transition from protected prices to world-market prices. In the end Ukraine lost the Soviet consumer market, and the strategies of the new leadership, aiming at a quick entrance to the world market, turned out to lack a proper foundation.

Today we are a country of the third world, and there are no independent states in the third world. Practically, Ukraine is ruled from Washington and Strasbourg. And international financial centres such as the IMF and the World Bank control not only Ukraine's economy but also its politics.

The living standard of the Ukrainian population has almost reached zero-level, all levels and sections of society have been infected by ubiquitous criminality.

The long years of experimenting with independence, which have relegated us to the backyard of the world, should help us to learn one important lesson: the weak and defenseless have always been beaten up, and all the more in today's world. Thus, Ukraine will find real independence

only in a commonwealth of Slavic peoples and states, with Russia, Byelarus', and other historical allies.

2 My hopes of the early 90s were to do with democracy. The were not fulfilled because our incipient democracy turned into a plutocracy which uses its electoral procedures as fig leaves.

3 A sad symbol of these years are the garbage cans with old people and children wallowing in them. A more optimistic one comes to the fore when people do not withdraw into themselves but join us to work and struggle.

### Vasyl SHKLAR, writer

2 The national dream has not come true and neither has mine. But we should not palter with the truth: a lot has been achieved. We have, as it were, reached the level of the bees, which are said to distinguish only between two colours, blue and yellow. But this does not stop them from flying to crimson thistles. Now we can hope that one day, like the bees, we will learn to create a queen bee. Our inability to do this right now is the reason for the discrepancy between the present situation and our expectations.

Personally, I have managed all these years not become involved in politics, business, charlatantry, etc. I used all my strength to remain Ukrainian, and such a goal does not leave any energy for anything else.

This inhumane accord concluded the «peasant era» in the history of Ukraine. The peasantry, stripped of its property, bled dry by deportations, and broken by collectivization, was no longer suited for the role of the carrier of «historical tradition».

What also vanished were the hypothetical «civic instinct» that the «narodolyubtsi» of the nineteenth century considered to be a central virtue of the Ukrainian peasant, as well as one of the foundations of Ukrainian tradition – the symbolism of the peasant, agricultural worldview. Since «the Great Turn,» the life of the peasantry has been defined not by the farmer's point of view, but by the ability to mimic, to painlessly adopt imposed behavioral norms while waiting for the «trouble» (collective farms, taxes, reorganization, «perestroika», independence, de-collectivization) to pass.

As for a peasant motif in the current formula of «historical memory», it can be found as a nostalgic sentence out of Soviet ideology or as a rhetorical slogan of post-Soviet left ideology; in either case it is not the messianic role of the peasantry as in the nineteenth century. In general, it seems as if the baby has been thrown out with the bath water. It is clear that the «silent majority of history» has been crossed out of the canon of «historical memory». The farming life is not too rich with plots that

can easily be turned into striking symbols, but it is filled with the drama of submission and muteness. The suffering hero is a potent symbol too, one that is able to stir people and evoke compassion. Perhaps this symbol can become the emotionally triumphant «role» of the peasantry in the «historical memory» of Ukrainians.

#### «IRON KNIGHTS» VERSUS «SWINE-HERDS»

Not all the cultured intelligentsia worshipped the peasantry as an «emanation» of the «Ukrainian idea». Born on the turn of the twentieth century, the idea of elitism became the alternative to the populism that dominated the Russian Empire in that time. It was refined by Russians as well as by the residents of Galicia. It is true that Ukrainians in the Austro-Hungarian Empire did not feel themselves condemned to village reservations. Before the First World War there were 3,000 Ukrainian elementary schools and 6 state and 15 private gymnasiums. There were ten Ukrainian departments at Lviv University. The Shevchenko Scientific Society published about 800 volumes of scholarly works. Nonetheless, the intellectuals of Galicia were been fighting the apolitical (pro-peasantry) «love of the people» movement with the same eagerness as their colleagues from the Middle Dniپر region.

15



NATALIYA  
YAKOVENKO  
ABOUT  
«HISTORICAL  
MEMORY»  
AND «HISTORICAL  
TRADITIONS»  
OF UKRAINIAN  
PEOPLE

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Leonid FINBERG, director of the Institute of Jewish Studies, editor of the journal «Dukh i Litera»

1 Possibly, as an ethnic Jew and Ukrainian citizen, I feel the burden of having no state of their own, which these two peoples had to carry in history, very sharply and twice over. The Holocaust and the Holodomor, Babyn Yar and Chernobyl have convinced me that a nation without its own independent state has no instrument of self-preservation. It has no structures which work towards social consolidation and no mechanisms of decision-making, it is unable to defend itself in times of danger.

Of course, tragedies are not unknown to nations with their own state. However, they are much more often the subjects of history than its objects in such situations.

I very well understand that the way from the declaration of independence to actual independence is long and hard. But who says that the survival of a nation is an easy thing? Many historical nations do not exist on today's geographical map. But destiny has given the Ukrainians a chance, and I think not at the worst historical moment.

Oleksandr LAVRYNOVYCH, national deputy

1 If a person does not feel their roots, they cannot fully develop and succeed. Already in Soviet times, I felt that I would necessarily have to be a citizen of Ukraine, not of the Soviet Union. From 1987 onwards, I took part in various

illegal, and only later on legal, forms of activity. I am proud that as the deputy leader of the Narodnyj Rukh of Ukraine, in October 1990 at the 2<sup>nd</sup> congress of the Narodnyj Rukh, I proposed an amendment to the statutes, according to which the national independence of Ukraine was defined as the main goal of the Narodnyj Rukh.

2 The hope that we would have an independent state has been fulfilled. Ukraine has become quite well-known throughout the world. Unfortunately, however, she is paid attention only in a few contexts. Now we can express our thoughts freely, but standing up for our principles is sometimes a dangerous thing to do. People can realize themselves, though not always fully.

There are so many things which have not come true, I could go on for ages. First of all, our hopes for quick structural and economic changes. Why are we fully dependent on the energy resources of one single country, why is our agrarian sector neglected, why do we have the tax system we have?

Yevhen SVERSTYUK, head of the Ukrainian Pen Club, former political prisoner

1 Ukrainian independence came in through the wrong door, it fell into the wrong hands and was sanctified by the the wrong hands. That is why it contains an element of parody. However, independence as such is a value which will be purified and enriched. In pitch dark Siberian nights hundreds of thousands

At the turn of the twentieth century, elitism as an antithesis to populism started to appear practically everywhere: in fiction, motifs of liberation and the individual that have something in common with Nietzsche ideas of the «super man»<sup>10</sup>; in the «riot» of young «naddnipyantsi» who founded the belligerent «Taras Brotherhood» in 1890 in Kharkiv as a counterweight to Kyiv Old Hromada (i.e. society). In 1900, one of these «brothers» would publish the brochure «The Independent Ukraine». This elitism also appeared in a group of «young radicals» of Galicia. One of them, Julian Bachyns'kyj, in 1895 composed a brochure «Ukraina Irredenta» («Unliberated Ukraine»), in which he declared that political independence was the final condition not only for the economic and cultural development of Ukraine, but for its very existence. In 1901, Longin Tsehelsky published a brochure entitled «Rus' is Ukraine, and Moskovshchyna is Russia», where the readiness of heroes to sacrifice their lives for the independence of Ukraine was articulated for the first time. In order to better understand the European connections and the future radicalization of young minds (Ukrainian irredentism), we have to remember that irredentism (the political movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Italy) merged with fascism after

the First World War. Crossing the threshold of the iron century of totalitarian ideologies, young Ukrainian intellectuals breathed the air of the same crises of old values as throughout Europe, and were infected by the same virus.

In this context, the appearance of the work of Vyacheslav Lypynsky on the eve of First World War is no coincidence. Here was an individual who changed the understanding of Ukrainian history. He proclaimed that the goal of the historic existence of every ethnic community was not the striving of the masses for the «rights of the people», but the state, because «there is no citizenry without organization and authority, but only a scattered crowd of slaves that does not understand itself and, indeed, hates itself». Only a «leading force» that is disciplined, well-organized and self-sacrificing – not populist idea – will be able to lead the stateless masses of Ukrainians to victory. The main role of this «leading force» is to direct the spontaneous movement of the lower layers of the population that, without the leadership of the elite, only creates anarchy and is «destructive» by nature.<sup>11</sup>

In the second decade of the twentieth century (V. Lypynsky died in 1931), academics and indeed the majority of the intelligentsia expelled from Soviet Ukraine were contemplating

of Ukrainians kept praying to God for freedom and independence. And independence is a great value for them even under the present conditions, when the state takes care not of them but of the judges who sent them to Siberia.

2 Finally, bugging and shadowing are things of the past. The dream about a life without state escort has come true. So has the dream about freedom of speech and freedom of conscience, about freedom of communication and freedom of movement. And most important of all, freedom from the totalitarian lie enforced by the Kremlin, which infested all generations with its black energy of hopelessness with its instructions for enslavement, and which waged a war against people, against individuality.

I had no particular hopes for a happy life: I did not expect people to suddenly redefine themselves and to be young and optimistic. But things are getting brighter...

Oleksandr MAJBORODA, head of the Department of Ethnic Political Studies of the Institute of Political and Ethnic Research at the Ukrainian National Academy of Science

1 The need for freedom cannot be rationally explained. It is a subconscious necessity.

2 No doubt, there have been changes for the better. At least the external attributes of democracy have appeared – a new wineskin ready to be filled with young wine. Since printing facilities are now privately owned and financially

independent, both communists and non-communists can be printed. Debates may not be conducted very properly, but their very existence triggers public reflection.

Essentially, nothing has changed. In the early 90s we were dreaming about a fundamentally new way of life. Perhaps everybody desired changes first of all in their own sphere. For example, historians were dissatisfied because their superiors were appointed «from above». We wanted true devotees of science to become our bosses, we did not want the highest academic positions to be appendices to posts in the nomenclatura or just some sort of cosy job. In fact, whereas this had episodic character in Soviet times, it is now becoming becoming general practice. We changed the circumstances, but we did not change ourselves. They did not change either, but they adapted to the new circumstances. This, in fact, is the result of our ten-year development.

Stepan KHMARA, national deputy of the 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> convocations of the Ukrainian parliament, former dissident

1 No nation can realize itself without a state of its own.

Unfortunately, however, the problem of our state is that it is governed by powers with are essentially un-Ukrainian, opposed to the interests of the people, and destructive. A nation without a proper leader, without an elite, is like a herd of cattle. Ukraine is not independent. Nor is it moving

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the reasons for the defeat of the national revolution. The metaphoric answer can be found in a brochure that was republished in Vienna in 1920 «Ukraine on the Brink»: just as after the death of Bohdan Khmelnyts'kyj, Cossack Ukraine lacked the «iron arm of a hetman» and was swamped by destructive anarchy, so in the throes of the recent revolution, Ukraine lacked that disciplined «leading force» able to give the blast of ideas that turns nations without a state into nations with a state. Just as the «unwise descendants» of Bohdan pinned the national cause to «Zaporizhzhya, beautiful and romantic but destined for death,» the players of the recent revolution ruined it by linking themselves to «Haidamatsky destruction and every kind of anti-state, anarchistic, anti-cultural and chaotic insurrection.»

V. Lypyns'kyj did not get a lot of support for his pro-monarchy and pro-hetman political views, but his concept of a «disciplined leading force» and an «iron arm» as prerequisites for creating a Ukrainian state found adequate response in Galicia, which was bitter from defeat after having been annexed by Poland. Moreover, the Galicians blended well with the general Central and Eastern European *Zeitgeist*, and had something in common with the slogans of the opponents of

Lypyns'kyj, first and foremost the spokesperson of nationalism Dmytry Dontsov, whom Lypyns'kyj openly hated.

The main elements of Dontsov's theory, most fully set forth in his work «Nationalism» (1926), are the cult of «will» and «direct action» that the heroes of nation must affirm in preparing for the future battles for independence. According to D. Dontsov, only the totalitarian elitist model of the nation reflects its biological vitality personified by «saint knights» who are able to sacrifice themselves and lead «millions of swine-herds». The extremism of this doctrine was able to find a home. After the defeat of efforts at liberation as an opposition movement on the interwar Polish political scene, which was in constant crisis, the youth saw Dontsov's slogans «as a broken siege, as a renewed ability to move after a long paralysis,» in the words of Yevhen Malanyuk.

Thus, the turning point of the evolution of the «Ukrainian Idea» that began at the turn of the twentieth century with the «riot of young radicals» against apolitical populism reached its apogee. The maximal goal of creating a Ukrainian state would soon turn to the practical plan that would start with founding in 1929 of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). Within one year, OUN was already organizing a series of

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towards independence. What kind of state is this, if its security is not guaranteed, if the authorities do not take appropriate measures to guarantee national security? What justifies the absence of a decent border with our so-called strategic partner, who wants to revert us to dependency, or the presence of troops of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which in fact controls the south of Ukraine, i.e. a strategic part of our territory. Besides, our dependency on foreign energy resources leads to political and economic dependency, which makes it impossible for Ukraine to become a really independent state.

2 In terms of law, Ukraine has become a state. I have contributed to this process as one of the authors of the Declaration of State Sovereignty, as the author of the enactment which allowed Ukrainian young men to serve in the armed forces only on the territory of Ukraine, and I was the author of the decree which prohibited the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and nationalized its property.

I hope that Ukraine will gain its actual independence. But we will have to fight for it, everybody will have to take part in civic activities.

3 The Declaration of State Sovereignty was a revolutionary step. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian revolution has subsided and turned into a criminal one.

Slava STETSKO, national deputy, leader of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists

1 I am convinced that individuals, families, and the whole nation can only develop in an independent state. I am one of those people who will not be happy until they see their state independent and the people free and happy. I was a member of the nationalist movement, I was brought up in this organization, my husband was one of the movement leaders and head of the government in 1941. I grew up in the struggle for national independence, worked for the international anti-Bolshevik coalition, maintained contacts with nationalists of various countries.

On 30 June 1991 I came back to Ukraine and began work. I saw a terrible difference between the east and the west of Ukraine. The east of Ukraine had for 300 years been under Russian, later under Communist occupation. The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists wants to mobilize all powers in order to spiritually unite the east and the west of Ukraine. The west is more organized, more similar to Europe, but the east has a great many ideas and it is able to keep its position. Only by joining the east and the west will Ukraine be able to gain real independence and become a truly European country. I think in two generations Ukraine will become a European-style state.

2 Unfortunately, Ukraine has not yet become the state which those who fought for it were dreaming about. Yes, we did fight for independence. We wanted people to be rich

terrorist acts against Poland and would continue in the same vein until the beginning of the World War II. In 1941, OUN-UPA declared war against anyone threatening the Ukrainian state (enemy #1 – the USSR, #2 – Poland, #3 -Germany), and fought with admirable self-sacrifice, embodying the first commandment of Nationalist Decalogue: «You will achieve a Ukrainian State or die in the battle for it».

The motif of the opposing «knights» and «swine-herds» was not omitted either: a «strong spirited» people ruled by the higher idea of the nation and state compared to the life of a single person would have no doubts about which methods to use in order to revolutionize the masses, leaving villages without food, carrying out repression and terror toward innocent people, threatening the weak and the powerless.<sup>12</sup>

There is no need to talk about opposing interpretations of the actions of OUN – UPA: they still divide Ukraine into «easterners» and «banderivtsi», but they will probably pass away together with the «actual memory», i.e. with the generations that experienced the bloody conflict themselves or through loved ones. Obviously, only then will the time come when we will be able to speak without emotion about the role of the «saintly knights» of interwar or postwar nationalism in

Ukrainian «historical memory.» Then this role will not be associated with the fate of people whom we knew personally, but with heroic sacrifice and the great/blind tragedy of self-dedication.

#### DOOMED DECADES

The self-sacrifice of heroes and the despair of innocent victims from among common, unheroic people – these are the leading motifs of the century that is slipping into history. They paint our «actual memory» in the colors of death. They began with a revolution awaited by the liberal intelligentsia as a herald of happiness and freedom, but concluded with bloody terror and the deaths of millions.

As we know, the death of a single person is a tragedy, and the death of thousands of people is a statistic – but not many families in Ukraine remained untouched by such statistics. Let us honor in the language of numbers the loss of people that was started by the «revolutionary terror» in 1918-1919, continued by the Holodomor and the liquidation of the opposition in the early thirties, «the Great Terror» in 1938, German atrocities in 1941–1943 and the losses of Soviet Army, and completed with the repression in Galicia in the forties. The actual

and happy and to be able to develop spiritually, to believe in God, to have a church to go to and pray in. Unfortunately, the enormous problem of mass unemployment has not been resolved, girls are taken abroad and forced into prostitution. Scientists cannot set up in their profession and become traders.

The Ukrainian state exists but its politicians and officials speak mainly Russian, ignoring their own language. This is a lack of self-respect, of respect for our language and our nation. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian people did not come to power in their own country. Maybe this is why there are so many unresolved problems.

#### Mykola KULCHINSKYJ, national deputy

1 Many Ukrainians struggled and perished for our independence, among them some members of my family. Independence has been the aim of my life. Ukraine is the only place where Ukrainians can realize themselves fully. There is no other such place in the world, and independence has the power to release the Cossack Spirit of our nation.

2 We thought that in independent Ukraine, Ukrainians would be people. Nobody thought that the first president of Ukraine would be a former Communist, that people would be more afraid of the Ukrainian police than of criminals, that it would become normal for unwelcome politicians and journalists to disappear or be assassinated, that the Ukrainian language would provoke scornful smiles in fashionable

establishments, that former KGB members would be held in greater respect than Ukrainian Rebel Army fighters.

Despite the policies of the government, the process of national self-realization is gaining momentum, the determination of Ukrainians to occupy a fitting place in their state is developing.

#### Tatyana METELYOVA, editress-in-chief of the newspaper «Independent Ukraine»

1 Being an independent state is a necessary but insufficient condition for establishing the rule of law and democracy in Ukraine and to make it impossible to re-create the totalitarian regime of the USSR. This is the first point.

And the second one is that regardless of my ethnic origin I am Ukrainian. It is by no means the same to me whether my native community is the master of its own land or whether it remains subjected to another community and has to repudiate its ego, conforming its life to rules made by somebody else.

2 The hopes for a normal, democratic, civilized life, for a chance to focus on my own professional work without digressing to political struggles and civil-rights activities have not been fulfilled. I would really like to just write, do research, create philosophical works. But I cannot. In a country where any specialist, from scientists to businesspeople, are doomed to moral and physical degradation, you have to be involved in politics.

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number of victims of the early, «revolutionary» terror is impossible to count, because the famine of 1921 -1922 came immediately after that, taking five million lives in the territory of the former Soviet Empire. Instead of numbers we have only the idea that directed «the punishing sword of revolution» towards the extermination of the «bourgeois classes».<sup>13</sup>

There is also sporadic evidence as to the range of the terror. Thus, as known from the report of the Russian Red Cross nurses to the headquarters in Geneva, in the two weeks after Muravyov's army entered Kyiv about five thousand people were killed. From one of Muravyov's orders we can clearly see the essence of what was happening. It read: «We are bringing this order from the far North on the edges of our bayonets. And in the places we install it, we support it by the strength of these bayonets».

According to estimates of M. Maksudov, between 1927-1938 in the continuous campaigns to exterminate the opposition and potential opponents, direct losses caused by repression in Ukraine (without the Holodomor) were more than 4 million people. Most of the repression affected people younger than 50, especially men, of whom about 15% of died. In general, about 80% of intelligentsia was lost during that bloodstained

decade. The very life of any person, artistic or regular, party member or not, boss or employee, was hanging over the abyss of an uncertain tomorrow, the unknown «fate».<sup>14</sup>

No one spoke about immediate guilt and no one tried to prove it. During the search in the house of the uncle of the author of this article, Ivan Nestorovych Aprod, director of a village school in Mykolaiv Oblast, only his passport was taken, as was stated in the order for the search that the family still possesses. This did not save the life of the young teacher. He was killed in the spring of 1938.

This was Ukraine on the brink of World War II – emasculated, scared, feeling doomed. That is why the population greeted the coming of Germans in various ways, but generally not with hostility. The people hoped that it would not be much worse than before (besides the mass murder of political prisoners and the senseless destruction of property, the retreat of the Soviet army was also accompanied by the so-called «scorched earth policy».

As for nationally conscious intellectuals who were spared forced evacuation to the East, they hoped that Hitler might help to revive Ukrainian state<sup>15</sup> in order to destroy the Bolsheviks. Very soon it became clear that these hopes were just illusions.

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The inevitable occurred: the totalitarian system broke down (and this event alone was worth living for), there is the independent Ukrainian state (which is, unfortunately, mauled and instable) and some degree of professional self-realisation.

### Stepan HAVRYSH, Head Deputy of the Verkhovna Rada

3 Doubtless, the key event for myself was the creation of the majority in our parliament due to which I was elected Head Deputy of the Verkhovna Rada. One can call this an egotistical feeling, but I do not separate myself from society and I think the event has proved that more pragmatic professionals, who want to use all their potential for the development of the state, come to power.

The election of Leonid Kuchma was a key event too. It has confirmed the course of Ukraine towards integration with western Europe.

Finally, we have normal relations between the governmental departments, which enables us to find new approaches to the solution of many problems.

### Yevhen PRONYUK, head of the Ukrainian Association of Political Prisoners and Repressed Persons, national deputy of the Verkhovna Rada of the 13<sup>th</sup> convocation

1 Ukrainians did not only dream about independence and freedom, they also fought for it. More than half a million Ukrainian political prisoners died in Nazi concentration camps alone. In the Soviet epoch, about 20 million Ukrainian lives were lost (in prisons, concentration camps, special settlements, and the Holodomory, not counting the loss of lives in the war of 1941-45), three million of them being political prisoners.

The last Ukrainian political prisoner was freed in April 1991. So Ukrainian freedom was bought dearly.

2 I was the founder of the first free party, the Ukrainian Republican Party. On 3 June 1989, despite the actions of the KGB, the Ukrainian Association of Political Prisoners and Repressed People was created. As of today, our hopes for seeing a rich, great, powerful Ukraine with prosperous, creative Ukrainians in it have not been fulfilled. The reasons are as follows:

First, the powerful nomenclatura, which officially follows the policies of the Ukrainian state but for various reasons hampers the transition of Ukraine into European civilization.

Second, the lack of consolidation among the patriotic forces.

Third, the absence of lustration laws concerning the

The initiators of a self-proclaimed Ukrainian state, declared in L'viv on June 30, 1941, were arrested and sent to a concentration camp. A military-administrative zone was created in Ukraine (with the exception of Galicia); it was called the «Ukrainian Reichskommissariat» and was headed by Erich Koch, who started his reign by repressing nationalists. By the beginning of December the Germans had arrested 720 people, the majority of whom were killed. At the same time all civic organizations, publishing houses, and most theaters and newspapers were closed.

By the beginning of fall 1941, the German policy had already become racist. According to Hitler's plan, some Ukrainians were to be exterminated, others to be enslaved for the benefit of the Aryan race (Goering thought that all Ukrainian males older than 15 should have been killed). Following this mad plan, in the first several months of war special Sondercommandos exterminated about 500,000 people, mostly Jews. On the two bloodstained days of September 29 and 30, 1941, 33,700 Jews were killed at Kyiv's Babyn Yar. Here over 100,000 people were killed during the period of occupation; the shootings were carried out methodically every Tuesday and Friday in a truly German fashion. Besides Jews, whole

groups of people had to be «cleansed»: communists, gypsies, the mentally ill, etc. We know of more than 250 places in Ukraine where people were killed en masse. About 1,4 million prisoners of war perished in 180 temporary concentration camps.

According to official data about 5,5 million civilians died in the three years of occupation. 2,5 million soldiers were killed on the front lines. All together, it was one-fourth of the population. The military actions took place throughout Ukrainian territory; about 700 cities and more than 28,000 villages were destroyed. The correspondent of the newspaper «Saturday Evening Post» wrote after his trip to Ukraine, «What someone tries to present as «Russian glory» was first of all a Ukrainian war».

Thus, in less than 40 years Ukraine had to pay for its «bright stars and calm waters» with nearly 16 million lives of citizens who were tortured, shot, or who died from famine. Unfortunately, they proved to be attractive for the Bolshevik and fascist regimes that fought for the privilege to decide the fate of the Central and Eastern European nations.<sup>16</sup>

With such a grand total Ukraine entered the aftermath of the war, and, indeed, the present. As for the memory acquired in the darkness of the recent decades, it is still bleeding too much to turn it into the symbols of «national historic memory»

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Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of Ukraine and the fact that no elections to the Verkhovna Rada and to the local governing institutions were held in 1992.

Fourth, the new Moscow-oriented clans of the nouveaux riches and the financial sharks.

Finally, the old imperialistic plans which Moscow is still cherishing with regard to Ukraine.

### Oleksandr JEMETS, national deputy

1 Absolutely yes. I cannot explain why. Who has not experienced true love does not know what true love is.

2 Of course, today's reality does not correspond to the dreams of 1988 and 1989. But if I had been told in 1988 that in two or three years Ukraine would have gained its independence, I would not have believed it. I thought it would take twenty years. Ukraine was lucky with the events of August 1991 and other things which enabled it to gain its independence so quickly.

Unfortunately, we did not manage to fully put into practice the idea of democracy. It was beyond our powers. At that time independence was appreciated only in the Kyiv and Galychyna regions. Later, however, people changed their minds...

Of course, we were disappointed with the political and economic reforms. We suffered from a lack of knowledge, the way we interpreted things in 1989 was somewhat primitive, and so we were losing. The reason for the slow

reforms lies within ourselves. There are no generations in Ukraine which remember what private property and market economy are.

3 The major landmarks are, perhaps, the semi-democratic elections to the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, the enactment for Ukrainians to serve in the armed forces only within the territory of Ukraine, the law of economic independence, the Declaration of State Sovereignty, and the Constitution of Ukraine. For me personally — the fact that I have been elected to the Verkhovna Rada three times.

and other things loved so much by civilized European society. The ashes of Klaas are beating on our hearts, the ashes of Klaas that are unknown to the uninitiated. And only when time scatters it with the wind, when the last of us, who choked listening to the stories about «hunger», dies, and only when the great-grandson of a UPA member doesn't care that the most beautiful girl in his university class is the great-granddaughter of the man from the NKVD who «cleansed» his village, only then will the time of impartial intellectuals have come. And they will find a place for those «fatal decades» in the «historic tradition» of Ukrainians. Or else they will propose that we simply forget them, because some people say that the happiest are those nations that do not care about their history. For now, that is not us.

<sup>1</sup> «History of Ukraine-Rus» by M. Hrushevskij <...> not only substantially advanced the cultural consciousness of our people, but also has been crystallizing the forms of our life and politics, explaining and creating feelings of common material and spiritual interests in the whole Ukrainian territory, both past and present. Through his work the author gave his people the strongest weapon that could be given». Vasyl Herasymchuk. «Mykhailo Hrushevskij as a Ukrainian Historiographer», Lviv, 1922

<sup>2</sup> «The one, united, indivisible Ukraine» from the Carpathians to the Caucasus [...] All those throughout Ukraine who are not with us are against us». Mykola Mihnov-skyj, «The Independent Ukraine», 1900

<sup>3</sup> The perception of Ukrainian history as a history-martyrology was created about hundred years before Hrushevskij by the anonymous author of «The History of Rusy», «...This country was, as it were, created or doomed to become ruined by numerous alien invasions and even more numerous raids and battles with neighboring peoples or, finally, by continuous feuds among themselves, lived through all kinds of devastation, waste and burn. It is imbrued by blood and covered by ashes...»

<sup>4</sup> «The Cossacks with their camaraderie rebelled in the same way against noble «panstvo» and «shlyakhetstvo». With their equality and hatred of written norms, they did not accept any rights besides that of the free council (the old «viche»), which are the revived and transformed signs of the old Rus». Mykola Kostomarov, «The Southern Rus at the end of XVI century», Kharkiv, 1842.

<sup>5</sup> «Passing by, they saw the town on the hill and asked, «Who does this town belong to?». And they (the inhabitants) said, «Three brothers – Kyj, Shchek and Khoryv made this town and left. We are sitting in their town and paying the tribute to the Khasars. So Askold and Dir, two of them were left in this town, and gathered many Variags, and acquired the land of Polyany». «Russian Chronicle by Ipaty Manuscript», about 862.

<sup>6</sup> «(Mazepa), as he came to Baturin with the King of Sweden, decided to write to the Tsar the grateful letter and to list in this letter all our past and future grievances [...] and in the end to add that we as free people earlier

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# the lesson of chornobyl

konstantin sigov

The Chornobyl disaster did not only undermine the political and ideological system of Communist power and knowledge, but also, and with unprecedented radicalness, raise doubts about the «Faustian desire» of modern civilization to go beyond all natural and technological barriers...

These doubts were raised not on paper but in the air itself, which people were suddenly afraid to breathe. The whole atmosphere of old disputes changed. Peeping through the door of our ramshackle laboratory, we saw an immense shadow creep out and cover the planet.

We can neither see nor smell nor touch radiation. None of our senses helps us to spot the danger. Therefore, we cease to trust our own spontaneous and often traumatizing warning mechanisms, which may still be retained in the taste of iron or a certain sensation of the thyroid gland reported by some. Usually, we are nowhere near anything like «informed ignorance», i.e. a self-limitation of reason, whose pride is likely to be aroused even in the hour of defeat.

bowed under his Majesty's hand and now as free people we are leaving...»  
Pylyp Orlyk's letter to Stefan Yavorskyi, 1721

<sup>7</sup>«In Ukraine, unlike the neighboring peoples, they created no tsar, no master. They created a brotherhood – Cossacks, where anyone could come – master, or slave, or Christian. There all people were equal [...]. And no pompous titles have been known to the Cossacks ...» Mykola Kostomarov, «Books of Life», 1847

<sup>8</sup> «We will die but we will not give away the land and the freedom!» From the call of the All-Ukrainian Peasant Congress, May of 1918

<sup>9</sup> «The cruel fight is going on between peasants and our power. This is a deadly battle. This year has been a trial of our strength and their endurance. The famine has shown them who is the master. It cost millions of lives, but the collective farms system will exist forever. We have won this war». Mendel Khatayevych, one of the supervisors of the grain-storing campaign in Ukraine, 1933

<sup>10</sup> See the Ivan Franko poem «Pokhoron (The Funeral)», 1899 <sup>11</sup>«... The riots of the lowest classes may destroy states, but no state has been created out of this». Vyacheslav Lypynskyj, «Letters to the brothers ploughmen», 1933

<sup>12</sup> «Bravery and cruelty, nobility and betrayal were walking hand in hand in this struggle», Yaroslav Hrytsak, researching history of Bandera movement in the «Essay on the New History of Ukraine. Forming Modern Ukrainian Nation in the XIX – XX centuries», Kyiv, 1996

<sup>13</sup> «Dont look in the file for accusing evidence, if he rebelled against the Rada with weapons or words. First of all you have to ask him about his

education and occupation. These question will determine the fate of accused». Vilis Latsis, 1918

<sup>14</sup>« Somehow you don't care. Anyway you are doomed. You die now or in a year, what does it matter?», Serhiy Yefremov, «Diary of 1923-1929», entry of April 19, 1929

<sup>15</sup> «Ukraine is waking up. Ruined and burned by war, it rises from the ashes like the phoenix. Kharkiv, almost half of which is burned by Bolsheviks, is destroyed. [...] But my people, who made it through, will know a better life. Through all of these storms, tortures and insults, Ukraine, which started on the path of its own statehood 25 years ago, is not losing it and is starting a new key epoch of its affirmation». Arkadiy Liubchenko, «Diary», entry of November 2, 1941, Kharkiv.

<sup>16</sup> «The existence between the Russians and the Germans is the historical fate of the Central Europe. Central European fear oscillates between two anxieties: Germans are coming, Russians are coming. Central European death is a death in prison or in a camp, and more a collective one... The Central European voyage is an escape. But from what place and where? From Russians to Germans? From Germans to Russians?». Yuriy Andrukhovych, «The Central-Eastern Revisioin», September 1998 – January 2000.

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Naturalism, as the leading ideology of the «scientific revolution», transforms all knowledge about man: from medicine's attitude towards man as a physiological «body» to socio-political views of natural human rights in society. In the twentieth century, according to S. Frank, «the system of natural powers is perceived as closed in itself and encompassing all existence.»

The expansion of naturalism into its own desire to subjugate all areas of human existence turns into an idol the very concept of Nature. Both global and local sacrifices are demanded by the idol of naturalism.

Global hecatomb is caused by such concepts as the «natural» supremacy of one race over another, the «natural» tendency of «healthy» people to eliminate «unhealthy», suspicious ones etc. The local sacrifices in the name of Nature are no less horrible, they amount to the annihilation of those fundamental links between things and ideas which were traditionally thought of as natural.

The perspective of a new atmosphere of thinking

(despite the inertia of «hypercuriosity»), of a new air of «informed ignorance», will perhaps cast fresh light on the «ground» of our essence and existence, on the attitudes of people to each other, to the animal world, to the world as such, to language.

◦ Natalia panina, 2001  
◦ yevhen holovakha, 2001

# a social portrait of **yevhen holovakha** **natalia panina** contemporary ukraine

According to official data, the majority of Ukrainians are living at the edge of starvation. According to other sources, the well-being of our citizens has grown in the nineties. There are plenty of such paradoxes in the Ukrainian society.

## LIVING STANDARDS

According to most indices accepted in the world, since independence Ukraine has been one of the poor countries of the Third world. In recent years we have come very close to crossing the line separating poor countries from the poorest ones. Nevertheless, considering certain features, Ukraine is still far from the Third world because it is industrial and urban and because it possesses a relatively high intellectual potential due to a developed system of high school, college and university education. But according to official data, the income per capita is quite comparable to that of developing countries. Is it possible to maintain a more or less decent existence, even considering our fer-

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Мезабудьтє  
society

4. *Have you felt the taste of social liberty of the last decade?*

*Did Ukrainians succeed in liberty test?*

5. *How can you measure the level of realization of your talents during these years?*

*How did you change yourself during that time?*

tile black earth, with yearly incomes amounting to several hundred dollars, and with prices approaching those in the West?

Common sense suggests that it is impossible. The results of sociological surveys suggest that every year the indices of the living standards become lower, while the attitudes associated with the possibility of satisfying social needs become more pessimistic. Every year (beginning from the survey of 1994) nearly half of Ukrainian citizens assert that the material situation in their families has worsened, 20-25 per cent – worse to some extent, 18-22 per cent – everything remains as before, and only 5-7 per cent declare improvement. Youth up to 30 years is less nostalgic about 'the social gains' as their elders are. Nevertheless when asked: 'What in particular have you received due to the transition to a market economy?' they indicate most often 'the loss of social guarantees and support' (40 per cent participating in nation-wide quests), 'the decline of living standards' (36 per cent), 'the possibility to become jobless' (29 per cent). By contrast, 'the possibility to earn without limits' and 'the prospects for enterprise' are mentioned by a smaller number (24 per cent per statement).

Therefore, in the last 10-15h years the majority of peo-

ple grew poorer and less well fed. And now it remains to explain how car jams can happen in such a poor country, how numerous supermarkets and boutiques can find buyers for their expensive goods, and how impoverished collective farm workers can sell their food at prices which startle even overseas guests. It is obvious that additional sources exist which compensate diminutive wages, pensions, and stipends.

This is confirmed by sociological investigations. For example, a study of Ukrainian households carried out in 1995 by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology revealed that considerable contradictions exist between the entries in the diaries of incomes and expenditures: the expenditures exceed the incomes by nearly two times.

But this contradiction explains little because the sums with which the sociologists operated did not exceed several dozen dollars a month. It is impossible to maintain a more or less decent existence on such sums.

Such indices as average wages or family income calculated on the basis of estimates made by Ukrainians themselves are absolutely invalid for obtaining objective conclusions. First of all, because the principal income of citizens comes from the sources they would not disclose due to the

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### Ivan PLUSCH, Head of Ukrainian Supreme Rada:

4. 16th July of 1990. The plenary session where the Ukrainian Republic Supreme Rada has just approved the State Sovereignty Declaration is closed. A delegation of national deputies persuaded me to go into the square in front of the Parliament building. Hundreds or maybe thousands of people were greeting us with tremendous energy and fervour. And I was looking at them and thinking we will have to apply much more energies and hard work to turn independent Ukraine into reality.

Ten years have gone – have Ukrainian people stood the test of freedom or not? Perhaps, they have.

Ten years ago freedom began winning on the macrolevel. Or maybe it was the display of national genes? From within came something that changed the self-realization of the whole nation forever. Our society passed through terrible ordeals Chornobyl, the truth about repressions, the truth about the war in Afghanistan, the truth about corruption, about purposeful character of the starvation of 1932-1933. We all had naked nerves.

Ten years ago Ukraine exploded with independence, and it was the victory of freedom. Later somebody tried to present it as their own victory. Every victory is usually known

to have a lot of fathers. But the truth is that all of us were taking part in it voluntary or involuntary, holding office or declaring his or her opposition. Communists of that time underwent the same events as People's Movement members of that time.

We can have an independent state and inscribe in the Constitution the most progressive ideas and words about freedom and human rights, but if there is no practical realization of them, it means that we have not passed the ordeal of freedom.

Freedom is more valuable than money. Freedom is more valuable than life.

### Mykola KNYAZHYTSKYJ, member of Television and Broadcasting National Council:

4. Ukrainians did not pass the freedom ordeal as they did not know and still do not know what it is. The widest freedom Ukrainians had somewhere between 1991 and 1997. That freedom was called anarchy and lawlessness, which is indicative of a young state. This freedom could have been legitimated through subjecting it to people. The nomenclature hesitated for a long time and was afraid of Europe, Russia, America and people. But later it understood that it is all the same for Europe, and Russia, and America, and even

so-called shadow economy. How much money people get from the shadow sector is not known. Most experts believe that the total volume from the shadow sector is not less than that from the 'sunny' sector.

Most reliable is an analysis of family material conditions based on an index of the attainability of durable goods necessary for having a civilized way of life. Their presence in a household testifies to a certain level of well-being. In 1991-1992 sociologists carried out representative surveys among the inhabitants of Ukraine. Therefore, it is possible to compare some indices of material well-being during the final years of so-called 'advanced Socialism' and the first years of independence (see Table 1).

It can be seen that, compared to the indices of 1992, the number of people possessing rural sites and summer residences increased several times. The number of the car owners doubled. People possess more refrigerators, color TV sets, washing and sewing machines, which constitute the base for contemporary civilized daily life.

Table 1  
Changes in Ukrainian families' life, %

Which of the following things does your family possess?	1982	1994	2000
Country site, summer residence	12.9	43.2	38.2
Car	9.8	19.9	20.2
Color TV set	12.9	64.7	71.9
Fashionable dress	19.1	25.1	12.2
Library (over 100 books)	8.7	30.7	21.8
Refrigerator	64.2	91.6	91.1
Washing machine	61.0	77.5	74.5
Sewing machine	46.0	57.5	50.5
Stereo and video equipment	10.2	9.9	17.5
Tape recorder, radiogramophone, radio set	53.6	58.4	59.1
Sport, tourist, hunting, fishing equipment	18.4	17.9	12.0
Running water	57.8	79.2	78.3
Hot running water	24.0	56.2	58.3
Centralized heating	33.5	63.7	64.9

Table 2  
Are you completely satisfied with your position nowadays?  
(dynamics of satisfaction of Ukrainian citizens with their position in society, %)

	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000
Basically not satisfied	50.7	62.4	63.4	77.5	69.4
Not certain	33.2	24.8	25.3	15.2	22.1
Basically satisfied	6.1	12.6	11.3	7.0	8.5



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Ukrainian people how these people would be ruled. And the nomenclature remained Soviet and was the most experienced in ruling these people, understood that the people had not changed themselves since the Soviet times and they could be ruled in the old way. Nobody has even noticed it was the ordeal of freedom.

Mykola ZHULYNSKYJ, vice-Prime Minister, member of Academy of Sciences of Ukraine:

4. Undoubtedly. I wonderfully remember the years when there was always present the inner censure that regularly «advised»: this would not go, do not write this, there is no hope for publishing this... I remember respectable people in the Institute of Literature who survived the terrible war years but were afraid of Central Committee instructor's glare. And they wrote the reviews being so gloatingly quoted today. But these people feared not so much for themselves as for their families. And the last decade gave unique possibilities for self-realization. It is quite another matter that the today's obstacles are not ideological but financial. To publish a book an author should ask or humbly beg somebody. Now in spite of the inner ease there are many nuances spoiling the taste of freedom.

Social freedom is the feeling and knowledge of the

possibility of self-realization by a society and a person as well. But we are still unable to use this freedom. We are making no headway, we cannot summon our strength to advance in a united vigorous impulse — to feel ourselves in a new way. A lot of us are carrying the burden of post totalitarian thinking, ideological cliches and stereotypes that have spread for several generations and still are pulsing in our subconsciousness. We are still passing the ordeal of freedom. We did not manage to exploit many chances. We did not managed to organize ourselves in the forms of freedom that could give a notable result. Why? Because these is no consolidation in our society and no system of basic values across that society. There is no understanding of the common aim. If we hope that someone else will do everything we have no freedom. Freedom is responsibility for your own life.

But the moment of a spur to changes will come in any case: quality accumulation continues. And this new quality is ripening it is in the new generation. The generation that is not overburdened with an inferiority complex, a generation that can see that its self-realization depends on a nationwide perspective.

5. I have not turned them into reality yet. I have a feeling of being the soil something can grow on. For all my life I

Table 3  
**I still need...**  
 (inhabitants who still lack some items of well-being, 1995-2000)

	1995	2000	difference in indices, % (1995-2000)
A possibility to work overtime	40.9	55.9	15.0
A decent job	41.5	55.5	14.0
A possibility to use all my potential	35.0	45.7	12.7
A possibility to have food according to taste	66.4	72.9	6.5
Long life and good life quality	46.5	52.1	5.6
A possibility to buy the necessary products	52.8	58.0	5.2
Assurance of one's abilities	30.6	34.8	4.2
Health	48.3	52.2	3.9
A possibility to spend vacation with comfort	60.1	63.8	3.7
Resolution in achieving the goals	27.7	31.3	3.6
Initiative and self-support in solving life problems	27.9	27.9	0.0
Knowledge of contemporary economics	46.7	45.2	-1.5
Legal support in defending one's rights and interests	51.9	50.2	-1.7
Knowledge of contemporary politics	31.9	28.8	-3.1
Ability to manage one's affairs in new social environment	46.9	43.4	-3.5

Fashionable and good dress	48.8	44.1	-4.7
Everyday dress	48.3	43.8	-5.5
Medical care	69.2	62.1	-7.1
Comfortable dwelling	43.2	35.6	-7.6
The necessary furniture	42.2	32.1	-10.1

Note. The table incorporates an abridged version of the social goods list. The complete list consists of 44 items.

Therefore, according to composite data, a contemporary family lives better now than in the last years of the 'advanced Socialism'. Moreover, unlike the nostalgic past when only 40 per cent of families possessed the main communal conveniences, now the majority has them. To be sure, official statistics suggest that all these conveniences were compiled back in the Socialist times. But the facts revealed in these data raises doubts concerning the accuracy of this data. Indeed, if all that had been acquired in the years of the 'advanced Socialism' and the Reconstruction period, then why did the number of cars, TV sets, refrigerators, stereo and video equipment not decrease in the period from 1994 to 2000? (It should be considered also that the average amortization of the goods purchased before has achieved by then the utmost tolerable periods of 17 – 22 years.)

have not written any book I could be proud of. I have been writing a huge amount of different articles but my heart does not open to them.

I have not used my chance yet. As now I am a member of the government, I would like us to implement a pension reform, medicine system reform, and an education reform. To create favourable conditions for the development of Ukrainian literature and mass media in order to approach standards of the developed countries.

These are the main points I am trying to focus on. But the time for me is like a horse feeling it is to be saddled and therefore striving to break out. But I will try to saddle it.

I have greatly changed inwardly, felt my inner dignity. Some time I had a lot of complexes, I suffered from being not as handsome as I would like, I desired to have black forelock... And now I have no hair but I feel confident.

The fact that I have changed myself I attribute first of all to my age and experience, but the general social situation has also stimulated changes. In some other atmosphere I would feel absolutely differently.

**Petro TOLOCHKO, national deputy, member of Ukrainian Academy of Sciences:**

4. If we compare the level of social freedom of the last decade with our previous life, we would undoubtedly find out noticeable changes for better. So I have felt the taste of our freedom to some extent. But if we compare the level of our social freedom with that of the developed countries with their old traditions of democratic development, we would find ourselves only in the beginning of our way. And besides we have recently slowed down our movement toward this desired social freedom.

To answer the question whether Ukrainians have passed the ordeal of freedom is obvious and has a single meaning – no. The new political leaders of the country did not produce it. For most of them freedom turned into a means of the unpunished appropriation of common property for their own good. It was not produced by the so-called the «fourth power» which moved from an ideological dependence in the past to an economic one in the present and seems to be enjoying such a state. We are returning to the unanimous idealization of our life, and attempts to view it critically are considered almost unpatriotic. It was not produced by our intellectual elite that is captivated by a sweet dream of the so-called revival of the Ukrainian statehood and urges people

Compared to 1994, in 2000 the people possess fewer country sites, sewing machines, equipment for tourism, hunting, and fishing. That is, people still continue purchasing everything necessary for use, and abandon what could bring them additional income (working on a country site, sewing).

### SOCIAL DISPOSITION OF THE UKRAINIANS

Naturally, it is important to know what people think of the society and how they evaluate it. The main point is how they perceive the existing social situation. The first questions asked both in medical and social diagnostics are: «How do you feel yourself? Is anything wrong with you?»

When you put a direct question you get usually an exact answer that leaves no room for nuances. In the monitoring we asked people to what extent they were satisfied with their position in society (see Table 2).

Even by the second year of independence nearly half of the population expressed dissatisfaction with their position, and in 1998 the number of the unsatisfied was more than three quarters. Accordingly, the portion of the satisfied diminished. Positive changes have become noticeable only in the last two years, but that does not change the situation

of the mass social alienation. Besides, the dissatisfaction is dominating practically among entire population, in all demographical and professional groups.

In spite of such attitudes, in Ukraine relative social stability exists. Is that not a paradox? Why do people not hurry to abandon such uncomfortable social positions and fight for the scarce 'rooms in the sun'? Is it really a case of endless patience of the people? Are there any social features that would compensate this dissatisfaction? One of them is everyday life provision. In the last decade, they have become more fundamental and civilized. There is no doubt they restrain effusive manifestations of dissatisfaction. But there are other social benefits valued by the people better than life comforts.

It is the level of social disposition that is considered the ultimate aggregate of people's satisfaction (or dissatisfaction). It is based on material, and social, and spiritual values. Beginning in 1995, every year in 11 main spheres of life are measured to determine what social commodities are missing. The examinations are based on presumption that the more social commodities a person lacks, the worse are his or her feelings.

Among the majority of aspects associated with every-

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to endure for some time for the sake of this century-old dream, whereas in the meantime people are dying out. When we gained our independence there were 52 million of us but now the figure has decreased. Something is wrong with us. It has to do either with our freedom or with our inability to handle it.

5. Personally I have no reasons to complain of the last decade. Over this time I have published five monographs, about one hundred articles but nevertheless I am not fully satisfied.

I have not made mistakes in the past years so I have nothing to confess to at present. But the gravest former sinners are known to become the most righteous men. But I think that I am not threatened with it.

Oleksander KRYVENKO, editor-in-chief  
of the «PiK» weekly:

4. I have not just felt it, I drank it to the full. In the early 90-es there was bacchanalia of freedom for self-realization of a public person (a journalist particularly). The common enthusiasm, embarrassment with the governing and state organs, disarray in the legal sphere and economic stability (turned to be short-term) gave great possibilities for every incentive. And the «hierarchic vacuum» stimulated these

incentives as Ukraine has at once become the society of the dynamic hierarchy.

All caste groups that defined the career process for decades lost the monopoly of influence. And new social realities needed a large number of people with new, previously useless or little used characteristics, from knowledge of Ukrainian (English) and computer skills to skills (or readiness) to use the new technologies of civic society. The old elite groups were unable to meet these needs. And a lot of vigorous people have used this in different spheres.

Despite the significant limitation of freedom, Ukrainian society has not become stiff yet — there is some dynamic in forming the hierarchy. So conclusions about the total limitation of the social freedom remain forgone ones.

But have Ukrainian people passed the ordeal of freedom? A lot of persons and even corporate groups undoubtedly have. These people have created themselves, gained some social positions that can enable them to advance. But of course many people have not used their chances and thus lost what they had. But the nation as a whole — has it passed the ordeal? I think that a sound a valid answer should be given in about ten years.

5. I really realized myself — I took up posts that were inaccessible for me in the «old times», gained serious

day material troubles, job, leisure, and maintaining health, the lack of social commodities is dominating (see Table 3).

According to some estimates, between 1995 and 2000 the deficit of social commodities increased, while other data suggest the opposite. The portion of people lacking proper jobs or possibilities to work overtime and to use their entire potential increased. On the one hand, this attests for the labour tension for the aggravated employment problem. On the other hand, unlike in the past, people have become better oriented towards the intensification of their labour. This can become an important psychological prerequisite of overcoming the social-economical crisis. The tendency of diminishing the deficit of the dwelling premises, furniture, everyday clothes, is very important. If this trait continues there will appear preconditions for improvement of structure and quality of nutrition, and then for an increase of savings which will finally signify a real success of the declared market reforms.

In recent years, among the people with insufficient education, low skills, and the unemployed, the social disposition deteriorated, while among qualified workers and the people with a university background it has improved. The worst indices have been registered among the agriculture

Table 4

**The deficit of social commodities among different age groups in Ukraine**

(per cent of respondents who declared the lack of some social commodities)

Social commodity	People under 30		Middle age (30-35 years)		The aged (older than 55 years)	
	Rank Lacking:		Rank Lacking:		Rank Lacking:	
Protection of the state from the decrease of living standards	81.3	1	88.4	1	88.1	1
Stability in the state and in society	74.9	2	77.9	2	76.1	5
Ecological security	74.4	3	74.0	4	75.3	6
Proper job	68.4	4	63.4	9	36.1	26
Assurance that the situation in the country will improve	67.1	5	70.1	7	70.4	9
A possibility to rest with comfort	65.0	6	75.1	3	45.2	19
Observing the human rights	64.6	7	64.0	8	63.1	11
Leaders able to rule the state	62.8	8	70.8	6	72.3	8
A car	61.1	9	48.3	20	33.0	28
Possibility to work overtime	60.2	10	60.8	11	45.3	17
Nutrition meeting one's preferences	59.5	11	73.9	5	81.0	3
Protection from crime	52.2	12	61.4	10	68.1	10
Fashionable and good-looking clothes	51.6	13	50.5	17	28.5	31
Just evaluation of one's merits before the society	49.2	14	53.4	15	60.8	12
Possibility to work full time	48.1	15	50.2	18	36.7	24
Contemporary knowledge in the economics	48.0	16	49.2	19	28.0	32

professional experience, and became rather famous. And what about the changes, I would name only one of them I began taking my mistakes more seriously.

**Mihail VORONIN, president of the concern «Michael Voronin Vienna Paris»:**

4. I was one of the first founders of rent, collective enterprises. Of course, I stumbled but this gave me the possibility to develop. I founded the atelier and firm «Michael Voronin». Later I opened a school that trained specialists for the whole Commonwealth of Independent States, delivered seminars, and arranged my fashion show abroad. Six years ago we turned into a powerful enterprise and I had to reclaim all the staff. Today we win international prizes one after another.

I am Jewish but not every Ukrainian loves Ukraine as I do. It ails me when I hear somewhere abroad the scornful phrase: «Ah, it is Ukrainian». My foreign partners propose to pay us twice more if we change the label and write: «Made in Italy». But I say: «No!» I am not complaining and not asking for help. I know that any newly born state has problems analogous to ours. I am grateful to President Leonid Kravchuk — he gave us freedom. It was he who laid the foundation of future Ukrainian prosperity.

Yes, we have a lot of problems but I am sure: in several years things will begin to straighten out. There are a lot of things to be pleased with. I am glad to see Kyiv changing and being built day after day it becomes more beautiful. But Ukrainians did not manage to use the independence in full measure. Bureaucrats remained from the Soviet times who slowed up the movement to freedom and development. When this caste disappears, Ukrainian people will be able to realize themselves.

5. Starting my business I worked from 8 a. m. to midnight. Today I am also working in such a way because I have to advance, to perfect myself. I see what is happening in the world, I have a model and I am trying to approach it.

As far as five years ago I was compassionate. I feel sorry for people and was afraid of discharging anybody. Later I understood that in my factory among seven hundred people there was a dozen scoundrels who hindered the work of the rest and I did not give them the sack because I felt sorry for them. And I thought — what kind of chief was I was after all?

Today people are afraid of me. Today they say: «Voronin become as brutal as a beast.» Today I can be compassionate only to the poor and the wretched. On the whole I became more rational and exacting. I have recently given a sack to some my friends because they began to presume upon their



Political ideals worth support	47.7	17	48.1	21	49.9	15
Legal support in protecting one's rights and interests	47.2	18	53.4	16	47.3	16
Contemporary knowledge in science and technology	47.2	19	43.2	26	23.4	36
Proper dwelling	46.1	20	38.1	28	42.1	21
Assurance there will be no national conflicts	44.4	21	47.9	22	51.4	14
Proper leisure	43.5	22	60.4	12	45.3	18
Education	42.5	23	35.7	31	25.3	34
Medical aid	42.4	24	58.5	13	81.9	2
Clothes	40.9	25	46.2	24	42.0	22
Possibility to buy the most needed products	39.0	14	26	7	56.0	74.8
Norms and values uniting the people in the state and society	38.1	27	41.7	27	36.2	25
Mutual understanding between the people of different nationalities	37.8	28	35.5	33	34.2	27
The necessary furniture	36.3	29	37.8	29	20.1	40
The resoluteness in achieving goals	33.2	30	36.1	30	22.3	38
Contemporary knowledge of politics	32.5	31	31.8	35	21.4	39
Kindness and benevolent attitude	29.9	32	35.6	32	41.1	23
Ability to live in new social environment	28.1	33	44.8	25	52.4	13
Loving person	28.0	34	22.3	40	25.0	35
Initiative and self-support in solving life problems	26.5	35	28.0	38	28.7	30
Assurance in one's abilities	26.4	36	32.9	34	44.0	20
Real friends	26.1	37	28.6	37	22.4	37
Happiness in family	26.1	38	28.9	36	30.9	29

Health	25.1	39	46.4	23	81.0	4
Political freedoms (of speech, of conscience, of move, etc.)	23.9	40	22.2	41	19.1	42
Country site	22.0	41	19.2	43	16.3	43
Information about the changes in society	19.2	42	19.6	42	19.4	41
Access to one's national culture	16.8	43	24.2	39	26.4	33
Command of Ukrainian language	15.7	44	18.5	44	13.6	44

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workers, salaried persons of low social standing, unskilled workers, housewives, and non-working pensioners.

That is natural, because support from the state is extremely scarce while these people lack resources due to old age, low skills, loss of job, etc.

Less natural is that the level of social disposition among those employed in the private sector is not improving. As they do not experience positive changes, the economic reforms do not bring explicit results. The social disposition among the employed in the state owned sector is at the same level as among the jobless part of the population. The latter feature indicates deep crisis in the state productive sector that becomes a heavier burden for the national economy.

In 1995 middle-aged people who bore the main responsibility for the survival of the society felt a bit worse than young and aged people.

status. If I had not changed myself, my enterprise would probably have not survived.

Leonid VYSHESLAVSKYJ, poet:

1. Over this decade I published some books, and I am not only their author but also their editor, proofreader and censor. On the whole I have published more than fifty books. But I have never felt so free, Never could I express myself so fully.

I am told: earlier you were published, and now you publish your books at your own expense, you are your sponsor. Yes, I said, but now I publish what I want. There is a great difference! It is the main point. There is a liberty of spirit. Independence of the territory, for all that, gives more chances to the liberty of spirit.

Disappointment has something to do only with economics. In this sense Ukraine is plundered and turned into a poverty-stricken country but only in this sense. Despite the economic breakdown we have doubtless spiritual achievements.

Volodymyr KULYK, political scientist:

4. We were so enchanted by freedom that inevitably it had to lead to disappointment. Of course, we have experienced this enchantment on the different intellectual «floors» and with different emotional «temperatures», and

now we experience our disappointment with unequal intensity and in widely varying forms as well.

Very often this disappointment is caused not by a lack of freedom in the external world but by a lack of inner freedom as well, and this prevents oneself from using available but of course limited external freedom. Even more, extension of the external freedom has revealed the lack of the inner one more brightly.

As the apogee of the enchantment was connected with the idea of independence, one of the bitterest disappointments was also connected with the fact that our independence did not bring expected freedom at least that freedom people were waiting for. Somebody decided that there was no real freedom yet, somebody else — that the very aspiration for it was a mistake. But most people, I think, regarded it with the pragmatic wisdom of bondsmen: we became independent and it could not be helped, and now we have to live as freely as we can. Of course, it is sad that our state contributes neither to our free life, nor to a satisfactory existence. At the same time people become used to the thought that the state will not solve their problems, and they themselves should be responsible for their own satiety and dignity and the ones of their relatives. Maybe this is the point where freedom begins.

In 2000 social disposition somewhat improved among the young people, and deteriorated among the middle-aged group, and the elderly people. It is obvious that the problem of social adaptation proved to be less problematic for the young people (see Table 4).

Young people more need proper jobs, fashionable clothes, comfortable dwellings, and contemporary knowledge of the economics. Middle-aged people often lack possibilities to have comfortable vacations and to spend their free time, to work with maximum results, and to purchase the clothes they need. The elderly people first of all point to health problems, quality of medical aid, the impossibility to buy the necessary foods, and to get the necessary nutrition.

Each age group endures deficits of social commodities in spheres, which are most important to them: the youth – in the sphere of professional self-identification and appearance, the middle-aged people – in the provisions for work and recreation.

And the elderly people – in restoring health, getting normal nutrition and maintaining a positive outlook in the midst of the current social and economic transformation.

On the other hand, factors of social stability cause ten-

sion across all age groups: «state protection from the decrease of living standards», «stability in the state and in society», «ecological security», and «assurance that the situation in the country will improve».

Notably for each age group «state protection from the decrease of living standards» is the most missed commodity. Everybody expects more protection from the state than is available.

Under such circumstances social stability is maintained through such compensatory factors as family well-being and personal relations.

Who we trust, what we believe, and what we hope for. Trust, beliefs, hope – these are the three fundamental notions on which social order and social organization are founded. Without trust, consolidation is impossible, without beliefs – progress wanes, and without hope – the ability to endure all adversities on the way to one's goals collapses.

So, does Ukraine possess the necessary social-psychological resources to overcome the social-economic crisis in the near future?

Let us begin with trust. Over the last decade Ukrainians elected a president and parliamentarians several times. As the elections were free, and in the majority of cases demo-

Have the Ukrainian people passed the ordeal of freedom? But it is not over yet, we are gaining immunity and warming up. When you see farmers who do not feel like taking their shares and are still members of their kolkhozes I do not know how they call them now then, of course, no. But when you see people who for the first time in their lives take hoes to grow their garden, or people who go to Turkey to buy some goods in order to sell them here, or those who take foreign language courses then, of course, yes.

5. For me personally the last decade was marked with various displays of gaining my freedom and the realization of its limits.

I changed my job. I left physics, tried to work as a journalist, translator, editor and at least visited political science. I wrote some works, became famous to some extent, visited a dozen countries – and not only because I was talented and worked hard but also because I was lucky to choose a setting appropriate in time and place.

But I had to earn my living, not always doing what I would prefer, Usually I worked harder than I liked, and I never knew what I would do in a year or even a month in advance. Ignoring the possibility of having a more certain and permanent job (meaning public service), I had to skip from grant to grant, from subject to subject, from having no time

to finish one task to nighttime sitting on another one. I thought about leaving for a long time or forever for places where science is taken care of to a greater extent, and maybe there I would not have to skip so often, but the very thought about «forever» and unwillingness to struggle for my place beyond my native sun has restrained me up to now. And it was and actually is my freedom.

**Dmytro KORCHYNSKYJ, leader of the public organization «Bratstvo»:**

4. I consider myself to be one of those who have really enjoyed the taste of freedom in Ukraine. I went through a lot of adventures and I stayed at large. I manifested myself radically in the home policy and I felt no pressure from the state. In no country of the «free world» would I have remained unpunished.

Ukrainians have passed the ordeal of freedom. The authorities did not suppress, the people did not revolt.

5. Over these ten years I have gained more experience than my parents did over fifty years.

**Pavlo MOVCHAN, national deputy of Ukraine:**

4. I would divide this period into two subperiods. The first one when we really did taste freedom that promised significant

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cratic, it is possible to consider that in the newest history of Ukraine its citizens manifested their trust of political leaders and state structures more than once. On the other hand, the electorate entrusted the power to politicians whom they do not trust while they perform their duties (see Table 5).

The growth of trust of the President of Ukraine is greatly explained by the fact that in 1994 the quest was carried out before the presidential elections, while in 2000 – soon after the elections. But the lack of trust dominates even the newly elected President.

A paradoxical situation exists: people entrust power to those whom they do not trust. To comprehend the reasons for the phenomenon, it is necessary to take into consideration the emotional state of people in circumstances of prolonged social-economic crisis. Trust (or the lack of trust) is an emotional state that is able to enlighten or spoil people's lives, but it cannot compel them to abstain from solving life's problems. If people do not trust any aspirant for power, they vote for those whom they mistrust less. Indeed, they trust only in themselves, their kin, and God. But it is impossible to elect God president, or one's relatives – parliamentarians, or oneself – the head of government.

To choose the lesser evil never brings 'a sense of deep

satisfaction', as the Communist leaders used to say. But it corresponds to the moral ambience that dominates the years of the post-Communist transformations. Its characteristic feature is mass demoralization, total disappointment in social ideals, and a solid portion of social cynicism. The last assertion is illustrated with the data obtained during still one more quest carried out in 2000 (see Table 6.)

The aggregate moral-psychological atmosphere dominating our society is gloomy. But it cannot be otherwise these days because the old norms and values have lost their power while the new ones have not yet been formed. In such a situation provisional norms exist which cater to the need to survive 'here' and 'now', and which to a great extent are grounded on primitive, protective, and grasping mechanisms. It is the ad hoc, provisional, and changing nature of their social position that deprives people of trust in society and in social justice.

But the absence of trust by itself is unsteady to the same extent as the transition society that gave it. In the times when three quarters of Ukrainians assert that «people felt better because everybody knew how to behave rightly», only a few believed that everything was done in a right way. But everybody knew what the totalitarian system would dec-



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changes in our society. And unfortunately, we did not use that freedom in full measure. As often happens in world history and more than once in our own history, it was used by adventurers. That is why today I feel some bitter smack of no freedom. A group of people usurped the right of freedom, insisting that it is for them. They seized the mass media and used money and power on the society to impose its stereotypes.

There is no freedom in Ukraine. Over last five years we lost our independence – both internal and external. The internal one lied in the releasing of the national potential. It was rising, it could have been realized but it was not allowed to do this. Pseudodemocracy replaced pseudoequality.

Ukrainians have not passed the ordeal of freedom. But that is not their guilt. There were Ukrainians who strove for freedom and gained it. But advantages were taken not by Ukrainians but by the nomenclature that had just changed its spots.

5. Over these ten years I changed significantly, I received a lot of information, I got knowledge about things I had not known before. Earlier I was a romantic but understood the problems and perspectives of the Ukrainian nation that marred our life. I know that the perspectives are illusory in this brutal world of gains. Actually the Ukrainian nation is in suspension. And all my knowledge, everything I managed to obtain, all my experience is useless.

Stanislav ARZHEVITIN, head of the bank «Azhiо»:

4. Somebody was infatuated with freedom but the nation on the whole has managed it. The main point is that time is needed to get used to freedom and to grow up in this atmosphere...

Let us recall that the reforms of Peter I caused the ascent in Russian culture and science only after 150-200 years. I hope in our case we will see the results sooner – the times have changed, now interrelations are closer, and information exchange is more intensive.

5. I think over these years that I have fulfilled myself in full measure. I managed to create a bank with independent management, with a staff having a strong sense of corporate unity and a bank having a slogan «Responsibility to society.» And it is not only a motto but also our credo.

And what about the discrepancy between expectations of that time and today's reality? I am not surprised with them. People say: «If you want to make the God laugh, tell him about your plans».

orate or punish him for. An atmosphere of 'immoral distinction' existed in which it was enough to adopt once and forever the rules of behavior and not to solve Hamlet's problems every day. In other words, the people completely trusted in the power's ability to punish everyone who would demonstrate a lack of trust or publicly relinquish his beliefs in the Communist ideals. It was exactly because of the immorality of this kind of trust that the majority of citizens of the 'unbroken Union' abandoned the state, its ideology, and its morals. The contemporary nostalgia is explained by the fact that the majority of people cannot live without social assurance, trust, and beliefs.

There are two determinants that help to preserve a certain psychological balance and sense of perspective in such circumstances. The first one includes good relations with close people necessary to overcome social and life troubles. It is in themselves and in their closest encirclement that the majority of Ukrainian citizens find the social and psychological resources necessary for physical, spiritual, and moral survival. The other feature is a well preserved aspiration for the future. It is not the near future that is regarded with hope by the majority of Ukrainians. For instance, in the survey conducted out in the Fall 1998 by

the firm 'Sotsis', only 17 per cent of Ukrainian citizens expressed the expectation that «the existing problems in economics and social life» would last less than 5 years.

On the other hand, the people evaluate more distant prospects more hopefully: 45 per cent of Ukrainians believe in gradual improvement of social situations, and only 22 per cent are sure that the situation will deteriorate.

Expectations of improvement are connected with the belief that Ukraine will advance in the same direction as the developed democratic countries do. The majority of Ukrainians consider that it is the Western social-economic model that should be the archetype for the further development of the state and society. Ukrainians differ on the prospects of development of human civilization and their state in the XXI century. But in several aspects the optimistic estimations are expressed more often concerning Ukraine than the rest world at large (see Table 7). That involves such situations as terrorism, armed conflicts, ecological disasters, and national intolerance. According to some positions, pessimistic estimates prevail (nearly equally for Ukraine and the world) for problems such as health-care, economic crisis, and corruption.

Optimistic attitudes dominate only prominent scientific

Taras VOZNYAK, editor-in-chief of the magazine «І»:

4. What can be called social freedom of the last decade? Is it some indulgence of institutional settings caused by transformational processes when machinery of one State was destroyed and that of another was just being created? Are absolute anarchy or multiple authority systems able to substitute real social freedom of a developed state? I think not. I believe a lot of what we managed to do over this decade was due to the gap between two state organisms – between the old totalitarian and new ones, the latter trying to transform itself into a post-totalitarian one.

On the whole our society is not still free enough. It is constrained by some external factors as well. And not only by material but mainly by mental ones. And what is more, recently there are tendencies towards the consolidation of the state as it is but this process (being in the main positive) does not always have a democratic character. Very often even common democratic principles are ignored. And unfortunately, if they are infringed upon some times it means that there are no principles at all and everything is permitted.

The saddest fact is that the nation itself is keeps silent. It has different reasons for this – abject poverty, absolute incomprehension of its significance, of the significance of every

personality and its personal freedom and originality. It keeps silent because it was not struggling for Ukraine. It keeps silent because it is not even worthy of such a Ukraine. And it cannot see itself in the real dimension of a real Ukraine – it lives in the virtual world of Russian television, leaving it only time to time.

Have Ukrainians passed the ordeal of freedom? They have and they have not. They have because the project «Ukraine» continues. They have not because it is not as successful as mere mortals would like it to be.

5. For such people as me any distemper is the time of their personal freedom. In times of a strict totalitarian regime they either become dissidents or give themselves up to bitter irony to live according to their «inner freedom». And when the external pressure abates, they return to the society.

But it is impossible to flee the system all the time. Recent changes do not favor such living-out-of-the system people. Soon a new period of «escaping» or «ignoring» may begin for them. But in modern society we call this simply «privacy». It is instructive to remember that in Ancient Greece such ignoring or casting off the political life was called «idiocy» (without scornful shades).



discoveries both in Ukraine and in the world. In general, the expectations concerning progress in Ukraine are close to those concerning the development of human civilization.

Ukraine's future is greatly affected by the success and/or failure in overcoming the air of mistrust and disappointment existing in society. The present mistrust of government, employers, and public organizations is a reflection of the feeling of helplessness before the state, of complete dependence on the employers, of a reluctance to defend one's rights and interests in voluntary organizations. In western societies where the level of trust in social institutions is much higher than in our country, fear of repression from the state does not exist as in our case with our Communist past.

Public control is the most important foundation of social trust. Public control is embodied in part through public organizations to which a large number of citizens belong. In our country only a small portion of citizens participate in the activities of public organizations. A person who is alone is able to defend only very special goals. That is why the only means for strengthening trust in society is a consistent transition from total control of the society by the state

Table 5  
Confidence in different social subjects and institutions in Ukraine, %

	1994		2000	
	Trust	Do not trust	Trust	Do not trust
In the family and relatives	86.9	3.6	93.0	2.7
In oneself	89.6	2.4	93.5	2.3
In neighbors	40.7	20.3	39.0	21.7
In compatriots	30.2	18.7	30.4	20.6
In God	61.2	14.2	68.8	12.5
In the colleagues	37.5	15.5	38.7	17.9
In the church and clergy	35.6	27.3	38.8	30.0
In astrologers	16.9	44.7	15.8	51.3
In mass media	19.9	36.6	29.1	31.3
In militia	12.8	57.1	12.5	57.0
In Communist party	14.5	65.0	16.9	59.2
In Nationalists	7.4	69.4	6.6	69.3
In Supreme Rada	10.1	51.2	7.1	62.3
In Army	38.1	24.1	34.8	26.0
In government	11.4	48.8	13.9	49.8
In President	16.1	52.8	27.1	43.2
In private enterprise	13.8	43.4	16.7	46.3
In administration of state enterprises	13.9	42.1	12.4	47.1
In trade union (traditional)	14.5	47.3	12.5	49.2
In new trade unions	8.8	41.2	6.7	49.1

**Remark.** The Table does not include data corresponding to answers «It's difficult to say».

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Petro ZHUK, director of the Center of Academy of Sciences of Ukraine territories informational problems:

4. My perception of taste of freedom is connected with the right and possibility of Ukraine to return to the European civilization it was torn away from.

The ordeal of freedom is not over yet, and it can hardly be over freedom involves the right of a person and a nation to choose between good and evil.

5. My perception of the world was imposed by the totalitarian system. So in recent years I struggled with it. Most strugglers of that romantic period did not understand the gist of freedom they were struggling for and therefore they were unable to achieve some concrete results. Nevertheless Ukraine gained independence that is on the road to freedom.

Of course, freedom brought some deformed aspects like real terror. Yes, during the breakdown of Communist system when we were actively struggling against it, I was not so sorely persecuted as in the times of freedom... But I consider this to be logical and natural: without these born by freedom trials I would not have changed myself.

Svytlana PANYCH, translator:

4. The taste of freedom is not that of coffee, it takes more than ten years to define it. I cannot say that now it is «easier to breath» than it was ten years ago. Yes, you are not asked some questions in public offices any more. You can openly cast doubt on the perfection of ideology or on some principles. At least there are alternatives — in social, political, cultural, educational spheres... But an alternative does not mean freedom. Alternatives are something «given from without», and freedom is an exceptionally inner state of personality or nation, being characterized first of all by responsibility for your own actions and your significance within your culture, and not just observing or consuming it. No alternative can be realized without this inner freedom.

Freedom take for all in all can exist only as a dialog of inner and outer forms of freedom. And we have not such a dialog yet.

Now we have limitless possibilities to do something. And these possibilities are coming from the blue, you just need your eyes to see them. They are very different book translations, subjects for reflections or articles, meetings, entering relationships but you can compose them into a single whole. It is the realization of everything happening in the world as a single whole that is the main change in my life over these years.

Table 6

**Attitudes of Ukrainian citizens to assertions about trust and beliefs in the society, %**

	Agree	Disagree	Uncertain
In the existing circumstances of decay and confusion it's difficult to decide in what to trust	78.5	14.6	6.9
The contemporary problems are that the majority of people do not believe in anything	87.9	7.3	4.8
Most secure is not to trust in anybody	52.0	31.7	16.4
Most people deserve confidence	34.5	46.2	19.3
In the past people felt better because everybody knew how to act rightly	72.1	15.8	12.1

Table 7

**The attitude of the inhabitants of Ukraine to social problems in Ukraine and in the world in XXI century (according to the quest carried out in Jan. 2000), %**

	In XXI century:		in the world		In Ukraine	
	will be:		Less	More	Less	More
Hungry			31.7	32.6	35.1	38.0
Victims of armed conflicts			25.8	33.8	37.1	15.1
Healthy people			46.2	26.1	46.6	28.9
Terrorist acts			24.2	31.8	33.2	17.8
Ecological disasters			22.8	36.1	28.9	27.5

Prominent scientific discoveries	8.5	46.6	13.1	42.3
National intolerance	26.1	18.9	32.2	15.2
Corruption (bribery)	21.3	40.4	24.7	42.1
Crisis's in economics	25.1	33.6	28.8	36.1
Happy people	29.8	32.9	32.1	33.9

**Remark.** The Table does not include the date relating to answers «Will remain the same».

to total control of the state bureaucrats and their ways by the civic society.

**NEW VALUES, TENDENCIES, AND ORIENTATIONS**

Many social problems in Ukraine are the consequence of Soviet ideology, which eradicated individual initiative. People were converted into dumb wage earners incapable of solving problems beyond their private life. During the dissolution of the Soviet Union it seemed that the barracks-like spirit and the values it had brought forth would disappear along with the barracks-like social organization. Indeed, something has gone. For instance, due to the vanishing of consumers goods and services deficits, the value of many professions connected with the possibility of getting the missing commodities have disappeared.

**Ivan BOKYJ, national deputy of Ukraine:**

There are so many traps, so many snares on our way to freedom that it is more reasonable to talk about the absence of freedom. And the ordeal of freedom's absence for Ukrainians is the problem not of years but rather of centuries. Only a few were able to escape these traps, to tear these snares: Taras Shevchenko, Lesya Ukrainka, Lyna Kostenko... Conformism and the absence of freedom now corrode Ukrainian society even worse than in totalitarian times. The evidence is that the presidential election of 1999 and the referendum of 2000 proved freedom is only a possibility to say that 2+2=4 and nothing more.

Perestroika and Ukrainian independence turned me into a political journalist. I realized that I was an oppositionist. An oppositionist not towards independent Ukraine but towards the regime that actually is destroying this independence and dooming most people in this country to poverty.

Contacts with national deputies of different countries convince me of the fact that Ukraine has chosen a wrong way of entering the world process. Not a European one that can result in prosperity and well-being but a way leading to a criminal economy.

**Oleksandr VYSHNAK, head of the company «Ukrainian Sociology Service»:**

4. Of course, I have tasted freedom but I have not eaten plenty of real (not from something but for something) freedom of productive activity. We still have not such freedom. We have freedom of speech so I can express my thoughts freely. But we have no freedom of press so my thoughts will not be heard. Or will be heard only when they are not concerned with the authorities. But sociologists had such «almost freedom» even in the Soviet times.

The analogous situation is with sociological and political research. Officially you can research everything but nobody supports serious projects — neither our state, our foundations, or our private companies. And what is more, private companies and parties in both marketing and political research often need some predetermined result. But as professionals do not perform such orders the number of the latter decreases.

Thus over these years I have managed to realize myself on about 30-40%. But it is not so bad, it could be worse.

The question whether Ukrainians have passed the ordeal of freedom is, in my opinion, rhetorical. If even professionals have problems, what about do low-skilled or older people? People who cannot swim were thrown in the free market sea

A new dominating value appeared – money as a universal measure of success in life and society. This value is more ancient than those we abandoned along with the Communist ideology. However, for the contemporary generation of 'post-Soviet people' it appeared to be a novelty which has become for the many a personal and social catastrophe. It should be noted that the role of the deceiver has been played by the state. First of all, through the hyperinflation it annihilated savings, then it was busy with the enrichment of bureaucrats at the expense of pseudo-privatization, and of corruption, and by introducing additional privileges for the leading staff of power structures of all branches at all levels.

It should be noted that this deception is absolutely natural. Because states and societies are always lead by the smartest and most viable individuals, it is be vain to expect that they would act with no return from the backs of inactive and disoriented common citizens.

On the other hand, there exists a mass self-deception as well. Most of us expect that when times are tough the state will defend and console us. It is the state which we associate with our economic problems and even with many personal and family ones. But such a defense would be

feasible only if we believe that a rational bureaucracy would miraculously arise from the ashes of the post-Soviet administrative labyrinth.

Unfortunately, people do not distinguish between state and society: they remain wedded in Soviet-like fashion to formerly familiar notions of the union of state and people. When sociologists ask people if the state has to provide all citizens with average living standards, the majority of respondents agree with such a senseless formulation. At the same time, 80 per cent of Ukrainians consider that living standards of their families are lower than average (18 per cent consider it as average, 2 per cent as being higher than average). In such circumstances the attitude to the state becomes still more negative. Along with that the value of society is also perceived negatively: there grows an attitude of detachment and social contingency.

If an idol is not perceived any more as the guarantor of survival then the idolaters attempt at first to influence it, then find another one. Such a role could be played by money. But in the environment of symbiosis of wild capitalism and state monopolies in profitable spheres of economic activities, the money distribution is very uneven and depends on state patronage. Therefore, any income exceeding the

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and told to learn to swim. But you should do this first on the shoals and not in the sea...

**Roman KOROGODSKYJ, cultural scientist,  
director  
of the publishing house «Gelikon»:**

4. Ukrainians have not passed the ordeal of freedom. And they could not have done this because of the genetic, subconscious feeling of having no freedom. Ukrainians will be free from this coding only in three to four generations. To achieve this we should learn to live independently, gain new experience and get a taste for new (more intensive, creative) life while not losing our originality.

The main point is not to waste time. For modern Ukraine time is the key factor. We have already lost ten favorable years...

**Myroslav MARYNOVYCH, vice-rector of Lviv  
Theological Academy, lawyer:**

4. I belong to the category of Ukrainian people who, perhaps, needed freedom more than the rest. By the word «freedom» I understand, first of all, freedom of thought and speech, creative work and self-expression. I received such freedom and nobody tried to deprive me of it over the last decade.

Regarding the level of social freedom on the whole, today it is impossible to definite it unambiguously. There is a great difference between the level of freedom being enjoyed by, for example, peasants and intellectuals, «new Ukrainians» and unpaid workers, the staff of public offices and private companies. The most tragic situation is, in my opinion, our peasants. In the most regions of Ukraine there is still feudalism burdened with post Communist permissiveness.

Uncontrolled freedom being enjoyed by «new Ukrainians» suggests the thought I once shared with my American friends: today Ukraine, and not America, enmeshed in its regulator rules and restrictions, is a free country. Today it is Ukraine and not America where there are «Klondikes» making huge profits and being ruled by the laws of classical American saloons.

It is difficult to say whether Ukrainians have passed the ordeal of freedom, there are also some gradations here. On the one hand, when I am in despair I can see how easily Ukrainians give back even that curtailed freedom they have obtained in the 90-es. For many people safety and minimal freedom again becomes more comfortable than freedom as it really is.

On the other hand, over the last decade Ukrainians had a good record for the problems they solved in a rather civilized

'average' level is not a measure of personal initiative or abilities, but rather of the possibility of corruption. Therefore, money remains a negative value for many people.

A question arises: if the values of the past and of today are perceived predominantly in negative emotional and moral terms, then how can a relative stability of social life be retained? Indeed, usually when social values are non-existent, there is no social order. The reason is that when we do not trust in any other social institutions, the values of family and the relations with the people whom we trust remain the source of stability for the majority of Ukrainians.

In the survey carried out in 1998 by the firm Sotsis among the staff of the Sociology Institute of the National Academy of the Sciences, the issue of forming new values was examined in the context of perceived new possibilities that could become a base for social changes in the XXI century. For the results of the investigation, see Table 8.

As a whole, the attitude of the Ukrainians to new social possibilities is either sceptical or not defined. More than half of them are unaware what benefits these possibilities can bring to them personally. But such results were obtained first of all concerning the position of elderly people. As for young people, they associate their prospects first of

Table 8  
Valuation of new possibilities depending on age, %  
Which of new possibilities are important to you?

	Less than 30 years	30-54 years	Older than 54 years	Total in Ukraine
To feel as a free individual	23.9	15.4	10.2	16.0
To provide better education for the children	14.1	23.2	4.4	15.2
To earn considerably more	22.0	18.5	4.1	15.0
To get diverse information	19.3	14.1	9.3	14.0
To be able to start own business	21.0	12.6	0.5	11.1
To go on voyages abroad	17.7	6.4	0.5	7.5
To change residence, buy dwellings	9.8	7.0	1.6	6.1
To become a proprietor	10.2	4.5	0.8	4.8
To influence life in some way	1.6	1.9	0.8	1.5
Other	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.4
Do not see any valuable possibilities	22.3	38.9	66.2	42.6
Uncertain	7.9	8.7	13.7	10.0

all with personal freedom, high earnings, private business, getting new information, trips abroad, and a good education for their children.

The most cardinal social and economic transformation is advocated by young people with the highest education and students. According to that, they designate their electoral position (see Table 9). At the elections young people

way. These are, for example, settlement of the problem in Crimea, resolution of contradictions between Ukrainian regions, and peaceful adjustment of periodical collisions between our government and Parliament.

We cannot be sure about the motives authorities were guided by while taking some decisions, but their cumulative effect is nevertheless a positive achievement which Ukraine can be proud of.

5. I am surprised that I managed to escape the tempting and enticing opportunities I could have seized: a possibility to become a national deputy, to hold prestige posts in governmental institutions. I managed to escape them because I was inured not to take up businesses you feel are not yours. I was captivated by the perspectives which a pious person has realized in our world.

Sergij MASLOBOISCHYKOV, film director:

4. Our world is the world swaying between violence and suicide, the world of extremes having its beginning and end but not its mean, the world with birth and death along its edges and with vacuum in its center, the world where a woman from a child turns into a mother, and a man is either an oppressor or a victim; where to live always means to live «contrary to» and not «for» something.

We still are burdened with the inertia of this state. Thus the level of inner freedom of a personality depends not on his or her social status but on the ability to realize himself or herself as a human being within the rich emotional spectrum.

Learn to live every moment and to feel and realize the entirety of life is, perhaps, the most difficult social and individual task.

A decade is a very short term for changes in a country with a huge train of morbid reflexes and complexes.

Andriy PAVLYSHYN, translator:

4. As the most conservative and the least educated part of Ukrainian society, ethnic Ukrainians were not able to use the achievements of social freedom. And in the political sphere our nation is only in the formative stage and has to solve so many various problems simultaneously that it remains the attempts of Munchausen to drag him out of the swamp.

Freedom is a great and at the same time very individual good, and it is unreasonable to demand that a person or a society uses it immediately and in full measure — it is impossible to find oneself at the equator, at the poles and in the temperate latitudes at the same time.

5. I lived trying to realize myself at work maximally, and there was plenty of it. If there had been no social changes



Table 9

**What will influence your vote if the deputies of the Supreme Rada advocate the capitalist path of development of economy?**

(The influence of respondents' age and the candidate's position on decision to vote for him, %)

Age groups	Positively	Negatively	No influence
18-21	43.3	21.7	35.0
22-25	44.4	17.6	38.0
26-30	42.8	28.4	29.9
31-40	37.7	29.9	32.3
41-50	32.9	33.2	33.9
51-60	25.0	42.5	32.5
older than 60	15.3	53.5	31.2

vote predominantly for the parties of democratic orientation. According to the survey carried out on the very day of 1998 parliamentary elections, the parties of right and centrist orientation would have won a decisive majority if only the people aged under 30 participated in voting.

As for the common values of everyday life for all ages, the well-being of families and the future of children remain the principal consolidating values. The value of individualism is accepted more reluctantly. It succeeds in competition with the collectivist ideology only among some groups:

over last fifteen years, I would have faced only three ways: an academic career of a scientist-opponent, the destiny of a dissident, or emigration because of political motives. But all these alternatives would have been wasted time and energy, inadequate to my previous way of life. I hope to be useful for society in the next decade as well. The only thing I do not wait for is that it will begin to appreciate the work of Ukrainian intellectuals.

**Andriy ZHOLDAK, film director:**

4. No, I have not felt social freedom. Democracy, flourishing of arts, freedom of creative choice — they are still absent in Ukraine. And for all the displays of social freedom over the last decade, Ukrainians, in my opinion, would not pass this ordeal. They were not ready for it.

Fortunately, the new generation is already formed, it is learning foreign languages and is fond of visiting different countries. Thus we believe in those who are aged 10, 15, 17.

5. It is sad but the situation in today's Ukraine is that the more talented people are, the less chance they have to realize what they have. Talented people have a year for three years. One year of creative work per three years of receiving permission to do it. Only about 3% of talented Ukrainians manages to realize themselves.

the intellectual elite, the young people, and the inhabitants of big cities. For Ukrainians, the issue of the intrinsic value of a personality remains problematic. It's not a coincidence that the heroes of our society are the people who created powerful military-administrative machines: Bogdan Khmelnytskyj in the East and Stepan Bandera in the West. In developed democratic societies, other types of heroes are esteemed: Mahatma Gandhi, Mother Theresa, Albert Schweitzer, to whom the fundamental values are life and dignity of every person irrespective of his or her position in social hierarchy. If we choose to enter the third Millennium choosing the way of Western societies, it is necessary to drastically change the system of our social values.

\* The analysis in this work incorporates the data obtained during sociological surveys carried out yearly since 1992 by the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine employing the program developed by the authors of the work. The 1.800 respondents represent inhabitants of all oblasts, the city of Kiev, and the Crimean Autonomous Republic (proportionally to the population of each region). Each oblast is represented with the corresponding administrative center of one city, and one rural settlement (in corresponding proportions).

I cannot say that I did not realize myself or that my dreams and my hopes did not come true. I contributed to the new Ukrainian theatrical art. I am working by demands of the time and I want to speak about problems common to all mankind, to problems that exist both in Ukraine and in the world. The only peculiarity — I focus mainly on young people and foreigners because the theatrical audience in Kyiv is too conservative. I would be happy to be recognized here, to be given the possibility to work instead of searching halls for performances and asking chief directors to permit this or that play. Time flies quickly, and I am distressed and even terrified by the fact that every minute I can say something but do not do this... A producer should work continuously. Otherwise it will inevitably result in his or her death as a creative person. Therefore now I am learning English and in the near future I am going to leave for abroad. Unfortunately...



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Н Е З Л И М Т И Х И М С Л О В О М  
Незлім твixимъ словомъ.

«projekt  
ukraine».  
decade  
summary  
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1. «STATE UKRAINE» APPEARANCE  
PRECONDITIONS

1.1. Crisis And the USSR Disintegration

A deep crisis of the Soviet society and the failure of the USSR and Warsaw Pact countries in «Cold War», or «World War III», as they name it now, in the struggle with the USA and their allies, were indubitable preconditions of the appearance of a new state, named «Ukraine». And the reasons are various, starting from ineffective society organisation to the inevitable technological backlog. It caused deep erosion of even remaining pieces of communist ideology, total social cynicism which overwhelmed almost all layers of social structure. The USSR disintegration was unavoidable. But ruling elites and people itself faced the problem of further organisation of the society or societies. Besides that,

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ukraine  
in the context  
of the global trends  
viktor vovk  
and scenarios  
of the world  
development

Ukraine's development as a modern nation and its capacity to secure national interests in today's world essentially depend on its deep integration into the current civilizational processes. This ambitious goal requires a comprehensive development strategy elaborated with proper consideration for the challenges of the 21st century and the global trends that are shaping the future of humanity.

THE GLOBAL TRENDS AND CHALLENGES  
OF THE 21ST CENTURY

The Physical Limits to Growth

Two hundred years ago, in 1798 Thomas Malthus, a British clergyman and intellectual, first raised the question of constraints on population and consumption growth provided by the limits of the Earth's carrying capacity. In historical context of his time this issue was formulated as a warning of future food shortages and famine as an inevitable consequence of the exponential population growth.

170 years later, in 1970-71 a research team of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, commissioned by the Club of Rome, undertook a two-year study to investigate the

the party nomenclature was confronted with the problem of saving their power, economy control, management forms transformation and maintaining a certain status quo. The discussion for the Soviet nomenclature was limited to a few questions only:

- to go out from the crisis by the change of social organization of the society (revolutionary project);
- to go out from the crisis by the cardinal social changes like «shock therapy»;
- to go out from the crisis by constant long-term changes (evolutionary project);
- to go out from the crisis separately by regions of a single country like «Chinese way of two systems in one country» (integration project);
- to disintegrate and go out from the crisis by independent states and territories (disintegration project).

The opposing anti-Soviet forces, which weren't so numerous, consisted of two main fluctuations: of those who demanded the widest democratisation of the society (conditional «democrats») and of those who were fighting for the national liberation

of Soviet nations or their self-identification, how it happened in the case of Ukrainians or Russians (conditional «nationalists»), though the views of those people on the future of political organization fill in the full ideological spectrum between democracy and totalitarianism.

By that time communist «orthodoxes» were the main opposing force to the planned society transformation, but they were frustrated and not ready enough either to the effective transformation, or to the effective opposing of the coming changes.

These are the main political forces, that realised somehow the need for and urgency of changes and were looking for a possible way of transformation or at least for their place in this process.

M.Gorbachev represented the project of evolutionary social and political transformation in the frames of single state (evolutionary-integrative project).

On the contrary, the national nomenclature leaders incl. B.Yeltsyn rushed towards power and independence and represented evolutionary



long-term causes and consequences of growth in population, industrial and food production, natural resources consumption, and pollution of the environment. A computer model based on the system dynamics method was created to simulate the world evolution with the viewpoint of the economy and the environment as one system. The results of the study were presented to the general public in the well-known book, *The Limits to Growth* [1], which created a furore and was widely debated by scientists and public activists, as well as parliaments. It contained a conditional warning to humanity:

«If the present growth trends in world population, industrialization, pollution, food production, and resource depletion continue unchanged, the limits to growth on this planet will be reached sometime within the next 100 years. The most probable result will be a sudden and uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial capacity.»

It also sent a message of promise stating that it was possible to alter these growth trends and to establish ecological and economic stability that would be sustainable far into the future.

Besides, due to this and other studies an important distinction between **growth** and **development** was drawn and highlighted. Growth is connected to increase in size by

processing larger volume of materials, while development is related to expansion of potentialities. Thus, quantitative growth and qualitative development follow different laws. As noticed in a document of the World Bank, «Our planet develops over time without growing. Our economy, a subsystem of the finite and non-growing Earth, must eventually adapt to a similar pattern of development» [2]. In fact, although there are physical limits to growth, there are no limits to development on a sustainable basis.

Gradual understanding by the nations and their political leaders of the new challenges of the 21st century resulted in a new positive vision of the future that was formulated in 1980s by the Brundtland Commission: «Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable – to ensure that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs» [3].

In 1991 the same team updated and expanded their research by using the new data on the world's resources and environment, recent information and reasonable assumptions on global trends in technologies and environmental policies, as well as different hypothesis about future human responses to this challenge. The results of the new study were published

(L.Kravchuk) or revolutionary (early D.Yeltsyn) social transformation projects in the frames of comparably or completely independent territories, where they could be able to control the whole process (evolutionary/revolutionary disintegrative projects).

«Democrats» tried to defend utopic projects of the USSR reformation (A.Sakharov) in the frames of either a single state or not (evolutionary/revolutionary integration/disintegration projects). They did not want to emphasize the disintegration problems, paying more attention to a deep society democratisation. A little more attention was paid to the economic transformation. Practically, nothing was said about administrative transformation. So, democratisation and economic reform became the main goals, and the ways of power obtaining and keeping were left out of stream.

Some of radicals opposed the state itself preparing ground for their staying outside the political transformation process. It became clear soon that single struggle for human rights is not enough for a full-size transformation. It was important in transition period to form modern kinds

of social relations, modern social mechanism, which had to constitute itself in a new Ukrainian statehood. Ignoring these challenges of time soon caused practical elimination from the political process of those whom some differently minded named «democrats».

«Nationalists», on the contrary, naturally supported the USSR disintegration project, being not so interested in other aspects of transformation, like problems of widest democratisation or social and economic organization as the base for constructing a new and effective society (evolutionary/revolutionary disintegrative projects). Those problems were not so urgent for them because they were either considered as the means of achievement of national independence, or simply ignored. Such nihilism soon caused the failure of those fluctuations. Nearly whole attention in their projects was paid to the problem of how to get power, but not to the transformation of national society into a modern, politically and economically effective one. In fact, they were ready to obtain power in presently existing socium and constructed

in the 1992 book, *Beyond the Limits* [4] and showed the variety of future paths that depend on our crucial choices. The book described 13 different scenarios through 2100, most of which show decline and collapse of human civilization, with only 2 scenarios that include a potential transition to a sustainable world.

It should be noted that the analysis of the above computer simulations clearly indicated that technology-market responses are not enough. Technological progress and market flexibility will be necessary and important factors to bring the world to sustainability but the latter will require something more essential. A crucial factor will be human mindsets, beliefs and values, that is – human wisdom. Both positive scenarios take this component into account as the basis for deliberate social constraints on material consumption and population growth. A transition to sustainable development is technically and economically possible, though it is psychologically and politically daunting. At present a significant number of scientists, public activists and politicians believe that it will require a new Sustainability Revolution as profound as the previous two great revolutions of human civilization – Agricultural and Industrial.

## Human Social Systems and Development Scenarios

The idea that future paths of human development depend on the prevailing patterns of thinking, social values and institutions, has been increasingly recognized. In this respect the scenarios using qualitative analysis of driving forces, flexible approach to the future and strategic thinking, rather than mathematics and computer models, are also of great interest. The World Business Council for Sustainable Development has constructed three different scenarios of how the world might unfold that diverge depending on the possible human responses to the challenge of sustainable development [5]. Thus, the branching point of these stories lies in how human actors will respond to the problems that face them.

In the **FROG!** scenario people simply ignore their social and environmental problems, relying upon the dynamic of economic growth and the technological innovations, and keep on doing «business as usual». Tension in North-South relations is not eased; in particular, those nations who are striving for economic development argue that if the developed countries insist on protection of the environment, they should «**First Raise Our Growth!**». The habitual reliance on market and techno-

an exclusively etatistic project. Following the only aim of creating an independent Ukrainian state by all possible means they very soon found a consensus with old nomenclature suggesting they would win playing according to its rules and on its field.

Communist «orthodoxes» proposed nothing better but putsch, accelerating the USSR disintegration process and crash of Gorbachev's intermediate project of evolution in the framework of single state and economics.

What were the projects elaborated in Ukraine and did they have any connections with other projects existing by that time?

There obviously existed (or were being born) two nomenclature projects in Ukraine – an integrational and a very moderate disintegrational ones. It is possible that the second one was not considered at once as a complete doctrine and appeared on a situational basis. Integrative nomenclature projects, on the contrary, existed in both – evolutionary (official) and «orthodox» communist forms, as an alternative to the official Gorbachev's project. Holding power – weaker than

ever, yet existing – was the distinctive feature of those projects' creators. They had a possibility to implement (though very carefully) their great universal social and political projects. They had a possibility and administrative resources to prepare themselves for cardinal power and property redistribution, to test first free entrepreneurship ordnance yards on the basis of different co-operatives and to transfer financial and material resources to their accounts. That was the way post-Soviet nomenclature prepared the basis for embodying its projects.

The conservative-integration nomenclature project was cancelled by GKChP putsch. That is why Ukrainian nomenclature had no other way but to try to embody evolutionary-disintegrative project. Besides the sluggish declarations of some economic reforms there never was any revolutionary economic project developed by Ukrainian nomenclature. Certainly, because it did not need such a project. Timely and constant implementation of free market economy could eliminate the possibility of property redistribution to its favour just as it did it.



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logies, however, is not sufficient to solve the indicated long-term problems. By 2050 there is evidence that the darkest predictions are actually nearer to the truth than the more optimistic ones. Thus, in this scenario the response is inadequate – the human social systems are unable to move toward sustainability – and, therefore, threatens basic survival of both human and environmental ecosystems.

In this story, people react like the proverbial frog: when placed in hot water, the frog leaped out to survive; but placed in cold water, that was gradually heated, the frog was boiled to death.

**GEOpolity** assumes that, when problems reach a crisis point, people will turn away from the ineffective institutions of government and business to seek new models that will take into account those human values, which seem to be ignored by the narrow economic approach. In this scenario the response is to build an interlocking governance structure coordinated at the international level – such as the Global Ecosystem Organization (GEO), which has broad powers to protect the environment and preserve society, even if doing so requires economic sacrifice.

Though it leads to a sustainable society, such perspective

may shock many Europeans and Americans, as it seems to reflect the mind-sets historically typical of Asian nations, particularly of China.

Finally, in the **Jazz** scenario people try to embody their growing environmental and social standards within the modern economic paradigm. Diverse players – governments, businesses, NGOs, and consumers – experiment with ad hoc alliances and innovative forms to solve the problems in the most pragmatic possible way. They act together as partners or else they fail. In this story markets are harnessed for finding appropriate solutions. Thus, a transition to sustainable development is based on the search for effective ways to incorporate environmental and social values into market mechanisms using the driving force and the full power of self-interest to survive and develop.

### Sustainable Development on the International Arena

Since the first UN conference on the environment was held in Stockholm in 1972 international community got a great number of warning signals of the need to take a balanced and integrated approach to environment and development

There were few pure «democrats» in Ukraine. At the very first stage of transformation they were shadowed by more numerous «nationalists».

«Nationalists» took power for a short period just after the GKChP putsch. For that time their disintegrative project temporarily coincided with the disintegrative project of nomenclature, which changed mind due to the circumstances. But they had no administrative resources, paid no serious attention to the problem of creation of economic base for future power through redistribution of property, resources and finances, to implementing the most active forms of economic activities (even in those few regions they won the elections).

«Nationalists» hurried to adopt a secret agreement with nomenclature in order to create the state named «Ukraine», creating and providing no real roles for themselves, supported by solid economic and political basis. Hereby they simply gave the nomenclature, recently imperial and openly anti-Ukrainian, «the sacres of independence». Soon it gave a chance to nomenclature to usurp the idea of independence, cut down the political tension

inside the society and to discharge the failures of its permanent ruling in the independent Ukraine during the last decade to the «democrats» and «nationalists» removing them finally from the political stage and keeping far from the great redistribution of the property and power.

### 1.2. Base For Forming «the State of Ukraine»

One of the state-constructing preconditions is self-identification of a certain group of people as an entity. The feeling of unity could be formed on different grounds, but it always needs some time. Ethnic unity must not necessarily be the consolidative element, but unity construct during some period of time and long-term natural assimilatory processes can cause new or renovated ethnos appearance. The same process could as well be provoked by primitive conquest of one ethnos by another with further voluntary or obligatory assimilation.

What was the situation in Ukraine from this point of view? Due to strict ideological limits in the USSR there was no long-term forming process of renovated consolidative unity feeling before the

questions. During the 1980s UN World Commission on Environment and Development chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland, Prime Minister of Norway, made an important contribution to raise this issue on the international political agenda. As the result of these efforts the nations of the world called for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, which was held in Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992. This conference, also known as Earth Summit, addressed the problems of today and also aimed at preparing the world for the challenges of the 21st century.

The adoption of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Agenda 21 Program and other documents of the Earth Summit hopefully marked the beginning of a new global partnership for a sustainable future. It was declared that «integration of environment and development concerns and greater attention to them will lead to the fulfilment of basic needs, improved living standards for all, better protected and managed ecosystems and a safer, more prosperous future.

No nation can achieve this on its own; but together we can – in a global partnership for sustainable development» [6].

The Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, which were adopted at the highest level, reflected a formal consensus on the need

of transition to sustainable development and allowed achievement of some limited political commitments on global cooperation in this sphere. However, modern humankind is divided into «nation-states» that contribute unevenly to the burdens on the carrying capacity of the Earth. This causes arguments between rich and poor nations over how to apportion responsibility for reversing the planet's ecological decline. Besides, for almost all nations economic growth is still the major concern, with sustainable development acknowledged as important but not pressing.

Nevertheless, ecological globalization in its many forms may pose enormous threat to national environment and ecosystems, and already challenges the traditional international governance structures. Environmental problems are climbing ever higher on the international agenda, preoccupying diplomats more and more. For example, the number of international environmental treaties over the past few decades has climbed to more than 230 [7].

The global challenge faced by the international community embraces various aspects of international relations:

△ easing tension between «Rich Planet and Poor Planet» or North and South;

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adoption of independence. Furthermore, Soviet propaganda provoked split even in Ukrainian ethnos, to say nothing about the rest of the population of UkrSSR. Image constructs of «westerners», «banderas», «easterns», «khokhols», «moskals» were formed in social consciousness. Openly and secretly on the state level the intolerance to Crimea Tatars and Jews was implanted. In fact, there was nothing even similar to the finally conformed community which could be named conditionally as a Ukrainian political nation in Ukraine on the eve of its independence. Mostly, its population was united only by territory having different mentality, belonging to different political constructs and cultural worlds.

The illusion of possible rapid exit from stagnation and crisis by separation from the unliftable USSR was the only comparatively consolidative element besides the territorial one. But the future of this new community was differently seen by each group of population, though, having the same sign name «Independent Ukraine». That was the matter of great illusion born by the referendum for

independence in 1991. All seemed to vote for the same. Formally – yes, but as a matter of fact – no. Post-communist nomenclature realized it and oriented itself at once and supported the plebiscite with powerful propaganda, which was different in each region and promised everything wanted to each one. The result was achieved, though the political nation did not appear.

Simultaneously the basis for those manipulations, which reached their peak in constitutional referendum in 2000 was installed. The same bi- or tri-standard technologies were used during all next presidential election; it continued to fix the heterogeneity of the Ukrainian population, did not provide real consensus or compromise in the realization of nation-forming tasks, helping to solve situative problems only.

In this way, heterogeneity not only became a fact but continued to grow in independent Ukraine. Different regions show no initiative to rapprochement or mutual interest. It concerns both cultural and economic sense. Due to the crisis conditions in economics and lack of any forming



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△ stabilizing world population;

△ approval of a new generation of international environmental treaties;

△ adjustment of international governance structures, such as World Trade Organization, International Financial Institutes (World Bank and International Monetary Fund), etc.;

△ international transfer of environmentally appropriate technologies;

△ facilitating sustainable development in the flow of financial capital to the developing countries and the economies in transition; and

△ establishment of the international political conditions most conducive to the emergence of sustainable societies.

Many developments in today's global affairs like debates over globalization and the third world debt crisis, poverty reduction strategy, global climate change and Kyoto protocol on carbon emissions, trade regime for genetically modified organisms, as well as many other international issues can be better understood in the light of the global challenge of sustainable development.

Yet nations are not prepared so far to grant any significant and growing powers to international environmental institutions.

Thus, successful implementation of the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21 and other international documents on the environment and development is first and foremost the responsibility of national governments. They have to elaborate national strategies and plans, and to pursue correspondent policies, which are crucial in achieving the sustainability goals. International cooperation can only support and supplement such national efforts.

## UKRAINE: 10 YEARS' BALANCE

### Ukraine's rank in the context of transition to sustainable development

In 2001, the World Economic Forum in Davos at its annual meeting presented the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) developed by its Global Leaders for Tomorrow Task Force, which compares nations on a range of indicators and allows to measure their overall progress toward a sustainable society [8]. ESI was developed for 122 countries for which detailed information on the ESI's elements was available. The ESI scores are based upon a set of 22 indicators, each of which combines a few variables for a total of 67 underlying variables that are

structure because of various privileges a single economic organism has not been created yet. Finally, regional nomenclatures even opposed the centre for interfering with the property redistribution in their regions.

Western region did not accept nearly complete and irreversible russification of South and East. There was no social discussion organized on that theme, society did not reflect the real way of things. Furthermore, it even did not elaborate any mutual strategy, acceptable for all components of the society (or majority of them), what to do with declared independence and political union and community implicated by that action.

No one knows what could serve as a basis for this unity: mutual fate? Economical interest? But is there any mutual all-Ukrainian economic interest? Some form of consensus? But there is no mechanism of all-national discussion, which can elaborate that consensus. Ukrainian society remains separated. Language? But what – that, used by the majority? Even official Kyiv did not manage to understand the consolidative role of the Ukrainian

language, it is treated by the capital too formally and cold, to say nothing about nearly completely Russian – or, better, Soviet-speaking Kyivan petty bourgeoisie. The fundamental thesis of a Russian political scientist Sergey Tchernyshov, that Russia is the Russian language first of all, not territory, polyethnic and polycultural population, or, moreover, any administrative structure – does not exist for them. For administration of «gosudarstvo (Rus. / Soviet -state) Ukraine» only one thesis is topical: the state is administration itself.

At the same time no identification with that state is formed within such heterogeneous population, which has no mutual language space (practical division into Russian-slang- and Ukrainian-slang-speaking population), no mutual informational space (mostly it is surrendered to Russian mass-media, and the majority of our citizens live in Russian media- and informational space being occupied by problems of Russian state and, being more «Russians» than «Ukrainians» in the informational sense of the term). For a long period of time the status connected with the independence even in its formal sense either

empirically measured. These indicators were deemed the most relevant constitutive elements of the five core components:

**1. Environmental Systems:** Air Quality, Water Quantity and Quality, Biodiversity, Terrestrial Systems;

**2. Reducing Stresses:** Reducing Air Pollution, Reducing Water Stress, Reducing Ecosystem Stress, Reducing Waste & Consumption Pressures, Reducing Population Pressure;

**3. Reducing Human Vulnerability:** Basic Human Sustenance, Environmental Health;

**4. Social and Institutional Capacity:** Science/Technology, Capacity for Debate, Regulation and Management, Private Sector Responsiveness, Environmental Information and Strategy, Eco-Efficiency, Reducing Public Choice Distortions;

**5. Global Stewardship:** International Commitment, Participation in Global-Scale Funding, Protecting International Commons.

The ESI permits cross-national comparisons of environmental progress in a systematic and quantitative fashion. A high ESI rank indicates that a country has achieved a higher level of environmental sustainability than other countries; a low ESI rank signals that a country is facing substantial problems

in achieving environmental sustainability along multiple dimensions.

The five highest-ranking nations in the 2001 ESI are Finland, Norway, Canada, Sweden, and Switzerland. **Ukraine, scoring the 110 position, is among the lowest-ranking countries.** Low ESI rank of Ukraine is a reflection of both the serious problems nation inherited from the USSR and the negative results of the so-called «reforms» during the first decade of independence.

**The development motive in the USSR**

Communist rulers set the task of being able to compete with leading powers for domination in the world (understood as military and ideological domination). This required achievement of the front lines in industrial production. In particular, such an ambitious objective implied an accelerated industrialization of the country. This task was partially fulfilled in the 1930s (before the World War II) and accomplished in the 1950s. A fairly industrialized but highly centralized and self-isolated economy was created in the USSR. The latter, however, turned out to be one of the most serious disadvantages of the industrial society of Soviet (communist) type.

was not realized by the great part of the society (it includes certain duties and limitations), or treated as some transitive state or imitation of independence, met unfriendly. The state project did not become important for the vast part of population. Even more – neither administration nor society itself elaborated the «Project Ukraine», acceptable by majority, it is simply absent. A certain «lack of state instinct» could be discussed, if such terminology is acceptable by the majority of Ukrainian population.

That is why it is extremely important to adopt civil society mechanisms in Ukraine in order to construct its mutual basis. It might be a society which realizes the actual state, elaborates a new vision of the future, can voice its discussion, has real political and civic mechanisms for embodying elaborated consensus into life. Unfortunately, the rate of civil society construction in Ukraine decreases, if not stagnates. The significant lag to oligarchy model of power construction is observed with strict dominating of one power branch, implicated to the president institution.

Certainly, economics is the platform on which the state could be constructed. Ukraine inherited from the USSR not autonomous self-sufficient organism or economics, which could be effectively incorporated into other economic systems. The collapse of economy in post-Soviet countries, practical liquidation of co-operation with former Council for Mutual Economic Co-operation countries, a declared but never fulfilled conversion of military-industrial complex fragmented Ukrainian economy. It stopped not only because of unnecessary or incompatible production, but because only parts of formerly integral technological cycles were left in Ukraine. It was impossible to compose full cycles inside Ukraine as well.

At the same time, active process of real deindustrialization of the country is taking place in the last years. It coincided with the world economics transition into post-industrial phase and forming of new informational economies and societies. Raw material branches and heavy industries highly developed in Ukraine have no exporting potential. At the same time, hi-tech branches oriented mostly



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Another serious flaw in the USSR's industrial development was an increasingly extensive usage of natural resources without proper consideration for the carrying capacity of nature. Communists always considered nature as something that should be conquered and transformed to serve their purposes. The perception of human being as the Master of Nature was the prevailing pattern of thinking during the communist era that provided a philosophical basis to the growing consumption of natural resources and large-scale transformation of nature in general.

The environment was almost completely neglected by the communist rulers, as there was a clear conflict between environmental protection and their growth objectives. The Soviet leadership was reluctant to use its scarce financial resources to clean up or protect the environment. For dozens of years both human and natural resources of the USSR were mobilized to achieve military parity with the West and to withstand the West all over the world in order to become a global superpower and maintain this status. Thus, communists were misusing natural resources and seriously overstressing the country's ecosystems. As a result, much of the USSR's territory became heavily contaminated with various pollutants.

The false development motive could not provide a solid basis in the long run. The communist development policy proved to be quite suitable for achieving traditional industrial objectives. However, it failed when the so-called post-industrial «knowledge and services economy» focused on efficient use of energy and natural resources, waste management and recycling, computer and information technologies, telecommunications, and other modern issues which gradually came to the front line of the development objectives. The communist industrial society, by contrast to the capitalist one, appeared to be inadequate to resolve the issues on the modern agenda. Its internal development potential was exhausted, its economy became more and more inefficient, and it lost in the Cold War and eventually had to surrender.

### Ukraine in the former USSR and post-Soviet reforms

As a part of the Russian Empire, Ukraine was one of the most industrialized provinces with well-educated population. The role of Ukraine even grew during the Soviet time when it became one of a few leading industrial and technological centres of the USSR due to its existing industrial base, educated

to weapons production, transport aviation, space technologies etc., faced various export/import limits and political priorities.

It seems that in fact all the «strategic partners» of Ukraine have no interest in its hi-tech renovation both from strategic (fear of restoration of military potential, which could be used by enemy) and competitive (creation of serious competitor on the world market, not only of goods but of labour as well) point of view.

«Geopolitically intermediate» situation could become not a bad basis for the creation of economy of an effective state. While in military sense Ukraine finds itself between two counterstanding camps in Central Eastern Europe – NATO and Tashkent pact, what is a source of threats, in economic sense it is between the EU and Russia with satellites (Russia+) as huge markets as well as industrial and raw materials bases. The main transportation East-West (the EU – Russia+ – Central Asia – Far East) and North-South (the EU – Caucasus – Central Asia) routes are crossing (or would cross) Ukrainian territory. Projects dealing

with oil and gas transportation from Caspian region, North Europe or Persian Gulf are also possible resources. Both super-regions are interested in control or, at least, in participating in this transport cross-road of Europe, which has the most attractive perspectives on the continent due to its geopolitical transport situation. According to Rendall Institute estimates, the transit transportation rating of Ukraine is the highest in Europe – 3.11 points. To compare, the same index in neighbouring Poland is only 2.72 points. The transit rating of a country territory takes into consideration the development of its transportation systems and the level and condition of their infrastructure.

### 1.3. Opposing Forces

One of the factors influencing the creation of modern Ukrainian society and «Project Ukraine» is the structure of the opposing forces. This structure is not only the system of opposition, but also reflects possible future redistributions of power or splits in a society or state. Redistributions of power in the centre or regions happen when the demands of a

and hardworking population and rich mineral resources, which were extensively exploited by the Soviets.

In 1990 about 40% of the USSR's military industrial complex was located in Ukraine with some main machine-building corporations producing modern space rockets, inter-continental and middle range ballistic missiles, warships, tanks, space satellites, equipment for nuclear power stations, etc; as well as heavy industries with huge metal and chemical plants, oil-refineries, hundreds of mines extracting mineral resources like coal, iron ore, uranium ore and many other important resources. In general, Ukraine, having about 18% of the USSR's population and less than 4% of its territory, accounted for more than 30% of its overall industrial production and 25% of its agricultural output.

These results, however, had been achieved at the expense of extensive and overstrained usage of natural resources and vast environmental pollution; thus, causing a great part of Ukraine to become an environmental problems area with depleted energy and other natural resources. The well-known accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and subsequent radioactive contamination of large areas of Ukraine's territory is only one of a number of serious environmental problems facing Ukraine.

In 1991, as the result of the collapse of the USSR, Ukraine

gained its independence. However, the starting point was very complicated and had some serious disadvantages with regard to the modern world trends.

Ukraine inherited from the USSR a failing highly centralized economy with industries based on inefficient outdated technologies and with essentially unbalanced economic structure (composition). In fact, the economy of newly independent Ukraine was just an ugly wreck-piece of the outdated economy of the failed superpower. In particular, inefficient use of energy proved to be one of the most critical factors when Russia in 1992-93 abruptly increased prices for energy supplies to the level of the world market prices. Another shock came from the hastily attempts of the Ukraine's integration into the world economy when the earlier closed (within the borders of the former USSR) and vulnerable national economy was suddenly opened to the surrounding world.

After 70 years of communist rule the newly independent Ukraine had inadequate governance structure: most of social institutions either were ruined or lost credibility, and new ones were not created yet. Besides, national traditions had been lost; virtually all Ukrainian population was still affected by the obsolete myths, mind-sets and mental maps of the communist industrial society.

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certain part of the society or political fluctuation are not satisfied. Moreover, when dissatisfaction is located in some geographical regions, it may cause regional autonomic or even separatist tendencies.

The process of extreme power concentration is going on in Ukraine now. State administration with the President at the head made conclusions from the previous bi-power period of all years of Ukrainian statehood – presidential and parliamentary branches of power. Unfortunately, judicial power did not manage to liberate itself from the state wardship and to develop into a separate branch. After creating the parliamentary majority in Verkhovna Rada (winter 2000) the source of communist opposition there was suppressed. Hence, there are symptoms, that not only communist, but whole opposition was eliminated. Presidential administration firmly established itself and there are threats that it not only spoils its image in the eyes of western partners, but also creates preconditions of its own instability. It does not represent the whole spectrum of regional elites.

Presidential administration mostly represents the

old/new Kyivan bureaucracy, Dnipropetrovsk group and some representatives of the regional elites loyal to both. Furthermore, power and business elites formation in the regions, which still have no representation in this administration takes place under its severe supervision. The system of big capital formation itself in the regions excludes the possibility of their independence from the central power. On the one hand, «oligarchs» try to get the power both in the centre and regions, but on the other they cannot do without sanctions and links with power.

Such practically complete dependence on the administration and Kyiv cannot eventually avoid confrontation with regional elites interests, which grew out from regional nomenclatures. From time to time President has to suppress local nomenclature separatism and to appoint his proteges to the regions. By now this process is almost finished. With the aim of supporting it, a legal reform was performed (constitutional basis was made for the institution of heads of regional administrations), special staff policy was carried out, strict presidential vertical was built.



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Thus, Ukraine required (and still requires) efficient governance, social and technological innovations, market reforms and economic restructuring, creation of new social institutions and development of civil society, as well as new patterns of thinking.

The ruling political elite in Ukraine, which used to be just a provincial communist bureaucracy in the former USSR, failed to tackle these problems and provide adequate leadership to the nation. It failed to work out, formulate and implement a modern and prospective development strategy to address the new economic, social and environmental challenges.

Transition to market economy was declared. Market reforms, however, were started with a significant delay and have been carried out in very slow and inconsistent way. Besides, the important question whether monetary market forces taken alone could shape the new economy that would satisfy the national needs in the long run was not answered or even stated. The objective of achieving sustainable development has never been formulated and set forth. In fact, the Ukrainian people never got a clear vision of the destination point of the country's transition process.

### Industrial and environmental decline

As the result the economic, social and environmental situation in Ukraine has been greatly aggravated. In the period 1991-2000 the Ukraine's GDP dropped by almost 60%, the average personal income (in real figures) is now approximately 2/5 of what it was in 1990.

The environment has been neglected in the process of market reforms even more than during the Soviet rule. This is mostly due to the fact that economy's structure has declined further, with heavy industries – metallurgy, mining, chemical and oil-refining industries, and energy sector – dominating more than earlier. The share of these intense resource-consuming and environmentally unfriendly industries in the economic output of Ukraine has more than doubled over the last 10 years – from 23% in 1991 to 58% in 2000. While in the 1990s Ukraine saw the overall industrial production plummet to half the level of 1990, the fall in the lighter and cleaner sectors of the industry, including high technologies and machine building, was even more drastic.

The macro indicators, like energy use, generation of industrial wastes, pollution emissions to the atmosphere per unit of GDP, explicitly show the growing inefficiency of the

In this way oligarchic form of power was created in Ukraine, which hampers the process of formation of civil society and deprives Ukrainian economy of a prospect of effective reforms. Oligarchs of different levels block civilized involvement of Ukrainian economy to the world market.

No doubt, the dissidents of the Soviet times, after short flirtation with the existing structure of power, formed opposition to it, however weak and powerless. It concerns both «nationalists» and «democrats». Finally, there is no space for them in the new state. From the post-Soviet nomenclature's point of view, they have played their role already. Flirtations of Kravtchuk epoch are finished. Nomenclature transformed successfully and does not need any «cover» anymore.

Western Ukraine has obvious opposition potential. At this moment deep frustration of the population does not allow this dissatisfaction to be embodied into something concrete, but it exists and grows. For a long time the administrations tried to play on the hyperpatriotic moods to lower the tension and to create illusion that the new appearing

political organism is the embodiment of the ideal that has been cherished in Western Ukraine for one hundred years. Now it becomes obvious, that it is not so, that the role of this region is not only negligible, but is minimized artificially at the state level in general.

The same processes take place in other regions as well. Dissatisfaction suppressed by frustration and other administrative methods, dominates in the Crimea and Odessa.

Mainly Russian-/slang-speaking regions, ethnic enclaves – Tatar, Hungarian, Romanian – also contain opposition potential.

## 2. «STOLEN UKRAINE»

The independence of the state of Ukraine became reality thanks to mutual efforts of post-Soviet communist nomenclature, which first in a low voice, than louder and louder declared its exclusive demands on the «Ukrainian region», and to conservative or traditional Ukrainian patriots.

The references to the referendum and its results became one of the present independence banalities.

Ukrainian economy and growing consumption of natural resources per unit of GDP (measured in purchasing power terms).

Consider, for instance, the carbon intensity of the energy economy, as measured in emissions per unit of economic output. This ratio is becoming an important indicator of our movement toward sustainable development, especially in the context of the global warming problem and Kyoto Protocol on greenhouse gas emissions. Between 1950 and 1999, the number of tons of carbon produced for each million dollars of gross world product was reduced by 39%, from 250 to 150 tons per million dollars of output, with a 2% annual average during the 1990s [9]. By contrast, between 1992 and 1999 Ukraine's carbon intensity grew by 29% – from 455 to 585 tons – and is now almost 4 times higher than the world's average amount (See Figure 1).

The same pattern is true for the energy intensity of Ukraine's economy, that is the amount of energy required per unit of nation's economic output. Although energy use has fallen in Ukraine over the past decade, much steeper drop in economic output has pushed the country's energy intensity upward by 52%. Between 1992 and 1999 Ukraine's energy intensity grew from 25,000 to 38,000 Btu per 1 dollar of national GDP, that is

2.7 to 5.4 times higher than in Poland, USA, Germany, and China (See Figure 2.).

As its economy recovers, Ukraine is projected to halve its energy intensity over the next 20 years – albeit to the level that will still be 2 to 5 times higher than in developing and industrial countries [10]. To radically reduce its energy consumption, Ukraine will need to enact a set of energy efficient policies, which would include technical improvements, structural economic shifts to less energy-intensive activities, and changing patterns of energy use.

The above examples are just a few of many evidences of the fact that the environmental price we pay to our economy has grown and the country's GDP composition has become more resource-consuming and environmentally unfriendly over the years of the on-going transition. Transition to what and which way? – we ask.

Lack of responsibility of Ukrainian business  
Since Ukraine inherited from the communist rule an extremely inefficient economic system with out-dated industries, inefficient use of natural resources and entirely neglected environment, transition to sustainable business practices is one

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But remembering the methods of counting the votes, which were the same almost everywhere, let us think: what were we really voting for? Nearly everyone voted. But, as it always happens during the revolution, not for what they wanted and what obtained.

One traditionally voted for hyperpopulistic slogans like «Nomenclature, get away from the trough!», having no positive project except ideology of Bulgakov's Sharikov, the simplest maxima of which sounds: «Divide everything!». Well, it was one more attempt to implement «Paradise on the Earth», but not in the frames of failed USSR project, though in the modest frames of the «territory of Ukraine».

The others were voting for the same, but in a more archaic or conservative form of «Paradise on the separate land named Ukraine», where, according to the Deutsche Bank predictions, flourishing had to start at once. In this case they voted for one more utopia suggesting that the paradise on the earth and still during their lives could be achieved by simple voting, without any work or blood.

At the same time a modern «imaginary community» (according to Benedict Andersson) was not formed in Ukraine. Different groups and region did not manage to find a single consolidative and completely acceptable subject.

### 3. «GOSUDARSTVO «UKRAINE»

Having intercepted national slogans from «patriots» and «democrats» the nomenclature keeps the real power in Ukraine. By this action it got time-out for regrouping forces, transferring capitals, privatisation of former state property. It holds the whole economy. There are few of the «old cadres» in the state power structures, mostly they moved to business. But they are difficult to separate: they still remain as one unity. Administration itself serves as a link, simultaneously controlling everything in the so-called privatized economy sector.

Mostly in some Western Ukrainian regions infantile and weakly developed democratic power was adopted for a short transitional period, which more or less was similar to the absence of power. It was ruled by Ukrainian conservative patriots.



of the main challenges faced by the national business. In particular, Ukrainian industry has a tremendous need for efficient and eco-friendly technologies, effective environmental and resource management, clean and safe production systems.

In order to help world businesses respond to the new environmental challenges the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) has worked out a modern sustainable business strategy – the Eco-efficiency concept, which makes a positive link between resources efficiency, environmental improvements and economic benefits. This concept helps companies understand that better environmental performance increases their competitiveness on the global market. Eco-efficiency as business strategy also provides new business opportunities and thus helps companies get engaged in both domestic and international efforts towards sustainable development.

Thus, Eco-efficiency concept with its pragmatic and business oriented approach towards sustainability could make an important contribution to Ukraine's sustainable future. Moreover, Ukraine's progress on this path will be impossible without socially and environmentally responsible businesses prepared to provide leadership as a catalyst for change towards

sustainable development, and to participate in policy development to create an appropriate regulatory framework. In particular, a dialogue between the government and the national business could promote more rational and enforceable regulatory decisions on taxes, subsidies, environmental standards, tradable permits, etc. Companies, in turn, could promote Eco-efficiency through high voluntary standards of environmental and resource management in their business.

Unfortunately, Ukrainian oligarchic business has fallen far behind the fundamental shifts in the world business and failed to recognize the modern trends. Most of the leading Ukrainian industrialists and businessmen, whose origin from the former communist nomenclature is well known, have proved to have quite limited mindsets and archaic patterns of thinking. They are anxious to make quick money. Their driving force is a narrow-minded understanding of self-interest that does not include strategic thinking and planning. They don't need the assessment of long-term threats and opportunities, and care little about the future. Their major concern now is short-term profits, which they derive from the outdated industrial base seized, often illegally, after the disintegration of the communist superpower.

During the first years of independence Kyiv avoided the interference to the regional matters. The main struggle by that time was for the capital and, correspondingly, for the whole state. But after structuring of power, concentration of main capitals and marginalization of regional elites it came to the loss of power by Ukrainian conservative patriots even in Western Ukraine. Nearly the whole power nowadays is controlled by state administration directly from Kyiv. It could be eventually considered as a kind of benefit because the situation could be much worse if the authority did not have any control over the situation at all, as it recently was in Albania, what caused complete destruction of the society and state in this country. The question is: how much power has to be delegated to the centre, to the regions and to each branch of power? Can the usurpation of the whole plenitude of power by one of its branches, e.g. presidential, lead to authoritarianism, or can it be harmful in this case for that very branch and for the state in general? Cannot this power centralization cause amplifying of regionalistic or separatistic tendencies in regions?

Kyiv is not the only problem. Usually the capital acts in methodic and pragmatic way, exclusively to its favour. «National patriots» themselves could not manage to hold the power. From the very beginning of the state appearance a silent war began between dissident-patriotic and dissident-democratic wings of a formerly single opposition movement. Appealing to the urgent needs of maintaining the state in any possible form the dissident-democratic wing, which made emphasis on human rights and general norms of democracy, was removed from the political arena. «National patriots» were ready not only to sacrifice democracy, but started to collaborate with nomenclature. It caused their complete degeneration and, finally, loss of power, in which they started to play mostly decorative role.

Criminalization of almost all spheres of life, material especially, became a general phenomenon in all post-Soviet space. It was a mutual creation of nomenclature, which managed to organize unprecedented and out-of-control distribution of all-national property, and of traditional criminals, used as an instrument by nomenclature. It also

Thus, most of Ukrainian businessmen are paying little attention to the modernization issues and business strategy development. They are concerned more with the on-going fight to redistribute the existing industries and financial flows, and to achieve a higher position in the oligarchic hierarchy in the country which seems to them to be more important. Besides, a recognition of the fact that Eco-efficient manufacturing has a positive public relations and marketing value that translates into higher sales and increased market shares, in particular, that environmentally aware export markets could more easily be accessed, is quite uncommon for the today's business managers in Ukraine.

On the whole, Ukrainian businesses at present don't see strategic economic advantages in being environmentally and socially responsible. This has been the main reason for the failure of an initiative to establish a national Business Council for Sustainable Development in Ukraine that was launched in 2000. The mission of a national BCSD could be to get sustainable development onto the agenda of Ukrainian industries and to promote the business contribution to sustainability issues in Ukraine. This initiative, however, didn't find until now sufficient understanding among the Ukrainian

businessmen and so far has not been supported with their commitment.

### A need for new national leadership

We have to note that despite the acute problems and new challenges faced by Ukraine at the beginning of the 21st century **the idea of sustainable development is not well known in Ukraine**. The principles adopted at the Earth Summit in Rio-de-Janeiro (1992) have not received appropriate reflection in the public opinion in Ukraine and have not been implemented in the state policies, programs and economic practice. Advanced experience of the world's leading countries gained in the recent years is still unknown to general public and governmental officials responsible for policy- and decision-making. In spite of a great number of publications on sustainable development issued in the world in the last decade, any relevant information in Ukrainian language is very scarce.

As the result, **there is a serious gap between the current reforms in Ukraine and the challenge of transition to sustainable development**.

A bright manifestation of this situation is the story of the Ukraine's National Commission on Sustainable Development

declared its own rights for the property redistribution. Pauperization of vast layers of society, left without its part of property, passively supported this process. Certificate privatisation became the form of ransom for the people and deprived them of the formal ground for demanding their share during the redistribution of the so-called all-national property. That is why poverized population transformed into the field for recruiting more and more members of the society to the criminal circles.

Reduced control of the state property, especially in traditionally profitable spheres, led to its mass misappropriation all over the post-Soviet space. As a result, we have the situation in Ukraine when nearly «two dozen families (clans) got hold of 4/5 of the so-called all-national property, leaving the rest only 1/5 of that property just for the personal survival fight». And there is no guarantee, that even this property would not be redistributed again in favour of those two dozen clans. It is a mistake to consider that certificate privatisation did not pay its way and brought no results. Vice versa, for the majority of Ukrainian population, who allegedly

became «owners», it deprived them of the desire to participate in such actions. In fact, those people practically gave their property certificates for free. The population was paid ransom obtaining nothing, and the time came to distribute the rest of the undistributed. These were the most attractive branches, e.g. energetics.

But in that fuss of nomenclature robbing the whole branches of Ukrainian economy were destroyed or sold for free. What can be said about cannibalising for ephemeral debts or in fact destroying Black Sea Shipping Company? Hi-tech branches, including military industries, no longer exist. It caused practical deindustrialization of the country.

«Deintellectualization» of Ukraine is directly connected with that process. While the great part of industry was stopped and after decade of robbing and physical and moral destroying it can not be restored no more, engineers and technical staff were either disqualified or settled on the wide-spread bazaars. The same happened to the science deprived of finances and orders. Young and perspective scientists have found their job places



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(NCSД) created according to Ukraine's international commitments. It was formally established by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on December 30, 1997 with the official mission to advise the government on sustainable development and develop new approaches to achieve the nation's economic, environmental, and social goals. In this respect it's important to note the following.

Firstly, the NCSД was created several years later than correspondent bodies in other countries (for instance, in the USA it was established in June 1993). Secondly, the Commission was formed according to the worst Soviet bureaucratic traditions with the vast majority of members appointed from the state ministries and agencies. Thirdly, during 4 years of its formal existence (1998-2001) the NCSД meetings were convened only 3 (!) times, the last two of which were held in December 2000 and May 2001.

The last but not the least, the Commission was supposed to elaborate Ukraine's National Strategy of Sustainable Development, adoption of which by the middle of 2002 is stipulated by the UN documents. This strategy should strengthen national potential to work out and pursue economic, social and environmental policies adequate to contemporary

and future problems. The NCSД has failed to prepare a draft document and submit it for consideration to the Cabinet of Ministers and the Parliament of Ukraine. Moreover, it didn't reach an agreement even on the concept that could be put into the basis of the national sustainable development strategy. And the concept's draft prepared by the government was rejected in 2001 by the majority of the parliamentary standing committees. Thus, Ukraine is approaching the Rio+10 Summit without any national sustainable development document.

It is now evident that to fulfil its mission the NCSД should be radically re-organized. Members of the NCSД should be appointed from the public and private sectors and should represent a diverse range of governmental agencies, businesses and non-profit organizations with experience relating to matters of sustainable development. The success of reforms in Ukraine is impossible without active involvement of citizens and private business in the public policy process and decision-making.

The NCSД should become a major national body to forge consensus on Ukraine's transition to sustainable development by bringing together diverse interests to identify and develop innovative economic, environmental and social policies. It

abroad long time ago. Moreover, some friendly states and strategic partners purposefully wash out remaining Ukrainian intellectual potential through different aid and immigration programs (supposedly as a special aid ). There are certainly some achievements, but mostly in humanitarian sphere. In fundamental research and new technologies Ukraine belongs neither to the number of countries which develop and hold hi-tech, nor to those, which simply introduce them receiving from highly developed states. Ukraine rather belongs to the group of countries which are outside technological progress.

Social instability causes negative demographic processes. Weakness or simply absence of social support system even at the former Soviet level led to the rapid decrease of life expectancy, birth rate and to mass migration of population. Mostly economic factors were the main reasons for migration, as well as impossibility of self-realization in Ukraine. Some migration flows have distinctive ethnic colours (e.g. Jewish from Ukraine or Crimean Tatars to the Crimea), but it is not a result of any

should also work to raise public awareness, demonstrate implementation of the policies that foster sustainable development, evaluate and report on progress on this path.

Eventually, integration of the long-term tasks of the society transformation to achieve sustainability of economic development and environment (as stipulated by the Earth Summit and subsequent UN documents), and the current tasks faced by the Ukrainian society will provide a solid foundation for reforms in Ukraine and a deeper vision of the future prospects of our nation. The national sustainable development strategy should fully consider the specific Ukrainian problems, the modern world trends and the experience of the leading industrial powers.

Thus, Ukraine needs national leadership that would take into serious consideration the warning from ecological economists that the failure to tell the ecological truth could undermine capitalism, just as the failure to tell the economic truth undermined communism [11].

xenophobia in the country. The fact that almost 400,000 women of reproductive age left Ukraine looking for their fate somewhere abroad became a frightening summary of the last decade. Depopulation became reality in Ukraine. According to different evaluations the population in Ukraine decreased by at least two million inhabitants.

A complete support of the development of the Ukrainian ethnos and other national minorities or guarantees of their rights was expected as the aim of the creation of an independent Ukrainian state. But active process of denationalization of Ukrainians as well as other nations continues very rapidly and with wide use of new technical and media means, in spite of formal assertions of interested and not very competent clerks that nothing like that takes place here. It is often named «russification». It is so, yet it is not the whole truth. It is enough just to have a walk along the street, even in the capital, not necessarily in Sebastopol or Donetsk. In the tenth year of independence we have almost completely Russian-speaking business (of the 1% of 4/5 former national property holders Ukrainian-

## CONCLUSIONS

To become a modern nation Ukraine needs a new development strategy that will provide a new perspective and a clear vision of the prospective future. We believe that the market and democratic reforms alone are not sufficient. The new philosophy of Ukraine's development should, in our opinion, be based on new ideas, with proper consideration of the most fundamental trends that are shaping the future of our planet. To this end Ukrainian elite has got to answer the simple questions: What is today's world, where is it going, and what could be our way and our place in it?

We strongly believe that the independent Ukraine should choose the road of transition to a modern post-industrial society, which embraces, besides market economy and democratic institutions, one more crucial social principle – sustainable development that means living within the carrying capacity of the Earth. The role of national intellectuals, business communities and political elite in achieving this objective can not be overestimated.

speaking are in incredible minority), Russian-speaking army (the majority of the officers commonly use Russian), Russian-speaking media (TV-programs are transmitted either in Russian, or simply retransmitted from Russia; Ukrainian government does not control the strategic informational space of Ukraine), and Russian-speaking authorities.

This threatening way of things could not be accepted even from the state security point of view. I would not give the name of «russification» to the process of assimilation of the best elements of the Russian language, of high culture elements in its pure meaning. And quite opposite thing is practical domination of Russian electronic and traditional media. Russia does its best not only to keep the status quo ante, but to deepen this process as much as possible. The sense of «Russia Project» concept is often focused on maximisation of wide-spread sphere of the Russian language and Russian media common existence, what is in fact an official policy of the Russian Federation. Making his report at the Russian Federation Council of Defence conference, Sergey Tchernyshov defined the

strategy of Russian self-determination with the following words: a future Russia would become a «transnational world corporation of Russia», not a territory of actual Russia-RF, which «proceeds from the trivial thesis that the Russian language should be revived», and only afterwards it could be possible to start with the national security concept.

In parallel direction, following some inertia (even unnoticed) the process of sovietization goes on, expressed in endless reproduction of homo sovieticus. The process of destroying the Ukrainian and other languages including Russian is clearly seen. We can not only find new terms for description of new spheres of human life (new technologies, new phenomena), – we even manage to lose our incorporation to the old world described in Ukrainian terms.

That is the way of appearance of certain blind-deaf-mute zones in the Ukrainian and Russian world/language we live: there is a couple of important phenomena in modern world, which we do not see, do not hear or have no words to discuss them. So dissolves the last shelter of self-



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determination — the native language. All ethnic groups are affected by crawling sovietization. And the disaster is amplified by the lowest-range americanization propaganda performed by mass-media.

Right after independence in Ukraine there was no stratification of different kinds of elites. The structure of old Soviet economy did not allow to form elite groups and boundaries inside them and among them according to the territorial principle. The industrial principle of elite formation and extra-territorial links among them were rather referred to. That is why the severe fight on the regional level started just after socialist economics and corresponding super-national boundaries failed. Kyiv was too far and too weak at that time. Several territorial clans appeared — in Dnipropetrovsk, Donbass, Kharkiv, Odessa. Some regions did not manage to create their own clan groups. But this process is finished by now. Some bigger groups remained, but Kyiv controls the situation in general, being occupied by Dnipropetrovsk clan and old Kyivan nomenclature. Today we can talk about


certain consolidation of clans and oligarchs under the President's protectorate. Certainly, it does not exclude permanent conflicts between them for more or less close approach to the President and his administration in general.

The links between administration, bureaucracy and the so-called free business is a very essential moment of elite formation process. But in reality almost each businessman depends firmly on power. The most powerful oligarchs can lose their property with the interference of suppressive mechanism of administration. And P.Lazarenko is not the only example of this dependence. Nearly each more or less attractive and effective enterprise which has no patron in state structures could be repressed by administration. In this way the property and industrial potential are redistributed and further monopolized. Absolutely prospectless model of state capitalism is formed in the country, based on the administrative resources and powerfully enforced monopoly.

Evaluating the oligarchy role in an extremely differentiated Ukrainian society, it is possible to say that on this stage it became an effective slow-

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**Carbon Intensities of Energy Economy  
Selected Countries, 1985-99**



down mechanism for free-market relations and civil society development in Ukraine and, in general, is dangerous for the state existence. It is an extremely reactionary group which causes slow but constant crawling of Ukrainian society to the state capitalism in conditions of complete economy monopolization. That is why we can dub those few oligarchs who are close to the highest power *stagnarchs*, and the form of their ruling could be called *stagnarchy*.

#### 4. NATIONAL PROJECT OF A FAR-REACHING EFFECT

Symptomatically sounds the phrase, permanently repeated by Leonid Kuchma during his first and second presidential term: «So, what exactly are we constructing?». Obviously, this question is directed not only to himself, but to the society as well. And he is right, for who knows the correct answer today in Ukraine? What really are we building? Naked declaration of independence is not enough at all. Short-term clan games of *stagnarchs* (what is modern politics in Ukraine) have no relation to the perspective plans suggested to be fulfilled by us,


as well as there was no real prospect to ephemeral plans of national-democrates, who did not move further than the simplest slogans.

It is necessary first to define the aims which should be attained in order to create some plan or project. Is there any single aim acceptable for the majority of Ukrainian citizens? Inconsolidation of that group of people for sure hinders the process of realizing their aims and following instruments of their destination. For the first period achievement of consensus in the most general questions could become a possible aim. But this agreement has to be elaborated and accepted by all participants of the «Project Ukraine». If the all-national consensus is not achieved, own «subprojects Ukraine» will appear in each region being controversial to one another. It is exactly what we have today. The authorities have learned already how to use that, talking in each region its «signal» language and promising to embody just their «subproject Ukraine». It helps to prevent the consolidation of the population of different regions into the single political organism, political nation with the single



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Ratio of Ukraine's Energy Intensity to Energy Intensities in Selected Countries, 1985-99



aim and will for its embodiment, and in such a way – to solve its own problems in the existing situation.

#### 4.1. Russian Vision of «Project Ukraine»

It would be strange if there were no Russian «Project Ukraine». In the first post-Byelovezhian period of «sedition» there was no idea in Russia what to do with Ukraine. It was not yet the time for revenge projects, Russia was in a shock condition. Moreover, Boris Yeltsyn had certain leniency towards Ukraine, because it was Ukrainian independence that acted as a main factor which brought him to power in Russia.

But already in «late-Yeltsyn» period of exit from democratisational fog (not real democracy) Russia reversed itself to the neo-imperial revenge projects and new expansional encroachments towards Ukraine. Russia started to elaborate its own «Project Ukraine», which had to become a natural national interest of RF. It started to pursue a more aggressive economic and informational policy, which shortly resulted in almost complete loss of Ukrainian

informational and cultural independence, partial waste of economic independence due to tight links to Russian energy sources, supported by pro-Russian oil-and-gas lobbies in Ukraine and nourished by Russia itself.

It is not necessary to preview a primitive absorption of Ukraine by Russia in Russian «Project Ukraine», as it is considered by Russian empire revenge-seekers. Russia sees its sphere of interests and influence in Ukraine. It makes attempts for maximum dependence of Ukraine on RF in economical, political, security, even self-identification sphere. It spread widely the influence groups on different levels and in different areas – from mass-media to economics – in order to realize its plans. It can block measures opposing those ties, if needed. The example of Odessa oil terminal is more than sufficient. Practical Russian monopoly on energy carriers is not less articulative.

#### 4.2. American Vision of «Project Ukraine»

At the same time American «Project Ukraine» becomes clearer. The USA are surely interested in

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Н Е З Л И М Т И Х И М С Л О В О М . . .

Незлімство  
policy

6. How the actual political regime in Ukraine could be defined: democracy, authoritarianism, oligarchy, their mixture, something else?

7. How do you see the political development prospects of Ukraine?

Ukraine as in a buffer state between NATO and Russia+. They understand quite clearly, that it is not worth strengthening Russia by way of Ukraine annexation. Furthermore, they suggest that Russia had a chance to become a democratic (predictable and safe for the USA ) country if it gets rid of its imperial ambitions.

It is no use talking about mutual position of the West, because there is no common position due to the contradictions between the USA and the EU, inside the EU and inside NATO. The possible way for Ukraine suggested by the USA is in tight co-operation and further future membership in NATO, rapprochement with the EU (perhaps the US support is not excluded). Certainly nobody talks about the EU membership, but the movement in this direction is suggested. This US position is very useful for Ukraine while it can embody «European» or «Euro-Atlantic» way.

#### 4.3. The EU Vision of «Project Ukraine»

One can talk about the complete absence of the EU «Project Ukraine». The EU has so many

home problems connected with enlargement perspectives, that «Ukrainian question» could be hardly seen. It does not mean, certainly, that the problem disappears when the eyes are closed.

Only now they started to seek for a space for Ukraine in the substance recently named «common house». It became clear, that the offered place is not inside comfortable EU, but «close to» or rather between EU and RF. EU stands strictly on this position in spite of Ukrainian pro-European motions. And it is right, because it is impossible to build in such a state-monopolistic and stagnating in authoritarian direction «Project Ukraine» into «European House». But one question remains open: is it possible to deprive Ukraine in general, and not «Gosudarstvo» Ukraine/ parallel Russia/ crypto-Russia» of European prospect? That is why the official EU position has no restrictions as to the European future of Ukraine, but only after two waves of EU enlargement and changes in Ukraine itself.



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6 The expectations that the reforms in Ukraine will not only reach a qualitatively new, European level renewed after the presidential elections and a very ambitious inaugural speech by President Leonid Kuchma. However, the prospects for Ukraine to establish the rule of law and democracy have become bleak. It even seems that at present such prospects have disappeared altogether because there are no influential political forces in Ukraine which are genuinely interested in the democratic change of the political system and society.

A peculiar form of etatism has been established in Ukraine, i.e. the concentration of the entire potential of society with governmental structures. Especially during the presidential elections, but also during the referendum, society has demonstrated either its lack of interest in being structured and protecting its own

interests or its inability to do so. The public supports any initiative proposed by the administration, most likely due to a lack of understanding as to what democratic principles are meant to be. People tend towards pragmatism: it only should not be worse, all we need is survive. The austere fight for solving socio-economic issues has made people unwilling to take political responsibility.

7 The prospect of establishing the rule of law and democracy in Ukraine has almost been lost. All we have is various elements of democracy, such as the constitution, laws, and a multi-party system. Yet, we lack real pluralism, a qualitative political process, and the competition of differing opinions, which would enable us to improve governmental policies. There are no independent mass media in Ukraine. The parliamentary system is in jeopardy. The power disproportion in favour of the executive branch is apparent. We have ended up in a situation where everything depends on a small number of people. There are dark powers in the administration which do not appear publicly but in fact influence the whole

#### 4.4. Oligarchy-Nomenclatural Vision of «Project «Gosudarstvo» Ukraine»

It was already mentioned above, that there is no single «Project Ukraine», based on all-national consensus, as well as there is no consensus itself. Instead, there are several different proposals to the «Project Ukraine», not only distant but even quite opposite to one another. But it does not mean that at least one of them is implemented.

The real way of things in Ukraine could be described as a finished oligarchy-nomenclatural «Project Ukraine» in the form of «Gosudarstvo «Ukraine». Stagnarchy has practically embodied this project and is almost happy about that. It saved power, consolidated itself around state monopoly as political integrity, overcame successfully the transition from planned to state-capitalistic economy, carried out and finishes now the redistribution of property. It is not interested principally either in destroying of state monopoly or in introducing «civic society», which can cause threats to it. At the same time stagnarchy did its best to deprive Ukraine of the EU prospect, which

could finish the «Project «Gosudarstvo «Ukraine». Stagnarchy has no interest in civilizing economic policy in Ukraine, so the declaration of its «European choice» could not be considered seriously.

Non-admittance of such way of things by the West is the only discomfort for stagnarchy, though a healthy political cynicism of strategic partners helps them to watch the small drawbacks of «Gosudarstvo «Ukraine» turning blind eye to them. That is the reason for particular US support of «Gosudarstvo «Ukraine» project due to some anti-Russian or anti-EU considerations. EU does not understand and does not accept this project. Poland is the only close neighbour, which delicately makes no barriers to that project, as Czechia does, having its own concrete geopolitical interests in Ukraine.

The same particular support is received by «Gosudarstvo «Ukraine» project from Russian side while it promotes the way to Russia+ reintegration. Some other tendencies, certainly, could be noticed. Part of Ukrainian stagnarchs are not interested in redistribution of property and power in Ukraine in favour of more mighty Russian oligarchs, so they

country. Ukraine remains without any civil control. Its system cannot be democratic because it is characterised by irresponsibility. But most terribly of all, Ukrainian society does not even ask for responsibility.

In their strive for political power, the democratic political forces have lost their own political positions. The regime in Ukraine is characterised by the lack of any real opposition, for the left-wing forces can only formally be designated as opposition. They have no viable alternative and no perspective which is acceptable to society.

A rather stable political regime of mild authoritarianism has been established under the national banner of Ukraine. Patriotism has been monopolised.

Is there any prospect for transformation against this background of no expectations? Unfortunately, the most realistic prospect for Ukraine is development along the lines of the Latin American model of the 1960s. In the end, this does not cancel all prospects for development.

#### Volodymyr HRANOVSKYJ, Member of the National Council on TV and Radio Communications Issues

6 The system of state institutions is so underdeveloped that it is doubtful whether the entity at present called «Ukraine» will ever become a nation. So far, we merely have the formal characteristics of a state as they were defined back in the 19<sup>th</sup> century: borders, armed forces, recognition by other states, etc. Obviously, in the present conditions of globalization and competition between the countries and regions of the world, these characteristics are insufficient for a modern, competitive state.

As far as the absence of a strategy for the country's development is concerned, the present could be compared with the past. In comparison with the past, there is democracy in today's Ukraine. But from a future point of view we would see authoritarianism or oligarchy.

Another important factor is the territorial aspect, the environment which the country is surrounded by. The surroundings are no less important for a state than

can sabotage reintegration to Russia+ as effectively as the EU approach. There could not be final orientation – in Eastern or Western direction – in the frames of «Gosudarstvo «Ukraine» project. The great sense of that project consists in moving nowhere, because otherwise the rules of the game for power elites are to be changed, the property and, therefore, the power – to be redistributed. Big Western or Russian capitals would at once swallow weak capitals of Ukrainian «new Russians».

#### 4.5. Proposals to «Project Ukraine»

In spite of everything, Ukraine remains a problem. The problem for itself, because the present way of things is not acceptable for the majority of its citizens. Common silence does not mean common agreement. If society is going only to survive, not to change itself, it is condemned to sink to the very bottom sooner or later. It is important therefore to think at least conceptionally what to do next, for it is really impossible to live in such a way any longer.

#### 4.5.1. European Project

For such an average state in world scale as Ukraine the European project could become the most attractive. Taking into account that the membership of Ukraine in the EU is impossible this project may consist in maximum homogenisation of all social and state life spheres with the standards adopted in EU. Recently Ukraine adopted a 7-year program for EU integration, where practical co-ordination with EU standards of economics, legislation etc. are previewed. It has to approach the EU with the maximum of the US support, and in further perspective – supported by the FRG and Poland (in technical aspect). The time frames of the project would be determined by the EU effectiveness after two waves of its enlargement and by possible political collisions, which can accelerate or slow down this process.

#### 4.5.2. Black Sea-Mediterranean Project

In case of blocking the EU-directed project and complications with its development in Russian direction «Project Ukraine» can choose Black Sea-

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for an person. Thanks God, Ukraine is not located in the centre of Africa but in the centre of Europe. This is especially important for Ukraine as a young and inexperienced nation, because, roughly speaking, 50 per cent of the political system is determined by the politicians and the mentality of the people, while external factors are responsible for the other 50 per cent. The very fact that Ukraine has common borders with countries which have strong democratic traditions plays an important part in establishing the political system. In this sense, Ukraine is proceeding towards democracy.

7 Ukraine' independence could lead to two different scenarios. Either unequivocal economic, political, and cultural progression towards the West or being blackmailed by a certain northern state, which could use Ukraine's European aspirations to extend its rights and create a Eurasian unit. For the time being, the situation is developing towards the second scenario. Ukraine is linked with Russia through the crisis, the economic relations, and the language.

#### Les' TANYUK, national deputy, head of the V. Stus Memorial Foundation

Today we see the culmination of a development which could, at this stage, be called a bourgeois revolution, although in reality it is a strategical attack of oligarchs. Both the communists and the socialists have been cut off power in parliament, which is a step forward. It was the oligarchs and the right-wing parties who did this, most prominently Rukh. This is characteristic of the second stage of the Ukrainian revolution. The oligarchs and the right-wing parties have united to form a parliamentary majority. However, any political alliance of opposing forces could be compared to the alliance of a horse and its rider. And here it is important who is the horse and who the rider. In our case, the oligarchs are the riders, i.e. money rules. This is a great risk to the national interests of the state.

Only two factors are capable of bringing this process into line. They are strong presidential authority (free of the eternally changeable interests of the oligarchs) and spiritual substance, whose bearer is

Mediterranean area as a possible direction for further development of its relationships. GUUAM (the political union of Georgia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) is a considerable prolegomenon of that project. This project has good economic prospects: oil and gas transportation from Caspian, Caucasus and (what is not excluded) Gulf regions with their possible processing. There is no basis for discussion of the democratisation resources of that region. Ukraine is an actual leader of this political-economical union and can occupy good position in the Black Sea Co-operative Organization.

#### 4.5.3. Russia-Centered Project

The «Russia-centered project» could not be ignored, but not the one, formed by Russia, but a purely Ukrainian one. Ukraine itself can attempt to build its relations with Russia according to personal «Russia-centric project». This project could be very effective in certain but almost impossible circumstances, when real consensus were found. Hence, Russia and Ukraine have to change themselves for that. Russia first of all has to refuse

from its imperial syndrome and to seek strategical, not tactical, profitable co-operation with friendly Ukraine. At the same time Ukraine has to forget its fears associated with Russian imperialism and to go out from the stagnarchial dead point.

#### 4.5.4. Buffer Project

The mixture of stagnarchial and American «buffer projects», timidly planned in Washington as well as in Kyiv, is being partly implemented now in Ukraine. Strategic partnership with the USA and Russia allows Ukrainian stagnarchs to realize their buffer state policy, which moves nowhere and does not develop as a social organism. The form of a regime dominating in their partner-state is less interesting for the USA than its faithfulness to political and military obligations undertaken by Ukraine as a political partner. Kyiv uses that successfully. It parasitizes on its geopolitical resources, preserving the present state of things. At the same time Kyiv does not approach Russia+ too close, leaving a space for stagnation in this direction as well.

the intelligentsia. If Ukraine does not remove its focus from essentially economic problems to values of national concern, to phenomena of the spiritual sphere (e.g. language, culture, education, church, art, family, literature, philosophy, book publishing, national television, independent press, legal matters, cult of Ukrainian statehood, and, most important, turning its eyes away from Russia towards Europe), our development will be very hard and dramatic.

7 The prospect for Ukraine's political development is to clearly evolve the Ukrainian national idea and to unite everybody in the framework of this idea: the government, the parliament, the parties, the oligarchs, the workers and the farmers, the national bourgeoisie, the church – everybody who regards themselves as a citizen of Ukraine. Only then will the Ukrainian state arise. This idea has been achieved through much suffering, a lot of blood has been shed for it.

#### Mykola TOMENKO, director of the Institute of Politics

6 I think we have assumed a democratic pose. In the constitution, in the ideas and ambitions of the leaders there seems to be democracy, but in practice it does not work. The insincerity of democracy has been engrained in people's minds. The most recent opinion polls show that more than 70 per cent of its citizens consider Ukraine to be a state where human rights are regularly abused.

We are living in an ochlocratic political system with elements of democracy, in an authoritarian, maybe even totalitarian regime, if you consider certain regions and decisions.

7 The next few years will be decisive for Ukraine's further development. It is most important who will be the next president of Ukraine.

In the 1999 presidential elections the oligarchs supported L. Kuchma because it would be his last term in office, and the Russian practice of hereditary power transition through a quasi-democratic procedure is quite conceivable. However, agreement is to be

#### 4.5.5. Baltic Sea – Black Sea Project

This project is almost impossible or lost due to Russia and Byelarus reunion and definite EU direction of Baltic countries. Byelarus was neutralized by this reunion as a natural strategic partner of Ukraine. It is a pity that practically everybody forgot about that. About Poland, however, it is talked much more, though it is distinctly and incomparatively different to Ukraine. Nevertheless, despite everything what is going on in Byelarus, its resources could be sooner or later activated.

#### 4.5.6. Temporal «Project Ukraine»

Awaiting the coming of new generations could become a possible project, when the old way of thinking and, therefore, decision-making would go away together with old nomenclature. The youth should have a more developed «state» and «enterprise» experience. Finally, it has to declare inevitably its right to power. Is this youth being brought up now? The majority tries to make ends meet in the problems of stagnating society. At the same time the stagnarchs invented the

system of their reproduction. Soviet nomenclature delivered oligarchy and stagnarchy, and those, respectively, are «bringing up» their new generation, which, certainly, is not interested in the loss of its position and in construction of civil society. And this can stop the development of Ukraine in general.

#### 4.5.7. Language «Project Ukraine» / «Project Ukraine-Language»

Even in the case of complete prospectlessness of this project in «Gosudarstvo «Ukraine» conditions, it has to be declared. The Ukrainian language as a consolidative element of potential Ukrainian political nation has a great prospect. But nevertheless, it is suppressed severely in already independent Ukraine in its post-colonial, in fact neo-colonial period of history. That is why the society has a task to compose its enlarged self-identification with the Ukrainian language, creating Ukrainian world outlook. It is impossible to build an effective and independent identity on the basis of actual bilingualism of Ukrainian population (in conditions of



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achieved between the acting president and the oligarchs in order to achieve that. If L. Kuchma appoints one of them as his successor, Ukraine's development will definitely enter an oligarchic stage.

The democratic perspective could be rescued by serious conflicts among the oligarchs. At the next presidential elections, Ukraine will have its last chance to propose an alternative to the neo-Latin American concept of its social development.

**Viktor MEDVEDCHUK, First Deputy Head of the Verkhovna Rada, leader of the Social Democratic Party (united) of Ukraine**

6 I would call it a developing democracy. An authoritarian state knows neither elections nor the rule of law nor distribution of power.

Anybody who objectively follows the political developments in Ukraine understands that we are not going down the authoritarian path. Nor can I call the present political system in Ukraine an oligarchy, because according to Aristotle oligarchy is an instrument of exercising power through financial means.

Oligarchy leaves nor room for choice, no room for elections. I do not want to discuss the mixed characteristics of the political system because an analysis of the political systems of the countries of the world would prove that no system ever exists in its pure, archetypal form. Therefore, it is necessary to specify a dominant. I see this dominant in the tendency toward establishing democracy.

7 I believe the best and most realistic prospect for Ukraine's political future is to strengthen and develop these democratic tendencies.

I would give the greatest priority to the political liability of the authorities to the people. Judicial reforms are of exceptional importance because an independent judiciary is the most important constituent of a real partnership between the state and its citizens. It is hardly possible to achieve all this quickly. Society and the state have their own inertia, which will be overcome when the contemporary political elite will be replaced by the self-made people of the new generation.

rigid Russian neoimperialistic discourse pressing and neo-Russian / Russian-speaking identity).

The only thing left is to work on those and, perhaps, some other directions of «Project Ukraine» development.

Not a single drop of blood was shed for independence of a new state of Ukraine and for the «Project Ukraine» embodiment. That is why it is price-less indeed. It has no price, it was not paid for and, therefore, is not valued by anybody. Stagnarchy lives with what it manages to «grab» today. For nine years of «Gosudarstvo «Ukraine» existence it has kept all its capitals abroad. Those are compradors, every moment ready to leave the sinking ship. «Gosudarstvo «Ukraine» project almost gave nothing to the pauperized masses, whose percentage in the society is constantly growing, so any sentiments towards it could be hardly expected. And the so-called middle class cannot be born in nomenclature-oligarchic society.

Незалежність

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### Yuryj BAUMAN, Institute of Philosophy at the Ukrainian Academy of Science

6 The ruling political system in Ukraine is some sort of conditional decorative constitutionalism. There are all characteristics of a democratic constitutional system: elections, a parliament, a constitution, law courts, etc. However, these institutions merely simulate activity, they are a peculiar kind of decoration. They are unnecessary for the real political act of governing, which is carried out by means of non-political, often unrightful and illegal, procedures, through administrative, financial, and illegal, violent actions.

7 If Ukraine does not enter the circle of «anarchy – oligarchy – despotism – anarchy» described by Polybius (most of Latin America has been going round this circle for nearly two centuries), then in thirty or forty years it will reach the level of today's Lithuania or Slovakia (I would not dare to think about the Czech Republic or Estonia). However, this is a nice promise along the lines of the saying «There will be music in your house but you won't hear it».

Analogical situations and prospects for today's

Ukraine are to be looked for not among modern developed countries but among the historical circumstances of Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe (as well as Japan, Mexico, Argentina, etc.) from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. We have a society of «the period of imperialism and proletarian revolutions»: inhumane, ineffective, unjust, unstable.

That is why the prospects are not encouraging. Up to the the democratic transformations of 1940 to 1990, all the above-mentioned countries underwent revolutions, the terror or authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, periods of dismal stagnation, wars, occupation (the last may one day become a reality for Ukraine, a neighbour of Russia, which is mad with militarist and imperialist chauvinism).

Moreover, it is possible to come to a practical conclusion based on the average prediction of the political future of Ukraine: perhaps everything will be more or less tolerable. But those who have the opportunity to leave the country should better not ignore it. Because there is a chance that it will be too late one day.

Н Е З Л И М Т И Х И М С Л О В О М . . .

# policy

*6. How the actual political regime in Ukraine could be defined: democracy, authoritarianism, oligarchy, their mixture, something else?*

*7. How do you see the political development prospects of Ukraine?*

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**Petro SYMONENKO, national deputy, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine**

6 The term «democracy» does not fit the present regime. Democracy literally means «rule of the people». Who, however, rules in today's Ukraine? A comparatively small group of people from the presidential environment.

The present political «elite» has risen from salespersons, from people who made their living illegally trading with foreign goods, from speculators and greedy people, for whom the meaning of life is to make profits whatever which way. Ignoring laws, moral principles, and values, they have accumulated immense capital. Our oligarchs aim for unshared power in society. All this characterises the present political regime as corrupt, authoritarian, and oligarchic.

7 The presidential elections of 1999, the anti-constitutional parliamentary coup, the referendum all demonstrate the desire of the ruling regime to distort the balance of power even more and to install absolute dictatorship.

At the same time, everything is done to weaken

the opposition, most notably the Communist Party and its influence in society. They strive to split, oppose, and discredit the left-wing forces. According to the latest public opinion polls, 76 per cent of Ukraine's citizens expect the situation to get worse. This means that the potential of the opposition will increase. The division of society will deepen. Since the rulers have no programme to stop the crisis, they will increase autocracy and forced measures. The Communist Party will be dealt the hardest blow.

In any case, the continuation of the current political course will only have negative effects on people's lives.

**Volodymyr POLOKHALO, editor of the journal «Politychna Dumka»**

6 The present political class of Ukraine is basically the old Soviet nomenclatura. The present political leaders have inherited all characteristics of the Soviet dictatorship. The important thing is not how big a part of the political class is constituted by the former party nomenclatura. What matters is that today's so-

### Andriy SHKIL', leader of UNA-UNSO

6 The political regime in today's Ukraine is a mixture of oligarchy and bureaucracy. It is difficult to expect democratic change in a state where the fiscal profession is the most prestigious and where decisions are made by minor bureaucrats instead of their ministers. What is called «the fruits of democracy» in Ukraine is actually the result of the carelessness of civil servants who blame their own mistakes on «democracy».

7 The salvation for Ukraine is national revolution. It is the only means by which power can be taken away from the bureaucracy and oligarchy and returned to the people. A «top-down» anti-bureaucratic revolution could lead Ukraine to a qualitatively higher level of development, but it would not solve all problems. We also need cultural, scientific revolutions, etc. Thus, the concept of developing the state must be based on revolution. In Ukrainian politics, only those forces will succeed which do not waste time on bemoaning the bad situation and which do

not attempt to adapt to it but strive to change it to their own advantage. Although the coming elections will be carried out according to the old script and although the veterans of the political service may make it into parliament, they will not be able to adopt a new style of rule whereas people will not be content to live the way they are living now.

### Serhyi ODARYCH, president of the Ukrainian Perspective Foundation

6 The present political system in Ukraine is a very strange mixture, a symbiosis of typical oligarchic rule and the command-administrative regime Ukraine has inherited from the Soviet power.

The dominating position has been usurped by a small circle of oligarchs around the head of state, who not only influence but also designate the executive power. Along with that, political weight is also retained by the «vertical» elements of the executive power, which relies not on the law and legal norms but on personal devotion.

7 The regime will grow stronger and its influence

called political elite has not really left the traditions of the non-democratic elite which existed in Soviet times. Today's political class is fully autonomous as regards decision-making, and its autonomy is so great that the alienation of the authorities from the majority of the population becomes all the more evident. This is the prime characteristic of the present regime.

Today we have an illegal political market in Ukraine. Just like there is a shadow economy, there is a shadow political sphere, in which parties, fractions, individual deputies, orders, decisions are sold. These political criminals or the «new political Ukrainians», who have naturally entered the ranks of the former party nomenclatura, have introduced their criminal habits and «philosophy» into politics. We are witnessing a diffusion of half-criminal elements and the authorities. This is where the second characteristic of the political regime comes in: politics itself has become a type of business. This symbiosis of politics and business, which finds its expression in total mass corruption and anti-democratic habits, corroborates the tendency towards informal, nontransparent relations in society.

The third characteristic of today's regime in Ukraine is the exploitation of the comotose condition of society by the ruling circles. The referendum has demonstrated that the authorities regard society as a passive and unautonomous extra in the political arena, as an argument or instrument in the competition financial and political groups.

Instead of a civil society, a non-civil society has been established in Ukraine. Most Ukrainians today think only that things should not be worse, they do not even think about changes for the better. The extreme low level of expectations and claims among the Ukrainian population is rather strange.

One cannot say that there is no democracy in Ukraine. However, what we have is not democracy of progress, success, and social control over the authorities. What we have is procedural democracy, i.e. parliamentary elections and presidential elections.

7 I do not see any signs of improvement for next year or five years in Ukraine. To make a statement about the more distant future would make no sense.

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on social processes will be bigger. At the same time, the political opposition will grow weaker. Right now we are witnessing how the administration encourages splits and conflicts in political parties, even among its strategic ally, the Communists.

However, there are signs of growing conflicts within the elite group of the president's oligarchic encirclement. As they go along allocating the main state property, these conflicts will become more critical. It is quite possible that within about two years a part of the group ruling now will join the opposition.

#### **Tetyana KOROBOVA, journalist**

6 The present political regime is a mixture of autocracy and oligarchy under a democratic umbrella. This is much more dangerous than an authoritarian or oligarchic regime in their explicit forms. Using democratic slogans, democratic institutions, and perfectly democratic legislation, the regime rules through a sphere of shadow politics which is dominated by representatives of the oligarchy who command the president.

So far, there is no political force in Ukraine which could bring about real democratic change.

#### **Ihor HRYNIV, chairman of the executive committee of the Reforms and Order Party**

6 The regime of political power which has been formed over the last nine years in Ukraine appears to be quite original, having not counterparts elsewhere in the world. On the other hand, it has taken on some features of various political regimes. As before, the state is administered by modified party committees. They acquire the form of encirclements of mayors and governors in cities and regions, and of the Politburo in the capital. The structure of that Politburo may change while the decision-taking process remains essentially intact. Power is not executed publicly. Therefore, the process can neither be controlled by society nor by the oligarchs (though some of them belong to the Politburo). Besides, power itself remains the principal economic good.

7 Nine years ago, Ukraine proclaimed its independence, and since then, it has been in a so-

Under these circumstances, the inexistence of a civil society, and the impossibility of developing one, enable any kind of «-cratia» to manipulate the people.

7 The lack of control over the administration and the impunity of its undertakings makes it likely that our place in the future will not be in Europe but between Russia and Byelorussia.

#### **Viktor MUSIYAKA, head of the «Ahead, Ukraine!» party, former vice-speaker of the Verkhovna Rada**

6 The present political regime in Ukraine shows elements of democracy and the beginnings of authoritarianism. The latter manifests itself in the actions and behaviour of the president's encirclement and in the activities of the whole system of state power down to the regions.

We also have oligarchs who influence the administration and actually form it – from the municipal organs up to the cabinet.

7 The president's encirclement does everything it can to restrict the rights of parliament. In essence, a

called period of transition. Neither the Ukrainian people nor the national elite have succeeded in answering the sacramental question: «What kind of state shall we be?»

The other urgent problem is that neither the administration nor society have yet realised that Ukraine needs not only oil and gas but also freedom of speech, strong political parties and civic organizations, and a strong opposition. Historically, Ukraine has developed as a European nation; therefore, it has a fair chance to find its place in a united Europe. Any other political choice could be the beginning of a great tragedy.

#### **Viktor NEBOZHENKO, political scientist**

6 The contemporary political regime is a kind of watered democracy with elements of autocratic rule and favouritism. We have already lived through the period of democracy, but we have not yet established the oligarchy. I would like to stress the natural character of the existing regime because it is adequate to the state of Ukrainian society in all spheres of life – in economics, in politics, and in culture.



mechanism of unlimited power is formed. It may well be that after parliament is formed, some other person will use these rights to quickly seize power on allegedly legal grounds.

Those with the big money have the best chances to win the next parliamentary elections. The Verkhovna Rada will become an organ readily adopting everything the president demands.

**Kostyantyn MALEYEV, Institute of Philosophy at the Ukrainian National Academy of Science, head of «Kyivs'ke Bratstvo»**

6 I believe the closest historical equivalent to the present regime in Ukraine can be found in the Polish Kingdom of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. Poland was at that time ruled by a triad consisting of the elected king, a small gentry, and the big landowners. In present-day Ukraine, the president performs the functions of the elected king, while the oligarchs perform those of the gentry and the landowners. As we know, that regime came to a poor end in Poland: at a certain stage of development, the neighbouring states bought the

«oligarchs», while the big landowners ruined the whole political system with their bribes.

7 Unfortunately, if no sound economic reforms are carried out, if no stable and solid middle class is formed, the future prospects of Ukraine are the very same as in the Polish example. In that case, the political and economic elite of Ukraine will sooner or later be subjected by the richer and more powerful Russian oligarchy.

**Semen GLUZMAN, director of the Ukrainian-American Office for the Protection of Human Rights**

6 I would name it differently – a post-totalitarian democracy, which is everything: democracy itself, authoritarianism, and, of course, oligarchy.

7 There is only one perspective for the political development of Ukraine: strengthening the democratic institutions, joining the realities and values of European democracy. The alternative is disintegration and the death of the Ukrainian state.

7 I do not rule out the possibility of early parliamentary elections. Moreover, chances are that there will be early presidential elections.

In the next year or two, several important processes will be going on in Ukraine. First, the strife among the president's team will become more severe. Second, the West will attempt to persuade Ukraine to proceed with the reforms and to establish the necessary level of democracy. Third, left of the political centre some new radical leaders will appear, whose popularity will grow along with the attempts of the administration to depict them as «enemies of the people». Finally, attempts will be made to reform the power structures in order to avoid too extreme a concentration of dissatisfaction with the political regime.

**Yaroslav ANDRUSHKIV, chairman of the Social-Nationalist Party of Ukraine**

6 The contemporary political system is of the Soviet type. The national revolutions which took place on post-Soviet terrain in the early nineties have only created new independent states. The social formation has not

been altered. The ruling class of the past has retained power.

7 As for the political development, first of all there should be some political activity. Unfortunately, political activity does not exist in our state. Instead, there is a kind of skirmish in the political beaumonde, in which the main goal is to gain «access to a body», i.e. to the bodies of the persons most important in the state or a district or a community. Naturally, if this state of affairs persists, no crucial changes will ever happen in Ukraine.

**Serhyi SOBOLIV, Representative of the Cabinet in the Verkhovna Rada**

6 Due to the great changes Ukraine has undergone in the last ten years, it is impossible to regard the political formation as something pure and simple. It should be regarded as a compound type of formation which has absorbed characteristics of various systems. There evidently exist sound elements of democracy, but along with these there are still are remnants of autocracy, i.e. the regime acknowledging the power

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### **Olexandr POTYEKHIN, historian**

6 From a formally legal point of view, Ukraine undoubtedly is a democratic state. Political freedom meets the strictest international standards. As far as the distribution of power, legal procedures, and state organization are concerned, Ukraine is a much more democratic country than the Russian Federation, let alone Byelorussia.

On the other side, society is still waiting for a concrete environment of political forces to fill the procedures of exercising the people's will with meaning. There is still systematic misinformation about an alleged confrontation between «left revanchists» and «centrist democrats», which has no connection with the real competitors.

7 The prospects of filling Ukrainian democracy with meaningful content depend on whether uniform, binding rules will be accepted by all political players, i.e. the independence of the judicial branch of power, the supremacy of the law, a general consensus among the citizens that everybody can gain their rights in a suit against everybody, including the administration.

of a single person. In the past, that was the Secretary General, while now it is the President.

The country is undergoing a period of primary capital accumulation. One of the most characteristic features of this period is the influence of the oligarchy on both the legislative and the executive branches of the administration. At present, the oligarchy also exerts great influence on the media in Ukraine.

7 Ukraine has not yet ultimately decided which way to go – either to European democracy or to the systems of Asian or Latin American countries, or maybe towards the adoption of dictatorship.

Ukraine will make the final decision only after another round of parliamentary, presidential, and local elections. I do hope that Ukraine will develop in the direction of democracy.

### **Oleksandar VOLKOV, parliamentary leader of «Renaissance of the Regions»**

6 Any struggle between old and new presents diverse prospects of future development, thus giving birth to contradicting tendencies. The worst thing is

The existence of free, economically independent media would be desirable, as well. Until this is achieved, the administrative power will retain its dominating position in the system of Ukrainian democracy.

Ukraine stands a fair chance of getting out of the political shadow of Russia because the preconditions for a qualitatively different development of Ukraine, as opposed to Russia and Byelorussia, have been established. The question is whether the political elite of Ukraine will further be afraid of independence or whether it will refuse to copy the decisions made in Moscow.

### **Volodymyr ZOLOTARYOV, head of the Constitutinal-Democratic Party of Ukraine**

6 The political system of Ukraine resembles most of all an authoritarian regime. Then again, all definitions of such terms as democracy, oligarchy, and autocracy are very conditional and every country has its own unique regime. In Ukraine, we have a tragic situation: there is a state but there is no political nation.

7 Reliable information about what is really going

that none of these tendencies has become dominant.

The situation is like in a city which is situated between two conflicting armies, one of which has already left the city while the other has not yet occupied it. This period is the best time for those who profit from disorder and lack of authority. Such a situation results in speculation with democratic slogans, political games hidden from the electorate, the degeneration of many branches of the economy, and in crime and corruption. These by-products of the transitional period do not correspond to the basic nature of the political regime, though they considerably compromise its image. In order to justify the credit obtained from the nation, the regime needs political strength and ideological unity; it should perform its functions as a team of true Ukrainian professionals and patriots. Unfortunately, all that is still missing in Ukraine.

7 Undoubtedly, Ukraine will proceed to democracy. It is possible that progress will not be made as fast as we would like it to. However, we must consider the political and socio-economic realities. First of all,



on is rare. To predict the future is very difficult in such a situation of closed doors.

The most striking example is the disintegration of the Soviet Union: nobody could have foreseen it, let alone its quickness and painlessness. If the Soviet Union had been open and democratic, the elite could have made a prediction.

The only thing that saves Ukraine from the abyss are our debts to the West. They guarantee that we will keep to the declared decency. If we had chosen the Byelorussian path (break of relations with the IMF), then, not being restrained by anything, we would have been living in a dictatorial regime for a long time. Another restraint is that the Ukrainian elite is accustomed to visiting the West and that it is important for them not to be expelled from there. And in order to prevent that, our ruling class will attempt to refrain from openly uncivilised steps.

there is traditional Ukrainian conservatism, the disinclination to accept anything new. Excessive demands to the state bring about either the preservation of the state-owned sector of the economy or the social-democratic system of allotting resources through a high level of business taxation. However, the social-democratic model can only work in a highly efficient and productive economy. Such an economy cannot exist in a country where free enterprise is oppressed with super-taxes and where a major part of the national product disappears. This is why we will have in the nearest future to give priority to the development of production and to overcome the existing social disproportion gradually, step by step.

The economically independent individual is the cornerstone of democracy. Economic independence can only be achieved through private property. If Ukrainians wish to live in a democratic country, they will have to adopt the principle according to which one has to rely first of all on one's own resources. The sooner this mentality is adopted, the sooner democracy will be established.

**Volodymyr MALINKOVICH, political scientist**

6 The old Soviet nomenclatura still rules Ukraine. It has already become unable to retain total control over the country, but though weakened, it still succeeds in imposing authoritative rule. The old nomenclatura has united with the new semi-mafiose clans of nouveaux riches, several leading units of which control the whole shadow economy. However, the oligarchy is not strong enough economically to dictate a policy of its own without support from the state administration. On the other hand, the oligarchy cannot do without the support of the oligarchy. This union has given rise to a semi-authoritarian oligarchic regime.

No doubt, some elements of democracy do exist in Ukraine. Nevertheless, the democratic institutions are too weak, all they can do is restrain the appetite of the nomenclatura. I am sure that the present Ukrainian state power would have suppressed these democratic elements completely, if it did not depend on the West.

7 Unfortunately, Ukraine is not economically self-supporting. This is why the future of our state depends



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exclusively on foreign investment. Without it, we will be unable to mend the situation.

The short-term prospects of Ukraine are connected with Russian capital, which, just like Ukrainian capital, is of a semi-shadow nature, though much stronger. Nevertheless, Russian capital is unable and unwilling to help Ukraine to reach European standards. The only chance for Ukraine is Europe. To reach its standards, we have to establish civilised economic relations and true democracy. Europe does not need us with our present situation, it does not believe us.

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# ukraine between east and west, north and south: geopolitical options and constraints

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## 1 INTRODUCTION

*East and West options exist.* North and South cannot be the primary geopolitical orientations. They can be a useful complement to the European choice of Ukraine. Choosing the right option and transforming it into reality is a vital question for Ukraine. It is a choice for the future nature of the societal architecture/order, a choice of values (*Weltanschauung*), of political institutions, of an economic system, of the structure of social relationships, of the role of the individual in society/ of the nature and the control of power, of economic efficacy and social justice. In fact the choice may determine the very existence of Ukraine as a distinctive, sovereign, and free society. It is a question of *to be or not to be*.

There has been built a very ineffective form of bureaucratic capitalism in Ukraine.

This is explained first by objective reasons, and only then by the errors made by the reformers. To mend the situation, it is necessary that the state machine ceases to cater to the benefits of the bureaucracy, thus becoming a means of achieving goals that are beneficial to the society. Further delay threatens the existence of the Ukrainian state.

### THE STEPS AND THE DYNAMICS OF THE CHANGES

Of all the post-Socialist states, the transformation of the planning type of economy into an economy of the market type is executed in the most complicated way which requires maximum expenditures in the productive and social spheres. The indices of economic decline are the worst among the member-states of the CIS states, including those that have endured armed conflicts. In the CIS countries, from 1991 to 1999 the average decrease of officially declared yearly gross product per capita amounted to 37 per cent,

## 2 THE EASTERN OPTIONS: CIS AND E.S.U.

1. *The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)* is not the type of entity which is capable of acting as a genuinely integrative institution that could lead to the creation of a type of European Union, a Eurasian union comprising Eastern European, Eurasian and Central Asian states, in all 12 republics of the former Soviet Union. All but one of these countries have been conquered by force, subdued to tsarist imperial and later to Soviet rule, integrated politically and economically to make them indissociable. Yet, they did dissociate. The CIS was seen by Ukraine as a friendly divorce procedure and not as a way to resuscitate the Soviet Union, which was dying peacefully. Ukraine is even now just an associate member of CIS. CIS can, at best, become an uncommon common market.

2. *A Slavic Union:* Is it an option? What are the driving forces/ advantages, and constraints?

The only realistic Eastern option can thus be a Slavic Union. More correctly such an entity would have to be called *E.S.U.*, i.e. *Eastern Slavic Union*. The

while in Ukraine it was 53 per cent. Almost all CIS countries renewed their economic growth by 1997, but in Ukraine the very first signs of growth appeared only at the end of 1999. The share of Ukraine in the total CIS bulk production was reduced from 14.5 per cent in 1991 to 10.1 per cent in 1998.

The drop of industrial and agrarian production as well as of the volume of transport services has exceeded 50 per cent. The living standards of the population have drastically declined. At the beginning of the nineties, most foreign experts considered Ukraine to be quite ready for implementation of a market type economy. It is obvious that the poor results cited above could be explained only by the particular economic policy of the past decade.

In 1991-1992, being *de facto* within the common economic area with Russia, Ukraine had to duplicate the steps of the Ye. Gaidar government. From the end of 1992 to the end of 1994, there was a period of 'reformers' eclecticism': along with the continuation of slow reorganization in the field of property and creation of market infrastructures. There were attempts to recreate the policy of rigid state control over the economics. The role of the traditional structures based on ministries and departments was reinforced, a strict system of state regulation of prices and of the currency market was implemented along with some elements



historical Slavic Union based on Panslavism, a 19<sup>th</sup> century ideal for some Slavs, is now dead. Perhaps even Bulgarians, but certainly Czechs and Slovaks, having lived under the benevolent supervision of the «big brother», have lost their illusions. Poles never had them, and neither did Croats or Slovenians. Some Serbs are ambivalent about it, but they were disappointed when Russia let them down during the NATO intervention. Also, given its geographical location and its political ambitions, including the desire to hang on to Montenegro, Serbia is hardly a real candidate for a potential Eastern Slavic Union.

What then are the *driving forces behind the creation of E.S.U.*? The main ones are: President Lukashenko/ big power nostalgia in Russia, some veterans, pensioners and Russophiles in Ukraine. The logic for creation of E.S.U. is based on geographic proximity, cultural and linguistic similarities, fairly intertwined economies, and, of course, a common history.

### 2.1 Perceived advantages of E.S.U.

For *Belarus*: The most obvious advantages seem to be access to cheap energy and other natural re-

sources, to a big market for its less than world quality goods and the feeling of being part of a big power.

For *Russia*, it would mean the return to big power status as a counterweight to Western alliances, re-constitution of Mother Russia, regaining its collective self-esteem, protection of and perhaps even assuring a privileged status for Russian minorities in all member states of the E.S.U., and control over a big market with near monopoly/monopsony positions vis-a-vis Belarus and Ukraine.

For *the Ukrainian side*, the prospects of cheap, domestically priced energy and free access to a big market also seem tantalising. For parts of the Russophone and Russophile populations (there is no close overlap of these two sectors of Ukraine's population) return to the preferred status sounds attractive. To some Russified Ukrainians the comfort of servility may be appealing.

*There are however dear disadvantages to such a Union, some of which translate into constraints.* These constraints are based on the credible assumption that E.S.U. would be dominated by Russia, be somewhat

of centralized planning and distribution such as issuing state orders, state contracts, etc.

The most characteristic feature of that period was the implementation of the 'inflation gradualism' policy, according to which the state budget deficit was compensated with money emissions effected by the National bank. That was done to preserve the productive potential of Ukraine, even at the expense of an endless pumping of 'empty money' into national economy. As a result, the highest level of inflation in the world transpired. The financial system was ruined, it was impossible to save and invest, and a precipitous drop of productivity occurred.

Finally, in the first half of 1994 the government of Ukraine began to restrict the budget deficit and the level of state expenditures and to renew control over the money supply. In October 1994, the principles of new economic policy were proclaimed (in The Report on the Economics made by the President of Ukraine). They envisaged the introduction of traditional monetary and financial means of stabilization, as well as implementation of a series of measures aimed at liberalization of the economy as a whole. Beginning in 1995, the policy of 'non-inflation gradualism' was carried out. It envisages financing the state budget deficit (which is gradually decreasing) on the basis of non-

inflation sources — loans made on the domestic and foreign markets. The implementation of the policy made it possible to gradually restore the National Bank's control over the monetary sphere, to reduce inflation to a manageable level, and then to achieve economic growth. Nevertheless, in 1998 in Ukraine (as well as in Russia that implemented the same policy) severe negative consequences of the policy of 'non-inflation gradualism' appeared. Firstly, the state debt has reached a level which necessitated frequent external and internal loans and the state was unable to fulfil its obligations. Secondly, the appropriation of investment resources for maintaining the budget deficit reached a critical level, and it became impossible to stimulate the development of the real economic sector.

These two hazards become real only when state debt increased excessively, and the majority of states employing the 'non-inflation gradualism' successfully avoided them (Hungary, Slovenia, etc.) In these cases the market economy grew successfully. This makes it possible to effectively maintain state debt and neutralize the budget deficit. But due to the retardation of the basic reforms, for the two last years Ukraine balanced at the edge of default.

The need for institutional-structural reform in our country was more urgent than in any other post-Socialist Euro-

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authoritarian, be likely an anti-Western – or at least not pro-Western -political entity, and be without a true market economy that is properly guided by laws.

For *Belarus* it would result in insufficient exposure to the outside world culturally, economically, intellectually and politically. The country would thus likely remain economically backward, politically under-developed with a weak civil society, and would suffer further loss of its national identity.

For *Russia* creation of E.S.U. would also be a step backward. Its authoritarian temptation would likely grow stronger. The joys of big power status would be diminished, not just by its military cost, but by the amount of leadership energy that would have to be wasted on governing a semi-empire, instead of focusing on modernising and building a contemporary nation state, Russia, as it is, faces some serious predicaments. The first one is the crisis of identity. Is the Russian Federation a nation state, is it still an empire, what is the common denominator, what is the root foundation of the state, what is the glue that holds the Federation together?

Another dilemma is that Russia is still a nuclear giant but an economic dwarf. Reconciling these two realities is not easy. Also, the Russian Federation is a Eurasian country, neither fully belonging to, nor excessively loved by either Europe or Asia. Finally, the Russian Federation is not only populated by orthodox Slavs. Other ethnic and religious groups might feel rather uncomfortable, rather restless in a Slavic Union.

Some of the Russian elite accepts the notion that it does not pay to be an empire in the contemporary era, that it is better to dominate other countries economically, rather than politically or territorially. Also, and this is a very important notion/ *the cost of governance increases exponent/ally with geographical spread and cultural diversity*, which more than offsets the economic advantages of scale. This is one of the reasons why many small and homogenous Nordic European countries, or Slovenia, have been economically successful. When I predicted the disintegration of the Soviet Union in a book published in 1980 entitled *Road Maps to the Future -toward more effective societies*, which appeared later in 7 other



pean country, especially in the industrial sector. That is because the centralization and concentration of industrial production in Ukraine was much higher compared to both developed countries as well as to the republics of the former USSR, including Russia. But reform has been carried out very inconsistently, very slowly, and very unsystematically.

The most important sectors in the economic structure of Ukraine were primary processing of raw materials, the fuel-energy complex, and enterprises producing military equipment and the so-called 'production of the means of production of the means of production'. The portion of economic sectors directed immediately at consumers and their needs was too low. Therefore, it was necessary to carry out basic structural reforms at both the micro and macro levels. Moreover, the state continued supporting the traditional 'base' sectors (which in many developed countries lost status long ago).

The consequence of these processes was that recently the demands of our economy for materials and energy grew by 40 – 50 per cent. However, the 'drug like dependence' on the import of fuels has increased.

In addition, state support of big non-restructured enterprises in the traditional sectors of the economy has drastically narrowed the prospects of development of small and

medium-size business. Ukraine is the only post-Socialist country in which small business not only periodically slowed its development, but even regressed. Nowadays it produces 8 per cent of the gross income while in the developed countries its portion reached the level of 40 – 50 per cent. For example, the number of small enterprises in Ukraine per 1.000 inhabitants is 10 times less than in Poland.

In the second half of 1998 it has become obvious that relative monetary and financial stability at the expense of reforms is practically impossible. Though outside influence (the crisis at the Asian financial markets as well as the August default in Russia) has ultimately aggravated the situation, it was not the immediate reason. The total crisis of state finances, retaining stability of the national currency at the expense of unprecedented growth of inner and especially external debts, – all pointed toward a cardinal turn in economic policy. At the end of 1998 and throughout 1999 something was done to mend the situation (cutting the budget expenses, decreasing the deficit, accelerating the privatization processes, liberalizing the currency market, etc.) As for cardinal changes in the attitudes toward economic policies, that is the task of the Cabinet headed by Victor Yushchenko. In the most general form, the assignment he has to perform was formulated by a French economy ex-

languages, the high «overhead» cost of managing a geographically spread, culturally diverse country, was one of the factors on which my prediction was based. The present Russian Federation is still highly spread geographically, and culturally and ethnically rather diverse. Does Russia really need to add the management of a Slavic Union to the difficulty of managing the Federation?

What are the constraints for Ukraine arising from the creation of E.S.U.?

First, there is no strong pro-union constituency in Ukraine. A party with a clear pro-union stance failed dismally in past elections. Although some leftist leaders talk about re-unification, they do not appear too anxious to consummate a union. They would lose their present autonomy under a numerically and intellectually stronger Russian communist party. A significant part of the population, virtually everybody in Western Ukraine/ many in Central Ukraine and some in the Southeast too, would oppose a reunification with Russia, even at the cost of civil war.

The main constraints for Ukraine are rooted in its

common history with Russia, because it was an imposed rather than a chosen common history. (Khmelnysky's treaty of 1654 notwithstanding). The heritage of tsars and commissars has been debilitating to Ukraine and particularly to Ukrainians within Ukraine, though some minorities such as the Tartars have suffered even more.

- Nearly three centuries as a colony of Tsarist Russia – with political, cultural and linguistic oppression – significantly diminished Ukraine's cultural, intellectual and political potential. Seventy years of Soviet regime resulted in the destruction of the peasant class and decimated the cultural and political elites either by extermination or through a brain drain to Russia. Upon the break up of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was left:

- Without any foreign currency, gold or precious metals reserves, or any part of the common Soviet assets abroad (e.g. many valuable buildings including banks), or part of the debt owed to the USSR, although there was an agreement that Ukraine should receive about 17% as its share of the common assets;

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pert Jerair Duchaine during the seminar for the deputies of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine in June 1998: «Ukraine has to make an historical choice: to continue to support the traditional sectors of heavy industry (as well as the bureaucracy related to it) which in most cases are obsolete and unprofitable, or to admit that if these sectors of the economy are unable to get out of the crisis on their own they will gradually degenerate. Along that, it is necessary to allow the development of private enterprise and not to hinder the process.» The key point of these theses is that the role of the Ukrainian bureaucracy since independence has been fundamental to the crisis facing the country as a whole as well as to any prospect of its resolution.

### THE ROLE OF THE BUREAUCRACY IN ECONOMIC REFORMS

Over the last decade, the status of the bureaucracy in Ukraine has ballooned: having been a means of power, it has become a subject of power. In the Soviet times, the Communist Party performed these functions. Its total power provided for stability and dictated the algorithm of the behaviour of the bureaucrats, including the forms and the boundaries of permitted corruption.

Ukraine failed to create a democratic alternative to the

Communist Party as the highest goal-creating and controlling the state machine. The newly created state machine preserved the old cadres, value orientations, and the technology of rule. The weak mechanism of social and political control not only allowed the bureaucracy to take over economic power, but also encouraged the adjustment of the reforming processes to their advantage.

The reformers underestimated the possible self-development of the state machine for achieving strictly inner bureaucratic goals. As a result, approximately from 1993-1995 the economic development in Ukraine has been diverted in favour of the bureaucracy and the associated social groups. These twists are easily seen within the organizational structure of the state machine, in the technology of administering, in the structure of private capital, and in the development of the reforms.

### THE STRUCTURE OF THE STATE MACHINE

A hypertrophied development of the state machine functions, procedures, and organization structures connected with the regulation (registering, permitting, licensing, certification, etc.) and control over the activities of the citizens and enterprises takes place. The bureaucracy has proved to be extremely inventive in creating new possibilities for brib-

- With an economic system that had already disintegrated, and a declining GDP;
- With an economic structure that was integrated with the other republics, but mainly with Russia, based on political rather than on economic or technical criteria, and designed to maintain total interdependence controlled by Moscow;
- With over a third of its industry dedicated to the military sector. The rest of its industry was capital, energy and material intensive, included very little light consumer industry/ and was technologically outdated;
- Without a real banking system;
- Without contemporary management know-how/ or knowledge of markets;
- Politically/ economically, and culturally isolated from the outside world;
- With a colonial type of administration rather than a real government. 85% of Ukraine's economy had been managed directly from Moscow, the government of the Ukrainian SSR being a branch office of that in Moscow, passing orders down and information up, often with distortions in both directions;

- With Russification. All university and 70% of the secondary level education was carried out in Russian even though 75% of population was Ukrainian;
  - With an exceptionally high proportion of the population drawing pensions, including some from Russia;
  - With the Tchernobyl disaster and its traumatic psychological, social and financial consequences.
- To conclude the review of the Eastern option, one can state that close economic relations with Russia are unavoidable and even desirable/ given the economic interdependence and in particular Ukraine's dependence on Russian energy. A political union/ however, would likely have catastrophic consequences. Ukraine would be condemned to economic backwardness, political subordination, and social strife. It would be deprived of an opportunity to develop into a truly free, democratic society, with an efficient economy, a strong collective self-respect, a sense of common identity, and being part of the progressive world society.



ery. This process takes place against the background of declarations by the highest power about the need to promote liberal ideology of deregulation. State functions that do not provide the possibilities for bribery are atrophied or left undeveloped.

#### THE TECHNOLOGY OF THE STATE RULE

During the transition period, the most profitable nationwide and regional markets have been monopolized. Very often artificial monopolies are assigned with functions of state regulation; therefore, the functions of state rule are factually privatized.

#### THE STRUCTURE OF PRIVATE CAPITAL

In these circumstances only capital which has become associated with the state bureaucracy is able to survive. It survives due to privileges and due to not being punished for shadow activities. Bureaucracy counteracts the creation of big private capital markets which would be independent from the state, and 'pushes away' solid foreign investors. The bureaucratic way of regulation retards the development of small enterprise, making it impossible to convert them to medium-size or big sized ones.

#### THE MACRO-ECONOMIC REFORMS

The bureaucracy is interested in retarding economic reforms and in freezing the transition from totalitarianism and the free market. Such a process — the freezing of development at an intermediate stage — is the best environment for carrying out unlawful operations. In this environment, reforms necessary for providing the climate in the sphere of micro-economics which would be agreeable to enterprise and investments, for reforming the sphere of deregulation, implementation the legal procedures of bankruptcy, and liberalizing the taxation system are blocked or stymied.

In Ukraine bureaucratic capitalism has flourished in which the rate, proportions, and quality of creation and re-creation of private capital are controlled by the bureaucracy. The unprecedented deepness and scale of the crisis that has stricken the Ukrainian economy gave birth to the phenomenon designated by foreign scientists as 'the virtual economy.' This is largely a feature of bureaucratic capitalism.

Generally, an economy in which the majority of industrial enterprises and nearly all agricultural enterprises are unprofitable cannot exist. Therefore, there are many reasons to designate the existing phenomenon as 'the Ukrainian miracle'. But this miracle has deep rooted causes.

### 3 THE WESTERN OPTION: INTEGRATION INTO THE EU

*The advantages and the attractiveness* of this option for Ukraine are overwhelming, perhaps obvious, but worth reiterating:

*Security:* Even without becoming a member of NATO Ukraine would be safe from aggression and territorial claims. Its accession to NATO would, however, be more than likely.

*Governance system:* Full institutionalisation and maintenance of a pluralistic society and of individual freedom, a government of the people, for the people/ and by the people, rooted in sound legislative and Judicial foundations.

*Economic efficacy:* Both the system and the structure would be internationally competitive/ supplying and distributing quality goods and services on the domestic market with an increasing prosperity of the whole population.

*Technological innovations:* Highly improved conversion of scientific knowledge into useful technologies, through the «market pull» on the traditionally

large inventory of theoretical knowledge in Ukraine for commercially useful innovations.

*Social:* Access to the best educational expertise in Western Europe, adequate health care, old age security/ and hopefully, a social partnership between government, business, and employees.

*Cultural:* Free interchange with the Western humanist cultures, borrowing from them and contributing to them. Sharpening what is uniquely Ukrainian, yet becoming part of the global society.

*A third way:* The currently dominant thought driving globalisation is:

«What is good for shareholders is good for the world».

There is ample proof that the single-minded pursuit of shareholder value increases the gap between rich and poor, between countries and within countries.

Western Europe with its experience in social democracy provides a good model for the reconciliation of economic efficacy and social justice. The mobilising motto could become: «People are the purpose, profits are the means». This could eliminate any

The disintegration of the USSR considerably diminished the scale and changed the structure of the previous principal consumer — the state — and evoked a shocking jump in fuel prices, causing the collapse of traditional markets and making the Ukrainian economy unattainable for foreign investors. The majority of enterprises in Ukraine (except for the extractive industries) have proved to be ineffective.

In a market economy, a normal reaction to such circumstances would be a reallocation of capital and labour resources between and within the branches of the economy, creating mass bankruptcies, the restructuring of production, and implementation of extensive innovation and innovation strategies. But Ukrainian enterprises, both state owned and corporate, have created principally a new type of economy. It includes barter operations, concealment of income, avoidance of payments to suppliers, to employees, and to the budget. With these manoeuvres, production expenditures are reduced while the employees' consent to be paid with material goods. All that means totally unprofitable enterprises.

Over several years, the crisis has stabilized. The unprofitable economy is being steadily revived. Influential social strata appeared for which such economy is profitable and which creates, supports and revives its organizational and legal conditions. First of all, it supports the employees of

the state machine who have privatized the state functions of regulating and controlling enterprises (taxes, legal documentation, land ownership, sanitary inspection, price regulation, state guarantees, etc.) These functions (the «assets» of the bureaucracy) control the activities of enterprises. But the income gained from the realization of these functions does not convert into the market price of the «assets».

The impossibility to capitalize the bureaucrat's «assets» along with the high risk imposed by the possession of such «assets» greatly determine the attitude of the bureaucracy toward production and capital circulation:

- it has become obvious that the bureaucracy is not interested in the growth of the market value of production because that does not influence the growth of their own well-being, but impedes allocation of illegal property;

- accordingly, the bureaucrats counteract the growth of the legal profitability of capital because that is the main factor of the growth of their value. The legalization of profits impedes its illegal re-allotment;

- the greatest hindrance to the bureaucracy's goals is presented by legal consolidation of capital in the hands of big business independent from it. That is why their obstacles are being created to the growth of share liquidity and to the development of the stock market in its civilized forms.

nostalgia in Ukraine for an «egalitarian» society of the Soviet kind.

Many of the benefits listed above can be achieved via the process of accession to the EU, through better technical assistance, harmonisation of standards, laws, administrative procedures, and increased trade.

*Constraints on the European option:* They are significant, particularly on the Ukrainian side, but not insurmountable. Among the main ones are:

- The current state of Ukrainian political institutions: the legislative, the executive and particularly the judicial;
- Bureaucratic barriers, and corruption;
- The economic system and structure, i.e. ownership of the means of production, the nature of markets, sectoral distribution, and poor management (in particular of state owned enterprises);
- Above all, with the low level of GDP and income per capita, Ukraine would be a potential burden on the EU, particularly regarding future claims of Ukraine on the structural fund of the EU;
- A constraint of a different kind but an important

one is the insufficient surface of contacts with Western Europe. These are adequate at the diplomatic level, but not in the intellectual, cultural and business domains. *There is, therefore, no real pro-Ukrainian lobby in the EU.* The USA, for strategic security considerations, is advocating a Euro-Atlantic option for Ukraine/ but would not likely have to deal with its costs. *Poland* is genuinely supportive but not yet a member state itself. The political leaderships of EU member states, and some of the think tanks, are well aware of the geopolitical importance of Ukraine's integration into the EU, but this awareness does not translate into any vigorous action to facilitate such integration. *Germany's* position on this issue, given its economic weight and the convergence of its national interest with Ukraine's western aspirations, will be of real importance;

• *Russia* officially cannot, and officially does not oppose the accession of Ukraine to the EU, though it is not a candidate itself. Russians, however, «love» Ukraine too much to feel happy about Ukraine being a willing bride of the European Union. Russia is likely



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Most of the highly ranked managers of state owned and privatized enterprises are among the most active advocates and even the originators of the virtual economics. Expenditure of capital is even supported by some of the legitimate capital owners. The reason is that in the situation when production risks are very high, it is more reasonable to consume and compile non-productive riches rather than increase productive capital.

It is the economics of 'capital eating' which is the reason for the unprecedented decrease of capital investments (6 to 7 times in the last decade) which has laid the foundation for an economic decay unprecedented in peace time. Its social and political consequences would be much more dramatic for the citizens if it were not for the so-called 'shadow economy.'

#### THE «SHADOW ECONOMY»: POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE FEATURES

The reaction of enterprises and the citizens of Ukraine to the collapse of the state economy in 1991 – 1993 with the subsequent creation of bureaucratic capitalism and the system of catering to the demands of the bureaucracy was the creation of the shadow economy whose extent is astonishing.

The 'shadow economy' includes:

- concealment of the production of goods and services, that is, the hiding from the state the scope of legal activities of officially registered enterprises;
- informal, unofficial activities, unregistered enterprises, the work at households for the provision of income;
- illegal economic behaviour: bribes, cheating, rackets, smuggling, prostitution, narcotics trafficking, and other activities connected with forced re-allotment of the income, production and distribution of goods and services banned by the law.

According to most experts, the shadow sector dominates the economy of Ukraine. Up to 50 – 60 per cent of the gross income is produced within the shadow economy (therefore, the economic decline fixed by the official statistics was indeed smaller.) The results of random surveys suggest that more than half of the employees obtain income beyond their official job.

Only the existence of the shadow economics prevents the total impoverishment of Ukraine. Moreover, in 1998 the average dwelling space in Ukraine amounted to 20.2 sq. meters per capita against 17.8 sq. meters in 1990. It should be noted that in 1998, 59 per cent of the house building expenses were covered by the citizens while a decade ago their

to exert some pressures on the EU and in particular on Ukraine not to be too expeditious with the integration agenda, even though Ukraine's membership in the EU would probably allow Russia to draw more benefits from its own partnership relations with the EU. Nevertheless, the EU's policy towards Ukraine has not been sufficiently dissociated from its relations with Russia, which is one of the constraints on the European option of Ukraine.

### 3.1 How should Ukraine pursue this only real option?

Some rapprochement or drawing closer has already occurred as manifested by the conclusion, ratification and the first steps in the implementation of the *Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA)*. The *Common Strategy of the EU* of December 1999 was a further step in the right direction.

Effective membership in the *Partnership for Peace Program (PPP)* and the *Special Charter with NATO* have also contributed to the rapprochement.

### 3.2 What needs to be done to transform Ukraine's European option into reality?

Ukraine must shed any ambivalence, if only im-

plied, about its European choice. Statements that Ukraine's foreign policy is multi-vectoral or that it is neither pro-Western, nor pro-Eastern, but pro-Ukrainian may help maintain reasonably friendly relations with its Eastern neighbor, but can also confuse the Ukrainian people and raise questions in the West about Ukraine's determination to pursue its chosen Western path. The policies, pronouncements and actions of Ukraine's government must be subordinated to its strategic, geopolitical Western choice.

To fulfil some of the key preconditions for entry into the EU, Ukraine must complete its administrative reforms and the transformation of its agriculture into a more productive and competitive sector, carry out privatisation in important sectors such as energy, and achieve a higher degree of price liberalisation. Ukraine must also repair relations with the IMF, attract more direct foreign investment, in particular from Western Europe and encourage flight capital to return. This can only be achieved:

- By stabilising legislation and making it predictable;

share constituted 24.2 per cent. The number of cars in the citizens' possession increased by one third, from 63 to 98 per 1,000 inhabitants.

In a situation where the obsolete state machine was collapsing, the shadow economics (its non-criminal sector) has played the role of a kind of a 'stabilizer' of production and of living standards. Its development stimulated a structural reconstruction of the state economy by orienting it to market demand. Nevertheless, in the long run the massive shadow activities lead to the technical and technological degradation of economy. Due to the peculiarities of relations between state and society, the shadow economy inevitably becomes criminal, and criminal types of relations gradually becomes a necessary attribute of any economic operation. Finally, the massive shadow economics is connected with the loss by the state of control over most real financial operations that prevent it from performing its basic functions, including social ones. The most vulnerable groups of inhabitants who do not get income from the shadow activities do not get proper social support from the state.

Chronologically, the acceleration of the shadow economy took place in 1994-1997. It is confirmed by the growth of the monetary mass beyond the range of bank op-

erations: 24.7, 38.3, 43.1, and 48.9 per cent in 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997 correspondingly. Some experts, including Prime Minister Victor Yushchenko and Secretary of the Cabinet of Ministers Victor Lysytskyj, attribute this to the sudden increase in state consumption.

In addition, the expenditures of the administrative power grew at a strikingly high rate, and that took place against the background of a decline of the gross income which is the main source of production expansion (in 1997, the part of the gross income constituted only 30 per cent of the bulk production while in 1993 that index was equal to 54 per cent). These indices depict an economy of 'feating the capital' and of re-allotting public resources to the bureaucracy.

Since 1993, a persistent increase tax increase has become the means of this reallocation. Most of the bureaucrats assert that the level of the taxation in Ukraine is much less than European rates. They explain the continuing drop of state budget income and tax revenues with the reduction of taxation levels.

But it is incorrect to compare Ukrainian fiscal policy and realities with corresponding policies of most developed countries. The fiscal possibilities of every country depend on the level of its economic development. Therefore it is necessary to compare the levels of taxation with those coun-

- By the reduction of barriers to imports and of corruption;
- By the reduction of the number of taxes and tax rates;
- By the removal of special privileges for many entities;
- And by bringing more of the shadow economy into the official one.

The *EU can do much* to help Ukraine's leadership mobilise the society's energy to complete the transformation process and thus approach its long-term accession objective. The EU should:

- Be less «iffy» about future accession to membership of Ukraine;
- Expand technical assistance to facilitate the harmonisation of laws and procedures;
- From its end, energetically pursue the implementation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement;
- Grant Ukraine «market economy» status as soon as possible, to help it with its foreign trade;
- Help Ukraine to achieve associate status with the EU;

- Support Ukraine's accession to the World Trade Organisation;
- Open up the possibility of a free trade zone agreement.

#### 4 ARE THERE OTHER OPTIONS OPEN FOR UKRAINE?

The *Baltic-Black Sea Union* is a nice dream but it is not a reality. Improvements to the north-south transportation system are clearly desirable/ but are an insufficient basis for a union.

*GUUM* – has some geopolitical connotation because it represents the joint flexing of muscles by five independent countries (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova)/ without seeking the benediction of Russia. This consultative forum of five states has some fairly concrete objectives:

- The creation of a Eurasian transport corridor particularly for oil and gas;
- The peaceful settlement of conflicts and combatting secession;
- Military technical co-operation;



tries with comparable gross production per capita. In countries where the gross national product per capita is between \$2.000 and \$6.000 (Ukraine belongs to this group even if the shadow national product is taken into consideration), the average level of total fiscal revenues is almost two times less than Ukraine. That means that the level of average tax burden in Ukraine is much higher than in other countries with comparable economies.

The reduction of the tax share in the gross national product cannot be assessed as the reduction of the taxation burden. The level of the latter is best characterized by the index of the true taxes (the volume of the taxes less subsidies) in the gross national product. In 1993 it has increased three times.

From a technical point of view, it would not be difficult to make the economy shadowless. It is simply necessary to reduce the volume of state expenditures to a realistic level, to radically reduce the tax burden and thus to eliminate such key elements of the 'virtual economy' as barter-type operations, avoiding of payments, abolishing debts, privileges, etc. Indeed, it's the excessive tax burden that legalizes these traits. In circumstances when the state reallocates nearly the entire volume of income and profits produced by legal economics, it is practically impossible to meet all tax demands.

#### THE PROSPECTS ARE NOT THAT HOPELESS

Could Ukraine use the experience of more successful Eastern European countries?

Their economies were less militarized, were better oriented toward the demands of the population, and their service sector is much better developed than that in the USSR. Besides, some countries of Eastern Europe began the implementation of market oriented reforms much earlier (Hungary – in 1968, Poland – in 1971). That made possible the creation of a basic market infrastructure well before the nineties which acquired definitive significance in achieving better results compared to, say, Ukraine, Romania or Bulgaria.

Ukraine was unable to set starting conditions for reform. As other CIS countries, Russia endures the same problems with the 'virtual economy' and 'shadowing' as does Ukraine. More decent indices of economic decay and higher gross national product per capita are explained first of all by the inflow of the oil and gas dollars, as well as to some extent by a more rational financial policy at the beginning of the reforms which allowed Russia avoid the highest world rates of inflation.

As a consequence of economic, historical, mental, and geopolitical circumstances, as well as their greater political maturity, the Baltic and Eastern European countries promptly

- The co-ordination of actions in international organisations;
- Economic co-operation;
- The creation of a Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (headquartered in Greece).

Neither of the above arrangements are alternatives to the Western integration option. Their objectives are not constraints on Ukraine's European choice. On the contrary/ their effective functioning would strengthen Ukraine's position in dealing with the EU.

## 5 CONCLUSIONS

Many *historical bridges* have existed between Ukraine and Western Europe. In the 11th century, four of Prince Yaroslav's children were married to Western royal courts. Anna of Kyiv became the Queen of France not just because of her beauty, but because she was the most literate at the court. Yaroslav set a sort of precedent for Western Europe by ordering a codification of laws. Western Ukraine was never fully detached from Western Europe. Even during the New Economic Policy (NEP) period in the twenties, a Ukrai-

created a more or less effective means of social control over the bureaucracy, and of designing a state machine for the benefit of the entire society. These means are similar to those employed in the process of forming Western civilization. That has not been the case in Ukraine. At the very early stages of economic transformation, the bureaucracy as a sovereign subject of economic power did not encounter any competition. As a result, there emerged such features as a 'virtual economy', 'eating the capital', mass 'shadowing' of economic relations which lead to the appearance of a stable 'rotten' semi-criminal market economy and a political system serving it.

The presence of these signs in Ukraine is obvious although hardly stable. The 'economy of eating the capital' has nearly exhausted its own feeding reserves which is attested by the country's balancing at the edge of national default. We can only pray the bureaucracy has some 'instinct of self-preservation'. It worked once in 1994 when the hyperinflation led the country close to financial collapse. It is hardly a coincidence that V. Yushenko has headed the government at the end of 1999. The Prime Minister declared his adherence to liberal values while the corner stones of his program are the measures aimed at eradicating the 'virtualism' and 'shadowness' of the economy. Further de-

nian literary figure from the Eastern part of Ukraine was preaching «our face to Europe and our back to Russia». This pro-Western declaration was squashed along with its author.

In reality, though, the bridges between Ukraine and Western Europe are old. They have to be rebuilt. This building should be done from both sides, the Ukrainian and the Western European. For Ukraine the objective of joining the EU is really a question of to be or not to be.

Ukraine will be a burden to the EU, but it will ultimately also be of benefit:

- It has a highly educated population, much of it with the type of education that can fit into the knowledge civilisation;
- It has a network of scientific institutions that can be revitalised;
- It has the most fertile soil in the world;
- It has established friendship treaties with all its neighbors;
- It has no imperialistic or aggressive past;
- It has achieved inter-ethnic peace, which given

lay with their implementation threatens the existence of the Ukrainian state.

Neither is it a coincidence that active measures have been directed at the creation of a party-based political system and a responsible parliamentary majority which would cooperate with the Cabinet (though it is doubtful if the existing system will prove effective without immediate forming of the government by the parliamentary majority and the adoption of the government's program as a coalition treaty between the parties comprising the parliamentary majority).

These features as well as the administrative reform provide a basis for a process of creating a system which would advocate the priority of social goals over the private interests of the bureaucracy. Only tough persistence in the chain: society — the parties — the representative organs (the parliament, the president) — political government — bureaucracy — will provide the subordination of the bureaucracy to the interests of society.

Optimism also comes from nature of economic development in 1999 — 2000. However, economic growth per se does not always mean a stronger and more vibrant economy.

For example, the 1998 (prior to the beginning the August crisis) economic growth was negatively interpreted by a number of experts. Specialists at the Ukrainian-European

the historical context, is an exemplary accomplishment;

- Ukraine asserts strongly its multi-ethnic status. This is being taken rather far. The Ukrainian ethnic majority seems prepared to remain a linguistic minority for a long time in order to preserve interethnic intercultural peace.

If Ukraine were to join a Slavic Union, the psychological confidence and resolve of reactionary forces in Russia to strive for big power status and create an anti-Western block, could be reborn. By joining the EU, Ukraine would lessen this danger significantly for the benefit of Russia, which could thus more readily transform itself into a normal federal nation state with peaceful relations with EU and others. The benefit of this alone would more than offset any cost of Ukraine's accession to the EU.

Am I, are we dreaming? Yes, but only partly. Do great things not start with a dream? Did the EU not come into being because of Jean Monet's visionary dreams? At this historical juncture for Ukraine we have to dream big, transform the dreams into mobilising

visions, and then work hard, pragmatically, Co transform the vision into reality. This is the challenge before us.



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Consultative Center on Legal Issues consider that the indices of economic growth achieved in 1998 were «... not the signs of halting the crisis. The reasons are as follows:

- 1) the growth takes place predominantly in the basic sectors. Therefore, it will preserve the branch structure which is disadvantageous for competition on foreign markets and which negatively influences the well being of the country as a whole;

- 2) growth took place at the non-restructured plants; it is not accompanied by the creation of newly flexible units in the production and service sectors.

Therefore, the economic growth has a very limited material base. It depends on financial support from the state».

Some foreign and Ukrainian leading experts (for example, a former vice-primer-minister Victor Pynzenyk) also doubt the existence of a sound base for economic growth in the second half of 1999 and in 2000. But the nature of this last economic growth differs from that of the beginning of 1998. At the session of the Supreme Rada on 5 April 2000, Premier Victor Yuschenko declared: «... The highest growth rates have been registered in the branches oriented to the ultimate consumer (practically, the production index in these branches exceeded by three times that of the correspondent period of the previous year). Factually, we are

witnessing the first positive financial results of the hard work in the area of the transformation of property relations in Ukraine. The branches in which the growth exceeds by three times the average in the country are the denationalized ones: they are either private or operate on corporate principles».

In spite of all difficulties, endless bureaucratic distortions, deformations, etc., the process of Ukrainian 'sleepy' privatization has lead to some positive consequences. Non-state enterprises more often demonstrate the signs of rational market behaviour.

Experts at the Harvard Institute of International Development and the Center of Market Reforms have analyzed the dynamics of the changes of balance indices in 1999 at 9 thousand privatized and state owned enterprises. Through all sections of the balances the average indices of the privatized enterprises are better than those of the state owned ones:

- the growth of the long time investments volume (per 1 hryvnia of sold production) is 15 times higher than the corresponding index of state owned enterprises;

- unlike state-owned enterprises, the non-state ones are more accurate in choosing their business partners. As per 1 hryvnia of sold production, their overdue debtor's debts are 7 times less;

- in their accounts with the budget, the indices of priva-

Із землі

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# culture in ukraine

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tized enterprises are incomparably better. The credit debts against the tax invoices are 200 times lower than those at the state owned enterprises;

- non-state enterprises make production for not to be stored in repositories but for the consumers. The ready products stock (per 1 hryvnia of the sold production) there is 15 times less than that at state owned enterprises.

Therefore, the dynamics of economic growth in 2000 presents grounds for optimism though it is too early to speak of solid economic growth and of overcoming the 'economy of capital eating'. But it is important that in spite of all pains on the way of reforms, the first results have been achieved. The Ukrainian economy still possesses the prospects of normal development on the basis that have been successfully employed in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe.

OLEKSANDR  
PASKHAVER  
NEW UKRAINIAN  
STATE

Cultural production in contemporary Ukraine is grounded predominantly on the lingual traditions of Russian language, and quite often it is of Russian origin. Whether such a trend will persist in the XXI-th century will largely depend on the state, and on the strategy it will choose at last for the cultural terrain.

#### THE WORLD CONTEXT: THE PARAMOUNT DISPOSITION

At the extremity of the Second Millennium the global processes in the field of culture are extremely deviant and controversial. Nevertheless, it is possible to indicate some most important features.

Firstly, as a result of the transition of the most industrially developed countries into the post-industrial phase, the sole content of their cultural environment is determined as never before with cultural industries incorporating highly sophisticated technologies and gaining one of the most dominant positions in the economy.

Secondly, the influence on culture of the process of globalization, which affects every sphere of our life, becomes still more profound. This process has given birth to the phenomenon of the coexistence of multiple cultures.

Thirdly, in the contemporary globalized world new conceptions are arising concerning the objectives of social development and the role of culture in it (the concept of the so called 'humanitarian development').

#### Cultural industries

In European countries culture became an industry approximately from the middle of the 19-th century when the development of industry and technology differentiated extensive industrial manufacture from craftsmanship (converting the latter into 'applied arts'), and when secular literature and the progress in printing abolished the domination of churches in the book publishing. Due to the substantial growth of the wealthy and educated bourgeois class (and later, the overall middle class' as well), mass consumption of cultural production appeared. In the XX-th century more radical changes appeared due to the emergence of strictly commercial and highly profitable cultural industries, such as cinema, radio, and sound recording. Due to the transition of countries with the most developed technology into the post-industrial level of development, the apportionment of the traditional 'producing' sector in the national gross income gradually decreased, producing the



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# Мезабудьме culture

*9. Which of spiritual values which appeared during the last decade became the symbols-signs of Ukrainian culture without censorship? Did we leave the Soviet values during that time, accept the universal and appeal to the national values?*

so called 'information sector producing 'ideas'. Having acquired 'goods qualities' and being spread via the mass media, the arts in the West presently has become a prosperous business. Industries based on intellectual property become more and more powerful. These are publishing and cinema businesses, audio and video industries, show and video cassette businesses and, lastly, the computer software industry. For example, following automobile production and agriculture, the 'copyright industries' in the USA occupy third position in the list of the largest export sectors within the national gross income.

#### The concept of humanitarian development

At the end of the 20-th century, the process of re-evaluating the role and position of art and culture in contemporary societies has given birth to a revised concept of humanitarian development. For the past two decades, within Europe that development has been interpreted from the education-rationalist point of view as a symbol of progress — that is, of intensive utilization both human and natural potentials, economic development, renovation of technologies, growth of well being, and so on. The role of culture and arts was considered as nonessential.

But due to disappointment with scientific and techno-

logical progress, which failed to make people happy, there appeared a more flexible concept of humanitarian development.

The 1996 UNESCO report entitled «Our Creative Diversity» defines the notion of «humanitarian development» as «the process which extends individuals' real freedom in achieving anything they consider a value». The concept identifies development through a long list of possibilities — from political, economic, and social freedoms through possibilities for individuals to be healthy and educated and creatively active, and to enjoy self-respect and human rights.

Correspondingly, the goals of the cultural policy are re-evaluated as well. According to the above-mentioned report, its objectives should be expanded, first of all by rejecting the monolithic notion of 'national culture', and by accepting the concept of a variety of individual options and group cultural practices. Furthermore this includes a) preservation of cultural-historical inheritance; b) access to cultural resources and practices; c) development of creative potential of societies; d) encouraging cultural pluralism in contemporary societies.

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#### Yury ANDRUKHOVYCH, writer

I would dare to separate formally cultural and artistic process into three main streams.

The first is the most traditional and the most official and focused in the area of «National Artistic Unions» scarcely supported by the state in persons of its «social ministers». They were for the most part active in the artistic sphere of the former USSR, and without even removing the old communist medals from their jackets (now a bit shabby), and without inner struggle, they started their activity in the sphere of independent Ukraine. They assumed nationalist patriotic phraseology in the same natural manner as they manipulated (without constraint) Soviet patriotic phraseology of the past. They even managed to acquire new Ukrainian awards. These people always support the state, no matter what the state is and to whom power belongs. This cultural type is the one closest to the proper «old aesthetic substance» with its colonial contents and loyalty pathos. And as in the opinion of great majority of Ukrainian society, this type is still associated most readily with «ukrainianness» and proper Ukrainian culture. Indeed, it is impossible to exaggerate the impact of this group, negative unfortunately, and to surpass its level of compromising everything in view, first of all that of the young generation.

The second stream is a part of the Ukrainian artistic process, more in a formal sense, or to say it better, due to its place of residence. In fact it is a part of Russian imperial culture, though noticeably overshadowed by its apparent «second class» status in relation to the Moscow metropolis. Within this group the trend of «Ukraine without «ukrainianness»» is predominant. It may be called a part of «Ukrainian culture,» if only as a matter of taking into account its immense and bitter impact on modern Ukrainian society, primarily in the area of mass culture, of which it controls 90%.

New Ukrainian culture being something different — here I refer to the third stream — is emerging at the fringes of the other two: limited edition books, circulating in one thousand copies, theatrical performances for only a few dozen spectators in makeshift venues, rock-concerts for a hundred mad fans, underground studios, presentations for one's parents, contacts between the initiated. Rare outbreaks into the «outer world» are possible only by means of «media», primarily TV, where new Ukrainian culture always finds a few agents.

I will not say that these **outsiders** are so bad: leading ideologies and systems of values started from the catacombs too. This culture is not subject to censorship, and (I dare to use somewhat discredited word)

## The tasks of cultural policies

### The historical context

The nineties brought Ukrainian culture to an era of deep and controversial transformation. . On the one hand, these processes meant dissociation from the Soviet totalitarian ideological machine. As a consequence, an outdated system of values and cultural practices emerged, while the cultural institutions inherited from the Soviet era deteriorated. On the other hand, a new cultural infrastructure of predominantly non-state origin is gradually forming. In a broader context, a qualitatively different (not necessarily a better one) paradigm of Ukrainian national culture appeared – as a culture which is neither mono-ethnic or populist but is not restricted to ghetto-type elitism.

The key elements of the contemporary cultural transformation in Ukraine are: ideological (that is, the transformation of cultural values); economic (gradual introduction of market principles and private enterprise at least in some sectors of culture); legislative and administrative (legalizing cultural rights and freedoms, creating judicial grounds for existence of non-state cultural institutions); technological changes in cultural industries; and, at last, transformation of everyday cultural practices of contemporary Ukrainians.

These changes take place against the background of

independent insofar as it has not been claimed by the Soros Foundation, or something similar, though this may be called «normal dependence» in other parts of the world. I hope that this marginality may turn out actually something far more influential than Russo-phonism or patriotic *officiality*.

If it is worth lingering over identifying symbols and tokens, then let this culture ferment for ten more years at least, let its current leaders grow at least a bit older, and then we will evaluate its resilience.

### Vadym SKURATOVSKYJ, Professor, Karpenko-Karyj Theatrical Art Institute

No really bright personalities have emerged in Ukrainian culture of the independent era. One must remember that, regrettably, the natural and regular burden that had been weighing on the country for centuries was removed only at the threshold of 1990s. Therefore one cannot expect any intellectual and artistic marvels from the present epoch. The most important fact is that favourable conditions to artistic and political creative activities have been established.

In the Soviet period, a number of Ukrainian writers and poets – from Taras Shevchenko to Lesya Ukrainka – were honoured properly. But so many falsifications, so many imitations were concentrated around them in

deep economic crisis. The capability of the state to effectively maintain, let alone to develop the cultural infrastructure is decreasing. The portion of the state budget allotted to culture has decreased from approximately 2 per cent in 1992 to less than 0,5 per cent in 1999. During the same period, the number employed in the sphere of culture has declined from 260 thousand to less than 180 thousand. The wear and tear of the material and technical base in the sphere of culture is increasing every Year.

Though the Ministry of Culture and Arts is formally the central state organ responsible for the maintaining culture, its actual ability to influence the situation is limited to a hundred establishments which are directly subordinated to it, and to some control of the regional divisions of culture. As for finances, the state budget and the Ministry of Culture is responsible for underwriting approximately one fifth of the culture allowance, the rest coming from the local budgets.

Meanwhile, thousands of old and new cultural establishments, particularly those who appeared without state initiative, get nothing from the state. Therefore the tax inspectors are the only representatives of the state whom they contact.

These are the four main directions for the cultural

that epoch that these great personalities of national culture were made ambiguous. I suppose that various provocative or sceptic remarks relating to them in mass Ukrainian and especially in mass Ukrainian Russo-phonism are the results of these pseudo reputations. During the last decade, Ukrainian culture has exerted efforts to recover the authentic reputations of its national and cultural personalities. A current look at portraits of Shevchenko, or Lesya Ukrainka, or, say, even Nechuy-Levytskyj, Panas Myrnyj is already quite different from those of Soviet times, and, in general, more fully approximates the great reality of these great persons.

### Raul CHILACHAVAGH, Writer, professor at the National Taras Shevchenko University

The greatest spiritual value of Ukraine, in my opinion, is its people's reverting to Christian sources, in spite of vexatious state of interdenominational relations and scandalous details of the fight for a single church.

Another significant event is the manifestation in all-Ukrainian cultural circulations of the so-called «Literature of Diaspora», represented by V.Vynnytschenko, E.Malanyuk, O.Teliga, O.Olgich, T.Osmachka, I.Bagryanyj, Y.Klen, V.Barka etc., that was prohibited and almost unknown in past.



aspects of «humanitarian development» in contemporary society. What is the situation with these directions in contemporary Ukrainian culture?

#### Creative self- manifestation

Nowadays, Ukrainian arts are developing in the environment of freedom and openness which had little precedent in its history (except perhaps for the short period in 1917-1918, though the political and economical situation are now considerably more stable). Censorship has been virtually erased; numerous banned names and works have been revealed to the society. For the first time there exists a common Ukrainian cultural continuum embracing past and modern, «Soviet» and «anti-Soviet», «Western» and «Eastern», the «home» and the «Diaspora». The demolishing of the «Iron curtain» and national independence opened Ukrainian culture to closer integration into European and world processes. But it has become obvious that both 'high' and traditional folk Ukrainian cultures were not ready to withstand massive pressure from mass-culture and commercially oriented production. That is particularly evident in the show and cinema business, and on radio and television. In the situation of unprecedented cultural openness (which means also greater vulnerability), it has

become obvious that native Ukrainian culture is far from dominant in Ukraine, and that often it yields to Russian and West European cultural models and output.

#### Preservation of cultural inheritance

Of the 136 thousand objects under state protection (in most cases symbolic), less than half are truly objects of cultural inheritance. By contrast thousands of real relics of the past are not yet registered and protected. The situation is aggravated by the lack of legal responsibility for destroying the relics.

During the era of 'reconstruction' and independence, the number of museums has grown by more than two times (from 167 in 1980 to 367 in 1998), but their financial situation is deteriorating. Their collections include more than 10 million pieces of which only 8 to 10 per cent are exhibited while the rest remain out of sight due to the lack of exposition sites.

#### Attainability of cultural potential

Though the principle of funding the network of public cultural establishments has been preserved, the shortage of actual funds has compelled some institutions (opera houses, concert halls, etc.) to increase entrance fees, whereas others retain low fees (libraries, museums) while the standards of

As regards the works of Ukrainian writers of the most recent period that impressed me for their large-scale narration, performed in the keys of sublimity and grief, I would mention the novel «Nalyvayko» by Mykola Vingranovskyj, and the epic poem «Berestechko» by Lina Kostenko. The outstanding phenomena of independent Ukrainian culture, are, without doubt, the masterpieces created by Ivan Marchuk.

I do not dare to name personalities that have been «symbols and tokens», because I have doubts of their existence, currently.

Modern Ukrainian culture is like a beautiful captive in hands of rapists, trying to save her chastity. The political commitments of statesmen, squinting with one eye at Washington, and with other back at Moscow, does not allow her freedom.

#### Myroslav POPOVYCH, Correspondent academic, Ukrainian National Academy of Science

Were Albert Einstein or Dmitrij Shostakovich cultural symbols for their own time? No, undoubtedly, though cultural giants like them do express the most profound features of their epoch. Rather it is the representatives of mass culture who mainly become «symbols» and «tokens». Mass culture is getting more independent and its

personages becoming increasingly popular, although, on the other hand, highly professional experts also find niches for themselves.

Were there in Ukrainian culture of the past decade phenomena to remain forever? I guess there were. But it does not mean that such works are of «epochal value». The history of literature uses the concept of the «literary background», that is the ambient environment necessary for great outbreaks. But it is for history to decide who belongs to that background and who does not.

#### Maryna NOVYKOVA, Professor, Tavric University

In most respects, modern Ukrainian philosophy, philology, culture and art are not inferior to the best works of Western Europe. The situation is rather opposite. I take pride in promptness of prominent Ukrainian scientists and artists to adopt advanced know-how and initiative in addressing the most acute problems – both philological and social – of the 20-th century. But I do not notice anything similar on the part of, say, Western partners. Their knowledge of Ukraine, the Slavic world or Eastern Europe is far worse than our insight into their reality.

The most important phenomenon of current culture is restorative. First of all we have to restore everything hidden, squeezed out, suppressed in the Soviet times. For

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service gradually become less acceptable to the public. In general, the state does little to preserve access to culture in the market environment — such as introducing reduced taxation (the only exception is the abolishing of taxes on added value on sale of books and textbooks printed in Ukraine.)

Nevertheless, political, ideological, and administrative restrictions of admission to culture disappeared (the censorship, 'special' (closed to the public) depositories, etc.) which made it accessible at least for the elite.

### Cultural pluralism

The basic principle of the concept of cultural pluralism and multi-culture is abandoning the idea of a monolithic national culture (that is, based on a single language, on common ethnic and ideological traditions) and accepting the notion of equality of multiple cultures, subcultures, styles of life, and creative practices characteristic for different national, ethnic, social, religious, and even age groups.

Ukrainian society is not yet ready for such multiculturalism either institutionally, or ideologically. Besides, it is not entirely obvious if swift transition to it would be useful nowadays. There is still a struggle between the adherents of the ideals of 'genuine' ethnic-national culture

and the supporters of the so-called «internationalism» which factually is a Soviet doctrine. Language legislation and its practical implementation have become the principal battlefield. However, the cultural practices of the contemporary Ukrainian society are merged with certain elements of multi-culture in the form of influential existence in Ukraine of Russian and Russian language cultures (the so called 'elevated' one, and even to a greater extent — the 'mass culture'). For example, 60 per cent of the popular music marked is occupied with Russian production, 30 per cent — with the Western one, while only 6 to 7 per cent of the market is represented with the Ukrainian production. 61 per cent of the state libraries funds go to books and magazines in Russian, 38 per cent — in Ukrainian, and only one per cent to other languages.

### The infrastructure of cultural sphere Television

Television is certainly the leading and popular leisure time habit of contemporary Ukrainians. Its leading position only increased in the nineties due to the diversification of programs and the emergence of numerous independent channels. The phenomenon is explained as well by the fact that other traditional forms of leisure (i.e., books,



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so long we had poor communication with the outside, and when new times came, it seemed as if someone would appear who had been able to say things we had not been allowed to say. But it turned out that the experience of withstanding oppression, along with taking responsibility for our own national culture, has accomplished more than freedom. National identity has been kept, even if it has been hidden.

### Dmytro GORBACHEV, art historian

The removal of the pressures of censorship and the opening of international borders in the last decade have prompted the rise of Ukrainian culture. A number of distinguished artists now do not leave now their native country, as it was usual for several centuries of colonial dependence. And even if they do migrate abroad, prompted by material needs, they may well visit Ukraine and affect artistic process.

In these years Ukraine has inserted itself into the global coordinate system, sometimes on a par, though not too often. The influence of Ukrainian (even in the form of Russo-phone) «media» is greater than in Soviet age, when only the Moscow information flow prevailed. In these years national minorities, including Jews, Tartars, Poles and Assyrians have contributed their voices.

The concept of «Ukrainian culture» as itself has changed for the better. Formerly any outstanding phenomenon was called «Russian»: Kiev St.Sofya Cathedral, Bortnyanskyj and Berezovskyj, Levytskyj and Borovykovskyj, Repin, Malevich. At the same time any outstanding phenomenon that did not come within the scope of definition «Russian» was hushed up and depreciated: Kurbas, Dovzhenko, Bogomazov, Petrytskyj, Velychkovskyj, Yermolov, Dragomanov, Chyzhevskyj.

My trips abroad to take parts in international conferences have made my view on our culture quite different. I have realized that it is neither better nor worse than other ones and that Ukrainians rank perceptibly in global cultural process, and sometimes even have some advantage, as in the development of non-figurative art.

### Dmytro STUS, philologist

The last decade has not given birth (neither could it) to any significant cultural symbols, let alone the appearance of a symbolic personality. The situation is quite natural, both because the post-imperial (barbarous, actually) essence of our culture lacks of context, and in view of artists' bondage to money-bags with rather crude or vague ideas Ukrainian traditions, or western grants with certain methodological requirements.

magazines, theatre, and concerts) have become unattainable. The Ukrainian television terrain is dominated by the non-government TV studio «1 + 1» and by the Inter channel. According to the results of sociologist inquests carried out at the beginning of 2000, 77 per cent of Kyivites and 80 per cent of inhabitants of the city of Lviv regularly watch the programs of «1 + 1», 82 per cent of Kyivites and 69 per cent of Lviv inhabitants regularly watch the programs of the Inter channel. The third most popular in Kyiv is The New Channel (49 per cent), in Lviv – the UT-1 (44 per cent).

Another important feature of the current period of time is vast expansion of cable and satellite television (though, only in big cities yet). That is stimulated by the decrease of the charge for the cable TV providers' services, the emergence of several Russian satellite channels, and the impossibility to watch as before the GRT, NTV, and TV-6 Moscow TV channels (i.e., through the free rebroadcast by the Ukrainian TV network).

Due to the 1998 financial crisis and consequent severe reduction of income from the advertisements, the financial situation of all TV companies has deteriorated, and they have become more dependent on their 'sponsors' and vulnerable to pressure.

## The cinematography

At the beginning of the eighties, the cinema studios produced yearly 30 to 35 full-length feature films, several dozen cartoon films, up to a hundred of documentary and popular science films. By the middle of the nineties, these indices dropped approximately by half, and now only several full-length films are produced yearly.

Cinema attendance has also dropped drastically: in 1980, there were 16 visits per capita, in 1995 – only one, and in 1998 – 0.1 per capita.

Besides production problems, serious ones of a creative character emerged. Some specialists assert that it is necessary to produce yearly (on the budget funds) 30 – 40 films with well pronounced national background, with historic and patriotic content, and with well-known Ukrainian actors. A dozen of this nature films were produced, with several pictures of high artistic quality among them (for example, 'The Cherry Nights', 'Atentat'). But the situation with the attitude of the spectators and potential investors did not change much.

On the other hand, some experts believe that the state has to provide decent conditions at least for the most talented masters who should be able to produce everything they wish, and to enrich Ukrainian cinema with their

Thus, even such brilliant individualities of Ukrainian culture as the late S.Pavlychko, O.Zabuzhko, Y.Andrukhovych, N.Yakovenko have had to maintain a balance between the need to create their own world, and conformity to the standard set of regulations for western grant recipients. This conflict makes their names very popular in confined circles of intellectuals and almost unknown outside the cultural centers.

Nevertheless all these names deserve to be discussed, and their contribution to Ukrainian culture of the last decade is essential, though not estimated properly. The representatives of culture supported by finance tycoons have achieved less. As for me, I have noticed nothing substantially new and noteworthy in theatre art or in exhibitions, in literature or in science, in painting or in architecture. The same names, well-known since Soviet times, are with us: Lina Kostenko, perhaps Ivan Dzuba, perhaps somebody else, who hasn't passed away, yet. But what else? Emptiness.

As regards the national values, in my opinion, no short-term prospects for essential changes in this area have appeared. As to long term prospects, the process of general and obligatory studies of Ukrainian language will **increase** the share of the Ukrainophone population on few decades, assuming that knowledge of the

language will facilitate career goals. But language is only one national value. As to the rest, sooner or later a choice must be made. Still it is desirable to choose the latter.

## Oksana ZABUZHKO, author: «The individuals who define Ukrainian cultural politics behave like lackeys in a deserted lord's estate»

Ukrainian culture does not yet have universally symbolic figures or phenomena; these exist only within the framework of separate, partial subcultures, scattered and totally unconnected to each other.

When Princess Diana died, I was struck by the coverage of her funeral – struck by the truly national extent of the mourning in Britain. I thought, God forgive me (we should all live long lives!), is there anyone in Ukraine who would inspire a similar reaction if he or she died today, who would make us citizens feel like one community of 50 million people, united only by the pain of loss? You see, it is precisely these kinds of mass phenomena that reveal, like a kind of litmus paper, the depth of symbolic meaning in a culture: in Britain it had to be a royal; in the U.S., it might be a sports figure or a rock star, or in the worst case scenario, a president; in continental Europe, film stars and directors are best known, or sometimes even opera singers who serve as the «nation's voice»

masterpieces. Such films have been created, mainly in cooperation with Russian producers. For example: 'The companion of the run-away' (produced by V. Krishtofovich), 'Three stories' (produced by K. Muratova), «The princess on beans' (produced by V. Novak), the film produced by R. Balayan 'Three moons and two suns'. These films were a success at several festivals, they have got favourable press, but after that, nothing else was achieved. A greater success among the public was achieved with the TV serials produced on «Ukrtefilm» by O. Biyma (The Jaw, The Island of Love, and The Crime with Several Unknown Quantities) and by B. Nebieridze ('Roksolana' with Olga Sums'ka starring). These films were shown several times on the UT-1 TV channel, and were sold to the Russian GRT TV channel.

The third 'salvation path' was displayed by the commercial success of the Polish fancy-dress epochal film after G. Senkevich's novel 'By fire and sword', in which several Ukrainian actors participated. There appeared suggestions about the necessity of producing Ukrainian historical 'blockbusters' which allegedly would be able to save Ukrainian cinema by bringing glory and money. Time will tell if the new panacea proves effective.

Table 1  
Production of books, newspapers, magazines in Ukraine

Year	Books:			Magazines:			Newspapers:		
	titles	edition	including	titles	total	including in	titles	total	including
	(copies,		in	circulation		Ukrainian		circulation	in
	total)		Ukrainian	(million/year)				(million, per a single edition)	Ukrainian
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]
1980	9061	145	92	198	211	193	1737	24	16
1989	8450	190	95	203	173	152	1763	24	16
1993	5053	141	37	296	33	30	1757	40	26
1998	7065*	44	24	1009	57	10	2660	48	19

\* Including: in Ukrainian – 3.8 thousand titles, in Russian – 2.5 thousand titles, in other languages – nearly 800 titles (according to the data obtained from The Book Chamber of Ukraine).



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### Radio and the music industry

As for the nation-wide level, the first program of Ukrainian state-supported radio, and the 'Promin' program dominate. This is explained mainly by the fact that they are broadcast to the fixed-program receiving units present almost at every kitchen. But in the cities where private music FM channels operate the audience, especially younger

(for example, Maria Callas in Greece); and there were similar figures in the Soviet Union – just think of the national mourning for Vladimir Vissotsky. But contemporary Ukraine would not be shaken, not even somewhat distressed, I fear, by anyone's death. In terms of «cultural diagnostics» this is a very bad symptom.

Having lost its outside censors (the Kremlin, Moscow, the Party's Central Committee, and the like), Ukrainian culture during the post-independence years has unfortunately not developed an «internal» censor, its own hierarchy of values from within, which would immediately distinguish between the wheat and the chaff, as occurs in all full-fledged, «mature» cultures. The individuals who define Ukrainian cultural politics behave like lackeys in a deserted lord's estate. As a result, we get a pile of half-baked academics who arouse doubts about whether they read anything but the very decrees that they sign; we have unabashedly given honorifics like «National Singer» and «Honored Vocalist» to people without an ear for music or a voice to sing with. And of course there are the innumerable «artistic prodigies» who don't even blush when they are called prodigies in public. This is not culture, but boorishness.

What I'm really getting at is everything that is, at its core, absolutely archetypically Soviet: when there's a mini-

Comrade Stalin sitting in every bureaucrat's chair who decides whether Goethe or Gorky is the better writer. Our society has simply not established any other means of assessing and appraising culture. Thus, it is premature to speak of «desovietization,» especially when we are still celebrating, with great pageantry, the anniversary of the Great Patriotic War, and not the Second World War, which began in Ukraine not when Stalin addressed the Soviet people in June 1941, but two years earlier, when the Nazi and Soviet armies occupied Poland in September 1939 under the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and Ukraine received its present borders. Even worse: the fact that the subsequent dissemination of the Soviet lie about history's most terrible war insults the memory of the millions of prisoners of war who were sent directly from Hitler's concentration camps to Stalin's Gulag after the Soviet Union's «Holy Victory» over Germany.

However, only 22% of the Ukrainian population is offended by this celebration. This is, I think, an extremely rough numerical expression of the «extent to which we have adopted the values of the civilized world.»

listeners, prefer these channels. According to the results of sociologist inquests carried out in April, 2000, 36 per cent of the Kyivites systematically listen to the First Ukrainian Radio program, 26 per cent – to 'The Russian Radio', 20 per cent – to 'The Gala Radio'. A pronounced tendency exists of increasing the portion of Russian language music broadcast both by the FM stations and sold on the audio market. One possible reason is that the Russian music business offers the newest production at lower cost.

Specialists from the West note a drastic growth in the last few years of production and export of 'pirated' compact discs in Ukraine. They consider that the state agencies of Ukraine do little to stop pirating, and that they themselves violate the copyright law by employing in their work the pirated PC software. Some representatives of international organizations estimate the level of 'pirated main 'copyright sectors' is as high as 90 to 98 per cent.

Publishing business, book market, libraries

The book publishing in Ukraine endures a deep crisis which is confirmed with the statistics (see Table1).

As a rule, the reasons for the crisis are the abolition of the state owned corporation Ukrknyha, and with the unwillingness of the state to liberate the publish houses from

taxes. Nevertheless, there are a number of other explanations. The main reason is that the publishing sector and the book distribution system (in the state they were in December 1991) are not ready to operate in the new environment. First of all, it operates with technological and management backwardness and awkwardness, a lack of experience with the environment of market competition, and a lack of desire to acquire such an experience.

The second reason is the economic crisis, in particular a decrease in the real income of those citizens who constitute the principal traditional consumer of Ukrainian books (the Ukrainian speaking intellectuals in Central and Western Ukraine).

Still another reason is the considerable reduction of the financing of state supported libraries which has lead to an almost complete termination of any increase in their funds. In addition, competition from other forms of leisure has intensified, such as television programs, video, and lately, the Internet. All that means not less, and sometimes even greater personal expenditures, thus leaving less money in the family budget for book purchases.

And lastly, a serious reason for the crisis in Ukrainian publishing business is a potent competition from the Russian book industry. The situation is aggravated with the shadow-

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v o l o d y m y r t s y b u l k o

# angels in a pyramid

poems

# underground

translated from ukrainian by yuriy tarnawsky

0.0

here I learned to understand  
the taste of green tea  
the cheapest tea in the country

my friends burdened with debts  
and alimonies  
introduced me to the concept of UNDERGROUND  
the hairy poets of Xerox copies  
were jealous of my jeans  
probably the most worn out jeans in the country  
but today I burned them with a great fanfare

the coins  
that spent at least one night in their pockets  
cried

1.1

this unconscious seepage  
of female body onto cloth  
the flight of clothes and diffraction of light rays  
Sam Semenychuk NAKED WITH A RAT

like character of most of the production imported from Russia.

French culture scientist M.O. Baruche points to four principal instruments of the state book publishing policy in democratic and market environments: firstly, the maintenance and development of a network of public libraries; secondly, a uniform system of controlled (and attainable) book prices; thirdly, measures of direct financial intervention (state ordered editions, issuing grants to authors and publishers, etc.); and, at last, privileged taxation (of either the book selling, or the whole sequence of operations connected with book editing and book selling). How are these instruments implemented in Ukraine?

*Libraries.* Ukraine attempts to maintain the network of public state funded libraries inherited from the Soviet era, but the persistent budget crisis curtails regular increases in their funds. Therefore, as a part of the book policy, the library network is ineffective. Meanwhile, a considerable quantitative progress in Ukrainian book publishing is hardly achievable under the current financial situation with the libraries. In 1990, the state-funded libraries got 23 million specimens of printed editions, in 1995 – 7 million, and last year – 4 million specimens. In the whole, the libraries get 6 to 8 per cent of new books published in Ukraine. Due to

that, the libraries become less and less capable of performing their educational functions.

*Prince controls.* Ukraine has refused any book price regulation, but the denationalization of the state owned publishing houses has not been carried out. Due to that, big state owned publishing houses have not become contemporary enterprises capable of withstanding competition or interested in lowering the prices on their production.

The means of the 'direct support' of the book publishing remained the same as they have been in the Soviet times (state orders, the «Library series', etc.), though the allocated funds are insufficient for that. On the other hand, no new systems were created (for example, tender grants).

*Tax measures.* The add-on value tax on the selling books published in Ukraine, as well as school textbooks and copybooks, has been abolished. However, that influenced the situation very little.

It is obvious that tax privileges should be implemented along with prudent utilization of other instruments, such as the normal increase of library funds, competitive grants to Ukrainian publishers, and the introduction of extensive cultural-education programs which would stimulate the development and expansion of the reading audience for Ukrainian books.



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the fish blood has thrashed within us  
and sinking to the bottom must come  
light up this woman  
as long as she's a candle

we will enter as clothes  
into the ripped open belly of the fish  
the mercury roe blinds our eyes

### 1.2

as long as an artist's model shines for us  
through the buttonhole  
our memory of Archipenko  
illuminates the void of matter

inside that fish our bodies  
have stuck to its ribs

in the underground boys in the underground  
above the fish drive super black cars

### 1.3

a rat named Harmodios to frighten the tyrant of the flesh  
will bite through the wedding band  
on the mother-of-pearl finger of the woman  
having become cat's  
feet multiply the silence  
nothing will squeal on us  
we're embodied only in the ghosts  
on the pages of Xerox copies

we'll seal clocks in tin cans  
in the condensed soup of time we won't be squealed on  
by the ticking of spinning tops and of water glasses  
myths about us are not us  
the jeans have been burned

### 1.4

the bodies of those killed by silence  
have stuck to the ribs of the fish  
covered with ivy  
don't bring along their social status  
their sheepskin coats have turned to cocoons  
pictures take to pawnshops

## The periodicals

In 1991, of the ten most popular newspapers in Ukraine six were published in Moscow. In Ukraine one was published in Russian, another was bilingual, and only two newspapers were published in Ukrainian. A similar situation was with the magazines. That is, before the independence era, periodicals published in Moscow were the main source of information for an average Ukrainian. Since then, the circulation of papers published in Ukrainian decreased from 68 to 40 percent. The main reason is that Russian press was forced out by local publications in Russian. Another reason is that due to the Russian language preferences of the reading audience, attempts to establish strictly commercial editions in Ukrainian were too scarce (besides Galicia, where two editions in Ukrainian language, 'Express' and 'Vysoky Zamok, dominate).

During the last decade the appearance of the Ukrainian press drastically changed. It has become diverse and multiform, and is more entertainment oriented. Nevertheless, our press has not become more independent: the dictates of the state are now replaced with a dependence on those who financially support a newspaper or a magazine (because self-supporting editions in Ukraine are almost non-existent).

## The «elevated» and folk arts

It was only recently that the notion of Ukrainian culture usually meant the traditional culture, usually referred to as 'elevated' (including 'serious' fiction, theatre, art, academic music), and folk culture: Ukrainian songs, proverbs, fancy Easter eggs, embroidery...

The main idea of all Ukrainian cultural 'resurrections' of the XX-th century was, firstly, to preserve and return to the people traditional spiritual values and, secondly, to create (or, strictly speaking, to return from «artificial oblivion») Ukrainian 'elevated' arts: from Zerov, Boychuk and Kurbas to Stus, Alla Hors'ka and the 'poetic cinema'. Nevertheless, when outer circumstances appeared for achieving these goals (the collapse of totalitarian regime, obtaining independence and freedom including freedom of creation), it has become obvious that the 'elevated arts' attracted the attention of only a limited portion of the country.

In general, such evolution coincides with the world-wide trend known of elevated cultures losing their legitimacy. But that does not mean that the processes taking place now in the 'elevated' Ukrainian culture are uninteresting or insignificant. It is the very sphere in which the current events in society are usually evaluated.

the hands of their artists  
the artist's models' lips  
of those who'd kissed them  
action takes place in reverse  
the process of gobbling up of dust and background

1.5  
the stone in the sculpture expands  
the forehead swells brutally  
tearing apart the cap on the head  
the hands reach for the tree

but we've had for a long time  
magpie's wings instead of ears  
tomorrow our coats will grow feathers  
not asking our permission

cutting out the tattooed names  
so that no-one can find us  
we took the place of roe  
in the ripped-open belly of the black  
fish

1.6  
night between two dates  
the multiplication sign of blood  
the surface of the genesis of man  
not his downfall

you pale artist's model  
your ring can't be taken off  
your bride's veil can't be set on fire  
your fingers don't feel the wax  
your feet can't get enough of walking  
up ahead lies your night  
blessed many times before

but here tonight  
by the light of the moon  
a rat will chew out a camellia  
on the shoulder of your sister statue

1.7  
the dissection of the planes and maxims  
is timeless  
the shackling of the hands that create

## Literature

At the end of the eighties, during the 'openness' era, Ukrainian men of letters were among the very first who began open discussions of the problems of the state status of Ukrainian language and of sovereignty or the economic independence of the Ukrainian SSR. Later they played a significant role in the creation of opposition organizations. Many men of letters appeared subsequently among the members of parliament, then among the ambassadors and ministers of independent Ukraine (D. Pavlychko, Yu. Scherbak, I. Drach, R. Lubkivskij, B. Oliynyk, P. Movchan, etc.) They left literature for politics and never turned back.

And what happened to the literature, which had achieved freedom? The circulation of literary magazines dropped and the poetic soiree takes place in empty halls. Having lost budget financing, the publishing houses 'Dnipro' and 'Ukrainskij pysmennyk' nearly terminated while the majority of private publishing houses were not interested in contemporary Ukrainian literature. Contemporary works are published either due to courtesy of Ukrainians living abroad, or on president's grants, or on the money of the authors themselves (with circulations of several hundred specimens). The broader public is interested only in works which have

gained scandalous publicity ('Recreations' and 'Perversion' by Yu. Andrukhovych, 'Field exploration of Ukrainian sex' by Oksana Zabuzhko, 'The discourse of modernism' by Solomiya Pavlychko).

At the same time, intensive and diverse literary events remain beyond the concerns of average Ukrainians. Prominent literary actions happen, the works of some contemporary writers are translated and published in the West (V. Dibrova, O. Lyshega, Oksana Zabuzhko, Eugenia Kononenko), and even in Moscow (Yu. Andrukhovych and Oksana Zabuzhko). So, Ukrainian literature lives even though it has ceased to be the canonized 'conscience of the nation'.

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## Music

Nowadays, the majority of Ukrainian composers are having tough times. Their works are seldom performed, recorded even more rarely, and almost never published in the note form. The National Opera and academic musical assemblies demonstrate only casual interest to contemporary Ukrainian classical music, while audio recording studios are not interested in it at all. For example, in the last years, the 'Vikings' ballet by Ye. Stankevych has become the only contemporary Ukrainian work staged by the National

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takes place at midnight  
the fish streets have been sown  
with the moon poppy seed  
the injured shoulder throbs  
ouch

the creative steel will shatter  
the old porcelain of the white teeth  
we won't be able to preserve  
the Socratic architecture of swallows

let's teach the rat to be an artist  
let's flatten the rat into a knife  
maybe it'll slice through the padlocks

hey guys  
you study dialectics  
but you can't smash the faces  
of those who spit in yours  
you study astrology  
you chant you're for the people  
but you can't smash the faces  
of the one who smashes yours

hey guys  
you're only half right  
money is only the cause  
the effect is life  
you want delicious bread  
a picture-perfect wife  
money is only the cause  
money fathers money

once again your silver pieces  
33 for one bill  
you won't be able to exchange them  
because there's only one bill  
because everyone has thirty-three  
silver pieces

hey guys  
you study  
dialectics  
corporal Ilko Muromets  
and thirty-three silver pieces  
will chase your souls out of the trees

Opera. Most of the works of the composer V. Silvestrov, who is honored throughout the world, have never been recorded.

Table 2

**Attendance of theaters and concert halls in Ukraine**

	Total number of professional theaters	Attendance of theaters (million per year)	Attendance of concerts (million a year)
1980	84	19.3	20.9
1990	125	17.6	15.0
1995	136	8.3	7.3
1998	132	5.6	3.5

**Theatre**

Nowadays, there are three National theatres in Ukraine (The Kyiv National Opera, Ivan Franko and Lesya Ukrainka dramatic theatres), more than a hundred theatres subordinated to local administration (to the region and city Divisions of Culture), and numerous independent theatres-studios (see Table 2). Compared to the past, touring activities have been considerably reduced, though some new theatrical festivals have been founded, such as 'Mystets'ke Berezillya' and 'The Khersones Plays'.

In the years of the Reconstruction and independence, the number of theatres has nearly doubled and performances have become more interesting, but the number of spectators decreased by nearly four times. To some extent, the reason is the increase in ticket prices (though, this is insignificant with the exception of stock-jobbing performances). The main reason is the competition caused by the television, video, and night-clubs.

**Folklore**

Ukrainians are one of the very few European peoples who have preserved the richness of their folklore up to CSX century. Ukrainian folklore survived not only in the records made by ethnic scientists or in museum collections, but as a feature of everyday life.

After 1917, the role of folklore was consistently diminished. The reason was that a key element of the Bolsheviks' so-called 'cultural revolution' eradicated the traditional culture, especially the authentic folklore, and implanted into the released space the artificial 'people creativeness' and controlled 'amateur art. Beginning with the late eighties, in spite of the economic problems, a resurrection of public interest to authentic folklore began along with traditional rites and handicraft, the riches of past

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because they're the guardians  
of borders and laws  
because you're birds in the air  
you live in trees  
trees grow out of nothing  
and you might crap  
on his new parade uniform

hey guys  
hey my little falcons  
the solo musician  
will play for you  
in your solitary cell  
a capriccio waltz

I dedicated this stupid poem  
when I used to breathe at the pyramid  
and now I've been condemned  
to travel forever  
in the third class railroad car  
with a two-ruble note in my passport  
now you see it  
now you don't

2.1  
who do you burn for nameless candle  
that you won't take on again  
a female form

nights have gotten so fragile when the autumn  
bazaars come birds plug up  
the holes left behind by the stars  
that fell out in the month of August

a background can be spotted  
but for the good of the public  
someone up in the sky  
has to plug up the holes we've been yanked from

2.2  
a wind will come blowing down from another outer space  
and will scatter eyes through the valleys  
maybe someone's conscience will wake up  
on the other side of the fish  
they'll call us to come out  
but there'll be no-one left to answer

Ukrainian 'elevated' culture, music in baroque style, sacred music, and so on.

A civilized protection policy is needed

At the beginning of XXI century, the process of deep cultural reformation will continue, including the structural transformation of the mass culture and the general, transformation of the paradigm of Ukrainian culture. For a certain time a deepening of the stratification of cultural practices will be apparent, mainly according to the social and property patterns. Some people will regularly attend opera houses, some other will prefer expensive concerts of foreign stars and prestigious night clubs, still others will spend their time surfing the Internet, while the so-called average Ukrainian will restrict his demands to watching TV or, probably, to attending football matches. The process of globalization will go on. The internet will expand along with cable and satellite television. International economic and humanitarian contacts will grow, and hundreds thousand of Ukrainian citizens will be involved into the process (as an example, the so-called 'shuttle' trade could be mentioned). All that will integrate Ukrainian life into the world processes, and inevitably lead to reduction of the originality of our style of life, which means both the arts sector and the whole style of life.

In my opinion, attempts to 'ukrainize' the Russian-speaking inhabitants of Ukraine will hardly be successful. It is obvious that they will learn to speak Ukrainian more or less fluently, but in everyday life (including cultural practices) they will remain the Russian-speaking inhabitants. Too potent and too close Russian cultural fields, too conservative in our everyday habits, too weak cultural sectors employing Ukrainian language — all this determines such a slow and restrained process of deeper change and transformation. The Soviet regime of the 'stagnation' era failed to isolate Soviet youth from Western rock-music, though it possessed much more power than we have now for, say, isolating our mass consumers from Kirkorov or Marinina. Besides, the globalization processes make the prospects of a monolingual situation in Ukraine almost unrealistic.

The actual prospects of Ukrainian culture, especially those related to cultural industries, will greatly depend on the strategy which the state will choose to adopt. The time to switch from the post-Soviet inertia to active cultural policy has long since come.

If that strategy is liberal, with equally unbiased attitudes towards all cultural processes, the cultural practices employing Ukrainian language will be similar to the Catalan lingual practices in Catalonia where 94 per cent of

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2.3

I burned my faded jeans  
like a frog's skin  
if I could only be just a story teller but  
the black raven peers into my eyes  
when will you finally  
croak

but till the end of my days  
I have to wear iron boots  
I'll burn up one day and then  
so many arms will stretch out  
to shake the ashes out of my boots

3.0

like a line on a street artist's portrait  
like a word in a dissident's poem departing  
suppression carries on its back  
little black boats

how they laughed  
these friends of mine burdened with alimonies  
and debts

hey you up there  
get down from the flagpole  
we'll keep our mouths shut  
so that colors in the world beyond the fish stay bright

3.1

smashing calendars carved in stone  
building dams out of half-baked bread  
on rivers of green tea  
earning pennies as night watchmen  
to clothe your forgotten bodies  
cleaning a paintbrush given to you by some novice  
on your stiff canvas shirts  
let's go to confession  
remembering the drawings we made as children  
on the asphalt between the two capitals  
which kills the idea of a village

academic sages have bitten  
through our spinal columns we're moors  
we could be free  
we'll step out of the belly of the fish  
into the new times of hunting for the traitors to the faith

inhabitants understand this language (it has got an autonomous status there), 67 per cent can speak and read it, 40 per cent can write, and still less are able to use it actively in everyday life.

Should the state choose the strategy which could be conditionally called «the Tadjman-style policy» (that is, it will be oriented to authoritative-nationalistic cultural policy of Croat President F. Tadjman and his party), then with the support of the state, extensive attacks on cultural practices employing Ukrainian language will take place. But it hardly will be accompanied with deep transformation processes in the conscience of the people. In the contrary, such an 'official' culture will provoke protest among many citizens.

Therefore, the policy that could be conditionally called 'French' looks optimal. That will be an assortment of procedures of civilized protectionism which will include tax and investment stimulation, a system of competitive grants, active development of international cultural contacts, and showing the world the best of Ukrainian culture, past and present.

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### 3.2

in the middle of the night  
I hear the underground shaking the pyramid  
but there's such power in its three corners  
that it's easier to climb it  
than to bring it down

the world behind the fish craves for abstraction  
of its own sins because every detail  
of a sin craves its sinner

the cause for ostracism  
could be even a white rat  
sitting on the pearly shoulder of a primadonna  
covering the tattoo mark

### 3.3

having exchanged butterfly wings  
for fish gills let's not fly off into an oxygen abyss  
from this fish of an earth  
the wasp-waisted icon of sex appeal  
the woman we've lit like a candle  
has seeped into the real world once again

except she was stuck with hands of a collective farm milking  
maid

there wasn't more life because of that  
just the faces have gotten brighter  
of those who spit on your back  
I just learned to tell the taste  
of green tea the cheapest in the country  
I just burned my jeans

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# ukraine between europe. and asia

h r y h o r i y n e m y r i a

Ukraine's path to Europe will be more complex and painful compared to the majority of Central and East European countries. The major reason for this is the inconsistency in fulfilling the reforms during past nine years. Due to this fact a long-term orientation to Euro-Asia is the proposed geopolitical alternative. However, do they wait for us there?

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## THE UKRAINIAN QUESTIONS AND THEIR TREATMENT BY «GREAT EUROPE»

Ukraine seeks to position itself over the territory of Europe, but factually, it is not perceived as a European nation by major countries who control the process of the Euro-alignment. For the time being Ukraine is rather 'specialized' on the export of disappointments. In 2004–2005, when Poland and Hungary join the European Union, Ukraine will have a common border with it. After Romania and Slovakia join the NATO, Ukraine's border with the North Atlantic alliance will extend. The Schengen Treaty will be effective on the borders of four out of seven member-countries. Ukraine will join the WTO. This latter event will mean first, an increase of influence of

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В о с е м б е н в е л и

# forecast

10. *What are the most realistic scenarios of the development of Ukraine for the next 15-20 years (on your opinion)?*
11. *How do you imagine the world of 2020?*

the external factor, secondly, a significant reduction of time necessary to solve the decisions concerning domestic reforms.

The 'Ukrainian' issue is just a part of the process of 'Great Europe' creation. We are the witnesses to an exciting process of Europe's 'europization' and to an expansion of the European political and economic space.

Where is the limit of Europe's borders? How far may the 'institutional' Europe expand without losing its cultural and civilizational peculiarity? How much can it absorb? The answers to these questions directly concern Ukraine's geopolitical future.

If one imagines the contemporary political process that takes place over the European continent as a trajectory of a pendulum, it is possible to state that currently it approaches its highest point. In course of the next 10–15 years ('the expansion period') a new dynamic balance will be created which will last a rather long period ('the intensification period'). The pendulum metaphor helps to visualize the combination of the dynamics and parallel uncertainty of the political processes as well as the probability to influence the amplitude of its oscillations.

Hence, the time factor stipulates for Ukraine two European scripts.

The first one: by way of superefforts to accelerate the process of domestic reforms and democratization, to latch on to the last carriage of the European train, to increase the oscillation of the 'European pendulum', and get to the EU. The second: to master a new specific form of association with Europe within the framework and terminology of a 'specific partnership', which does not stipulate precise prospects for the future membership or, in the best scenario, leaves this issue open. Due to the fact that the expanded European Union will need some time to 'digest' new members, to establish new institutional procedures, and to adapt to the asymmetry of the new immediate neighbourhood, this period of Ukraine-European Union's 'specific partnership' may last for 20–30 years. Remember that the eastward expansion of the EU will amplify economic and social disproportion in the EU itself by several times compared to its previous expansion. Even the powerful and economically developed Federal Republic of Germany is still years away from equalizing relations between its eastern and western halves following the reunification of Germany ten years ago

### Leonid KUCHMA, President of Ukraine

There can be many scenarios. I cannot accept only one of them, the pessimistic one.

Ukrainian statehood is only nine years old. You will agree with me that this is not a long time for a state that, in essence, has just begun a new count of its modern history, and has entered into a qualitatively new sociopolitical and economic system.

We managed to cover this extremely tense period without critical shocks, conflicts or failures. We also managed to provide every basic attribute of statehood – from essentially external ones to such complex structures as the infrastructure of the national economy, money, banking, customs, and tax systems.

No small price was paid for all of this; we have many difficulties. But we cannot be blind to the positive changes that are more and more confidently emerging.

These include signs of economic stabilization that are being seen for the first time over the past few years. In particular, the

decline in the gross domestic product has been stopped; industrial output has begun to grow. Over the nine months of this year, the volume of industrial output was up 1.6% compared to the same period last year.

Such figures naturally are relative and unstable, but they are good proof that the hardest period has passed and that conditions are being made for the next stage in economic growth.

The changes underway strengthen my confidence that Ukraine on the whole is able to join the ranks of countries with highly developed economies within the next 15-20 years. Such a forecast is based upon the experience of states that have moved ahead relying mostly on their own forces. And Ukraine has the same potential – strong economic and intellectual potential, as well as highly qualified professionals.

We also need to take into consideration the beneficial geostrategic location of Ukraine, which makes it possible to co-exist normally and actively interact with post-Soviet countries, with Europe, the USA, and Eastern states. More generally, our geostrategic location allows us to join global world processes and economic integration.

There is every ground for the conclusion that within the next few years, basic foreign-policy objectives will have been

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and the absorption of the former German democratic Republic.

However it is not Ukraine's choice alone, but the EU's as well. Ukraine is a country with 50 million inhabitants, and its territory is larger than that of France. However, it occupies a peripheral position in the mentality of the EU's bureaucracy. On the other hand, the EU is constantly expanding. If we assume that Turkey (population of 63 million) which is only two thirds a European country, will become a member of the European Union, then the EU will have mutual borders with Iraq, Iran and Syria.

In any case, the inner factor remains decisive. The politicians of such countries as Greece, Spain and Portugal considered (in 1981 the first, and the two latter in 1986) the option of joining the European Union in order to overthrow the totalitarian regimes; this option was closely related to their domestic transformation.

The transformation paradigm was probably considered in case of Ireland (1973). Close integration into the EU and their transformation course was considered by the upper echelons of these countries as integrity. Not less important was the fact that Brussels also shared

such a view as to the perception of interrelation and mutual dependence of integration and transformation.

Today it is already obvious that Ukraine's path to Europe will be more complex and painful as compared to that of the majority of other Central and Eastern European countries. This is explained not only by the heritage of the distant past, but also its inconsistency in fulfilling the reforms during last nine years. Besides, the physical parameters of Ukraine (its territory and population) influence the additional carefulness on the part of the European Union and its certain member countries. It is obvious that in different circumstances 'small' countries, e.g. Slovenia and Estonia who enjoy the status of special relations with neighbouring EU member countries (Scandinavian for Estonia, and Italy and Austria for Slovenia) have a much better chance for accelerated integration into the EU. In that respect, neighbouring Poland is the best source of successful integration experience as the largest regarding its territory and population candidate to join the European Union.

The principle of differentiation deployed by the European Union means that each candidate country is estimated in terms of its level of aptness. This new ap-



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achieved. First of all, this means acquiring of the status of an associate, and later a full-fledged member of the European Union. At the same time, development of mutually beneficial relations with Russia and other states of the former USSR remains among our top priorities.

We are witnesses to a turning point in the history of Ukraine, which coincided in time with radical changes in the world's history.

Only those states which clearly define and dynamically realize their domestic and foreign goals, which provide stable economic growth, and which can cooperate with the surrounding world on equal basis, will be able to survive and fight for the right to a decent existence under current conditions.

I am confident that Ukraine will be among such countries. Our future depends first of all on us.

**Sergiy TOLSTOV**, Director of the Independent Center for Political Analysis and Forecasting

The next decade in Ukraine will be a period of «regulated democracy», which will partially resemble the «conducting» of the rule of General Charles de Gaulle in France. The economy may partially stabilize in three to five years. It will center mostly agricultural sector and the food industry, metallurgy, chemistry,

some fragments of machine-building and high industrial and productive technologies, and the service sector. The population will radically decline, and changes in the social-professional structure will, to a degree, come closer to the standards of Asian and Latin-American countries. The level of the gross domestic product of 1988-1989, with an average rate of growth of 5-6% of GDP, may be reached only in 2010-2012.

In the European context, Ukraine will be mildly integrated into its western region, primarily NATO and to a lesser extent, the European Union, and likewise its southern region, the Black Sea Cooperation, the Caucasian oil-transportation corridor, etc.

The problem of access to alternative sources of oil and gas will remain significant. It can be solved only if the Baku-Odessa-Poland-Europe oil-transportation transit project is implemented. This is especially true from the viewpoint of the decline in gas output in Russia, which will have long-term consequences.

In the case of aggravating of tensions in relations with the Euro-Atlantic community and Russia, two alternatives are possible:

1. An increasingly close relationship between Ukraine and NATO, leading to Ukraine joining the Alliance. Joining the EU seems less realistic, and presuming the successful develop-

proach suggests maximum flexibility in terms of time, which stimulates the countries lagging behind to join the successful claimants. Therefore, differentiation complements the principle of consolidation.

Though this paradigm does not bear a direct relation to the current state of the art in relations of Ukraine with the EU, it may serve as a useful instrument to develop the Ukrainian way and methods to come closer to the European Union.

### THE RUSSIAN-CHINESE ALTERNATIVE

One of geopolitical alternatives proposed to Ukraine, is its long-term orientation to Euro-Asia, first of all to Russia and China. The alliance of Russia with China is a possible structural component of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The essential element in this situation is 'ad absurdum': «They do not wait for us in Europe!» Do they wait for us in Euro-Asia? Apart from new markets, China requires money in the form of direct foreign investments and the latest technologies. In the near future Ukraine cannot provide either. Naturally, China cannot provide them to us as well. The Russian Federation is far from stable.

ment of the Ukrainian economy, such an eventually seems unlikely before at least 20-25 years. In this event of a deepening of relations with NATO, Ukraine will come principally under the influence of the United States and be considered as its regional political partner.

2. In case of slow and less successful development of the Ukrainian economy and weakening of the Ukrainian-American partnership, the strengthening of the political and economic influence of Russia upon Ukraine is possible. If relations between Russia and the West develop on a non-confrontational basis, and if Russia gradually integrates into the Euro-Atlantic community, this obstacle will not be of a decisive character. However, if relations between Russia and the West develop on the basis of rivalry, Ukraine may become a real buffer, or «gray» zone for a short period of time. However, Ukraine will eventually join either the Euro-Atlantic or the Russian sphere of influence. In the latter case, such joining will render Ukraine an underdeveloped protectorate, since Russian politicians will consider direct inclusion of Ukraine into the Russian Federation as an economically unprofitable project.

In the case of a comparatively quiet international situation during the transformation period, Ukraine will pursue its multi-

Its economy is eleven times less effective than that of the European Union. Compared to Ukraine, Russia has never expressed its desire to join the EU. However, this does not mean that the course of integration with Europe should compete with the any possible cooperation with Russia. If cooperation promotes the development of the domestic economy, it will promote Ukraine's approach to the European Union. On the other hand, Ukraine's successful advancement down the path of integration into the EU will help bring Russia closer to Europe, improve Ukrainian-Russian relations, which meets the national interests of both the countries.

Integration into the European Union is not for the poor. To go back to Europe Ukraine should become a European country with regards to its functional, motivational, and institutional capacities and by way of transforming its economy and society; by replacing old staff in the governmental apparatus; by regularly modifying its laws, and by employing its stabilizing potential in regional cooperation.

vector policy with preference for a military-political union with the USA and NATO.

**Viktor YUSCHENKO, Prime Minister of Ukraine**

We are living in an open world, in which any commonly recognized initiative takes hold of people's minds with the speed of light. In the economy, this initiative is the process of globalization. Within the next 15-20 years, the development of the situation in Ukraine will be much like developments in Europe twenty to thirty years ago, when the so-called «basement of Europe», specifically Spain and Portugal, gradually joined the all-European technological processes due mostly to their cheap workforce. These gradual, step-by-step activities led to the equalizing of living standards across the European community.

Ukraine, with its open borders and open policy, is—to put it bluntly—doomed to such an equalizing. Money does not like emptiness, and in ten years the difference in the level of European and Ukrainian salaries will be about 20%, not more. At the same time, Ukraine's technological presence will impact the whole world, not to mention Europe. Ukraine will become one of the factors in the large-scale transformations in information and other new technologies. And this role will be



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due not only to certain demographic resources, but to a combination of many elements, including natural and intellectual resources, and geographical location. We will witness the synergetic effects of this combination.

The world even now feels Ukraine's intellectual potential in the work of Ukrainian specialists in various areas of minor and major global projects, and the Ukrainian presence will only continue to grow in the world. I would like to believe that Ukraine's inner life will not suffer as a result. Natural wits and stubbornness, or better—perseverance and patience—will lead this nation and this country into the ranks of the most influential ones.

It would be well to mention Zbigniew Brzezinski and his visit to Ukraine as an equal element of the Paris-Berlin-Warsaw-Kyiv European security axis. The military factor in this axis will, in time, no longer be dominant. Information and super-technology, rather than raw materials, will provide Ukraine with a decent place in the international community.

Stating the death of history, Francis Fukuyama did not consider the existing of Ukraine. It is in 15-20 years that the Ukrainian history will acquire its new sense and flavor.

### **Sergiy GOLOVATYJ, National Deputy, President of the Ukrainian Legal Foundation**

Ukraine has no chance of becoming a highly economically developed country. In the course of ten years of independence, and especially in the years of Leonid Kuchma's rule, the state has been moving towards Moscow, and towards the power of criminally tainted capital, which has been internationalized in the territory of the CIS. The last several years have demonstrated that the national economy in Ukraine has been ruined rather than built up. Ukraine and her people are surviving by some miracle, in defiance of the politics and actions of the government. But the social organism is extremely ill. While nominally remaining an independent state, Ukraine will no longer be one in a few years.

Today, Ukraine's economic potential has fallen to the pre-war level. In the future, we will become just a source of raw-materials to supplement to our great neighbors, and also their source of cheap labor. We have no political elite that will fight for the interests of Ukraine as an independent state. There is no Ukrainian social stratum that can defend these interests even in principle. The fact is that power in our state is neither Ukrainian nor humane. Unlike the Baltic countries, Poland, the

Czech Republic, Slovakia or Slovenia, Ukraine has become neither a European nor an independent state.

As far as the political development of the state is concerned, Ukraine is sure to run into authoritarianism, dictatorship and ruling of criminal capital. Those who used to call themselves democrats have been fed and given portfolios. Part of them cannot even think in prospective. Some leaders are for some reason still thinking about Hetman's mace and are unable to comprehend that they will not even reach new presidential elections. Neither do they understand the fact that in the parliamentary elections of 2002, the tornado of oligarchic-criminal capital will wipe them away from the political arena. For these reasons Ukraine has no chance of building up a normal European democratic society.

Maxym ROZUMNYJ, researcher at the Institute of Social and Political Psychology of Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of Ukraine

The development of Ukraine is defined by two groups of factors: the inner logic and dynamics of Ukrainian society, and the impact of outside circumstances which help to shape this logic and these dynamics.

Ukrainian development can be quite clearly foreseen for at least the next ten years. Its main component is the strengthening of state power. While for now the growth of the administrative power of the state is painfully, indeed brutally evident, at the end of this period we can expect its inner demobilization. Following this demobilization, we can forecast a certain stabilization of living conditions, and the establishment of a new frame of social roles. However, the path to such a condition in this country is unlikely to be passed without moral and intellectual losses.

A certain tendency toward closure will also be felt. The gap between internally and externally oriented activity will become of key significance. The circle of those partaking of externally oriented activity—including those humanitarians who receive grants, exporters of domestic products, workers of respective state departments, foreign companies' missions, visitors of exotic resorts, etc.—will be limited and look more like the Soviet elite circles.

At the same time, strict, indeed neo-feudal relations will be take root in the domestic affairs of the nation. Low incomes plus dependence on state administration, aggravated by a decline in the collective intellect, will create quite redacted and regulated

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# В о с е м б е н forecast

10. *What are the most realistic scenarios of the development of Ukraine for the next 15-20 years (on your opinion)?*

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opportunities for personal self-realization. «Shadow» economic niches for common citizens will be gradually and constantly eliminated. Instead, a new bureaucratic machine will gradually create low-income but guaranteed jobs in the spheres subject to it, from controlling bodies up to the system of education and academic sciences.

In connection with this decay of technological and scientific schools, opportunities for Ukrainian youth to find jobs abroad will continue to dwindle. Many people will desire to «break free», but for that part of the new generation which knows no psychological fatigue from the Soviet lifestyle, the administrative system may seem attractive in offering steady careers and forceful self-affirmation.

Ethnic patriotism will lose all of its prestige, even if regional distinctions are cherished as evidence of quasi-cultural identity. The remnant of the intellectuals will return to esoteric studies and the propagation of religious renaissance.

Such a scenario is possible if Ukraine remains outside of geopolitical transformations.

Dmytro VYDRIN, political scientist, President of the media corporation, «Vidomosti»

I cannot be optimistic about the possibility of cardinal improvement of the economic situation, since there are laws, in keeping with which the curves representing the beginning and end of crises have approximately the same duration. It took ten years for Ukraine to find itself in a crisis that began in the early 1990s with the decline in national gross products. Hence the end of the crisis it will take at least ten years. And only when we take good advantage of the traditional mechanism of ending the crisis will we reach the level of industrial output of 1990.

There are non-traditional ways of ending the crisis. Sometimes countries end them in a single leap, when they find non-traditional and innovational ways, use the hidden reserves of their citizens' mentality, or the unique geopolitical situation of their country. Unfortunately, in our incumbent government or its reserve I see no people who would be capable of such «crazy» actions.

The main problem for us today is not a lack of money or resources, but rather a lack of qualified management. I see no good economic managers in Ukraine, none capable of the veritable feat that is required to answer the crisis.

Pierre ASSNER, Center of International Relations Research, France

Prospects of development of the West, that is the USA and Europe, are relatively predictable. However, they too may face a great economic crisis like the one in 1929 that would put everything in question. I do not think this scenario is the mostly likely one; I tend rather to believe that the situation in Europe and in the United States will not cardinally differ from today's. The USA will probably concentrate on its own affairs, while the European Union will neither collapse, nor turn into a federal state, nor become a real military power. So, by the beginning of 2020, we can assume that the strategic alliance between the USA and Europe will have been preserved.

On the other hand, it is much harder to forecast the development of Asia and Russia. The most important question will probably be the future of China. There are three groups of forecasts today. Some experts believe that China, with its human, economic and military potential, will try to gain revenge

over the West and become a great power. Others believe that China will be able to integrate into the capital system just like Japan. The third group of experts says China may encounter disintegration or major shocks, since the unstable balance between the authoritarian, ex-Communist regime and the capitalist market cannot exist always. So, there are many factors upon which the development of China depends and which are difficult to predict.

I do not think Russia will become another superpower in some 20 years and threaten the world; however, nobody can foresee today in what direction Russia will develop. Russia may pursue the renewal of its strength, which will make it a great regional power. Under such scenario, it is unlikely to become very dangerous for the West, but is sure to present a threat to its closest neighbors. Neither do I exclude that after the period of corruption and violence, as in the case with the war in Chechnya, Russia will still choose the path of liberal democracy and capitalism.

In general we are encountering a rather philosophical question about the tendencies of development of the modern world. If the deep striving to possess strength and a powerful dominion is in the very nature of people and nations—even

Ukraine still has to cover a few socio-economic stages laid out for it by its past. We have passed only the first stage—the stage of frustration and collapse of democratic illusions. We hoped that it would be possible to build a highly developed democracy in a country without a highly developed free market. But there can be no civilized democracy built on an uncivilized market basis. Every normal country first created a normal market and built democracy upon it. We have striven to do it vice versa.

Since no market has been created, Ukraine must now go back to its starting point and pass through the inevitable authoritarian phase. During this period, the powers of the legislative body will be extremely restricted, the position of the judicial power will be weakened, while the position of the executive power will be increased. The influence of parliament as a whole and of deputies in particular will be essentially lessened, and the parliament may even be dissolved (in order to show whose power is stronger), but at any rate real power will flow to the presidential structures. Kazakhstan, for example, is now following this scenario of development. This situation will last until Ukraine establishes a civilized market economy, until owners achieve protection against the will of those wielding power.

Within the next two-three years I forecast a strengthening of the authoritarian tendencies in Ukraine, an unequal division of power and the radical weakening of regional power.

Our worst shortcoming is a lack of political culture, which can be remedied only through elections. In order to achieve a normal civic society in ten years, we need to go through a great series of elections. That is why I support referenda, public opinion polls and elections. I believe at least one parliament should be dissolved, so that others would learn from it.

Only in about ten years will have a possibility for a real movement ahead. Until then we will only have years of preparation.

Oleksa NEHREBETSKYJ, translator

The power of oligarchic capital, mostly Russian, will increase. Enterprises will be transferred into Russian hands, as well as into possession of transnational corporations. Only a few of them will actually be functioning.

Private property in land will be established, and peasants will immediately sell their land plots, maybe through straw middlemen. The Ukrainian village will totally decay, and those peasants who will not die on their own through the lack of medical care, elemental necessities, electricity and legal

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though it can fade sometimes—then Japan and Germany, for instance, will again become powers in the classical meaning of the term. If a certain evolution is inevitable, namely the transformation of Western countries into rich and individualistic societies in which any desire to sacrifice oneself or capture territories has lost its actuality to a large degree, then Russia and China may also finally follow the West. It is difficult to give accurate predictions. It is easier to list the most likely extreme hypotheses.

According to the optimistic scenario, we are currently watching the beginning of a new era in the history of humankind. In this scenario, the role of the law, international organizations led by the UN, international judicial bodies, and tribunals is becoming more and more important, and a system of global security is being formed. Thus, Francis Fukuyama is confident that we are coming to the end of history, since there are no more rivals to liberal democracy and the free-market. Subsequently peripheral countries with ethnic or religious conflicts still going on will gradually join the liberal-democratic path of development.

Samuel Gantington believes to the contrary that we are coming to the conflict of civilizations. Still other experts believe

that the wars of the future are likely to break out within the frameworks of one civilization, for instance, between China and Taiwan, or between two Koreas, or as a result of disintegration of the existing state formations and emergence of new nations. According to yet another pessimistic scenario, we will witness even greater demarcation between the North and the South, between the periphery and the well-developed countries of the Center. Finally, some specialists are confident that great agglomerates of the third world with their anarchy and epidemics are the future of the whole planet, including the West, within the framework of the total essential weakening of state powers.

It is hard for me to choose one of these hypotheses, since there are factors today that are arguments for several scenarios at the same time. To my mind, for the next 20 years the model of liberal democracy will remain the only model, and in this I agree with Fukuyama. This does not mean, however, that the liberal-democratic model is eternal. In the Western world there are people who are dissatisfied with the life of the individualistic, consuming and relativist society. So, it is possible that prophets and new models of development will appear in the future.

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protection will be cast out from their houses through decrees or normative acts of the local bodies of power, and even by force. Gangs will abound in the countryside. Some places will become «garbage-cans» for industrial wastes from all over Europe, while others will become military training ranges. The Bundeswehr will train at some of them, while the rest will be for the maneuvers of the Russian Army and the retooled Soviet Army of Ukraine. In order to uphold the morale and patriotism of its soldiers, the Russian army will hold antiterrorist operations in the territory of Ukraine every once in a while. They will target some renegade band, which will in fact be one of many spawned by the oligarchs. But more gangs will contain «degenerate» peasants cast out of their land, and homeless urban citizens, as we can be certain that in time the authorities will come up with new ideas to deprive city dwellers of their flats, perhaps for failure to pay rent.

Urban citizens deprived of their homes, as well as peasants seeking refuge in cities, will build paper or clay houses around big cities and towns and sink into alcoholism, drug addiction and crime.

A citizen of the Russian Federation will become the president of Ukraine for two terms. By the end of his rule, every

citizen will have received special identification marks on their foreheads or right hands that can be seen only in x-rays.

Epidemics of tuberculosis and hepatitis will spread wildly, as well as some other diseases that will constantly kill people. As a consequence of all these factors, the population of Ukraine will decline by 10-15 million. In Donbass, famine will break out in about five years, and all its population will flee to Russia to capture plots of land to build cities and towns. Emigration to Argentina will be counted in hundreds of thousands; Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania will shut their borders with Ukraine. The southern coast of Crimea will find itself in the hands of several private persons; control of the Russian military bases will spread all over the peninsula, which formally remain under the jurisdiction of Kyiv.

In about fifty years the developments will be even more interesting, but we are talking about the scenario till only the year 2020...

Oleg KHAVYCH, expert at the Agency of Humanitarian Technologies

Expert estimations show that only a small percentage of the population of the Earth are living in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The

Sergiy KRYMSKYJ, Professor of the National University «Kyiv-Mohyla Academy», Academic at the New York Academy of Sciences:

The greatest peculiarity of the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> – beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is the unique acceleration of the movement of history. Most of the states that we know emerged over the last 40-60 years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Ninety percent of human knowledge was accumulated in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Over the past fifty years unbelievable changes took place in industry.

This acceleration will continue in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Its result will be in increasing reliance on and culture of information, and increasing intellectualization, and the automation of production and the whole technologic sphere.

As far as geopolitical developments in the world are concerned, we can expect the world to be divided into two great systems: the Euro-Atlantic community and the World's South. China and Russia, Eurasia, and Far East will remain separate and preserve their archetypes.

The future world will remain unstable, as conflicts between globalization and the national archipelago of humankind will remain. Differences between the Catholics and Protestants will grow in the North-Atlantic communities.

As far as Russia goes, she will stand in a position of strength and strive for cooperation with Eurasia, rather than Europe.

A serious conflict between the so-called «golden billion» (the population of the seven highly-developed countries) and the rest of the population of the planet will be preserved. Unfortunately, it is impossible to spread the standard of living of the industrialized countries to the whole planet.

Within the next 15-20 years, the role of China and Japan will grow. The crisis of the South will deepen, particularly in Africa, which has lost its way in financial difficulties and is unable to return loans. The return of totalitarianism and the strengthening of the power of the military will contribute to that.

The «seven» countries will let no one else join them. They will do their best to restrict the development of technologies in other countries (in Ukraine in particular). There is a way out of such circumstances for Ukraine. The development of relations and cooperation with industrialized countries not allowed to join the «seven», namely Argentina, India, Brazil, can be promising. In general, the only alternative to the problems of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is the strengthening of spirituality and culture.

rest remain in the past. Even the 20<sup>th</sup> century began in reality only in 1914 for Europe. All of this directly concerns Ukraine, for three quarters of its lands (Malorosia, Novorosia and Western Ukraine) exist in different historical epochs. In fact, only the latter has a chance to catch up with Europe.

After the loss of statehood in the 14<sup>th</sup> century, western Ukrainians got «stuck» in the Middle Ages. Only the Austrian Empire—the first since the time of King Daniel to unite practically all western-Ukrainian lands—placed Ukraine on the path to building their own state, the norm for Europe at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. However, both the Austrian and the Russian Empires buried a mine underneath this road, namely the idea of «Great Ukraine», which each empire saw as under its own control. Hence, in 1918 the nations of the Danube monarchy created their own states, but western Ukrainians turned out to be unprepared to do the same due to the «export» orientation of their nationalist doctrine. There was enough strength to create the Western-Ukrainian People's Republic, but its interests were sacrificed to the «Great Ukraine» idea.

The subsequent history of relations between eastern and the western Ukrainians prove the unprofitability of the pursuit of unification for the latter. As a result of Stalinist terror in 1939-

1941 and in 1944-1954, administered from the east of Ukraine, hundreds of thousands of western Ukrainians perished, while millions found themselves outside their motherland. Western Ukraine slipped back to the 18<sup>th</sup> century... The years 1960-1980 brought no changes to this process. The years of «national revival» and «independence» proved once again to the western Ukrainians that historical differences accumulated with centuries can be overcome only through assimilation of one part of «the state of Ukraine» by another. Apparently, ten million western Ukrainians have no chance of winning against the 40-million-strong army of residents of the east and south of Ukraine, who are supported by the whole of 150-million-strong Russia.

Maybe this is why for the first time in many years the western Ukrainians are demonstrating some signs of recovering from the «Great Ukraine» ideas. Western Ukraine has practically entered path—traditional for Central-European states—of independence. This path begins as an idea by intellectuals, from which develops civic movement in support of this idea, followed by a political force that implements the idea. When will this movement appear? It looks like it will appear soon enough, because for the first time in their thousand-year-long history, western Ukrainians are now facing the real danger of total assimilation.

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Gavriil POPOV, economic consultant, Russia  
Integration (globalization) of the world will increase, but important changes will also take place. In particular:

- dependence upon raw materials will decrease, including energy, at the expense of new technologies;
- groups of states will be outlined: those of scientific-technical leadership and those of consumers of innovations; the gap between the «brain countries» and «hands countries» will increase;
- the ecological interdependence of countries will grow;
- the gap between countries will move from the sphere of the living level to the sphere of intellectual potential.

Today's American model of the globalization process in the form of pyramid headed by the USA will be forgotten.

The main geopolitical model of the world will be a planet with several power centers. Theoretically, it will be something like the following:

- the European bloc, which will be joined by Canada and the USA;
- the Chinese bloc;
- the Indian bloc;
- the Muslim bloc;

– the Latin-American bloc.

Russia will integrate with Ukraine and Belarus. However there will be no separate Russian bloc in the world. Russia will join one of the power centers as one of the leading countries of the world in this center.

Most people today speak about Russia's joining the European bloc. But we cannot exclude the possibility of repeating the 12<sup>th</sup>-13<sup>th</sup> century, when most of the provinces of the Kyiv Rus headed by Novgorod and Alexander Nevsky were oriented toward the Golden Horde and the Asian direction at large, leaving behind orientation of Galitian princes to the West.

Everything will depend on the place that Russia will be offered by the competing force centers of our planet.

Roman ZVARYCH, National Deputy of Ukraine

We can be sure only that life will bring us many surprises. However, even today we can say what kind of world we would like to see in twenty years. First of all, this should be a world in which peace is not established through dictatorship or blackmail.

I would like the interstate relations to be built first of all on the basis of mutual trust and tolerance, so that we hear nothing

Taras KUZYO, political scientist, Great Britain  
Ukraine has two choices, and accordingly two scenarios for its future.

The first one involves integration into Europe through a more decisive realization of the post-Soviet «four-step» transition. It contains four separate but interlinked transformations: the building of a civil society, institutional building, the creation of a free market economy and a democratic state.

The alternative choice is to continue following the «Ukrainian special third way», which has already led to stagnation and poverty. This choice means neither movement back towards Eurasia, nor movement forward towards Europe.

I am not even taking into consideration a third scenario, a turn to Eurasia following the «Belarussian way», because it is impossible in a country where two thirds of the population support the idea of independence.

Besides, today's ruling elite of Ukraine is afraid of turning to Eurasia, where it would become a Russian province. However, the same elite is afraid of processes linked with movement towards Europe. And so we see declarations of «strategic partnership» and integration both with Eurasia and with the West, neither of which are implemented.

Neither the European scenario, nor the scenario of the «special third way» will cause Ukraine to lose her independence. However, the pursuit of the third scenario will undermine the independence of Ukraine and make it possible in the future to return to a union headed by Russia.

The West does not take seriously Ukraine's objective of «returning to Europe», for in reality Ukraine gives preference to balancing between Europe and Eurasia.

If Ukraine desires genuinely to be considered a European country, in the next decades it needs to take the following steps. First, it must to renounce its membership in the CIS. Even though Ukraine has never ratified the CIS Charter, the international community understands it as full-fledged member of the Commonwealth and de-facto as part of Eurasia. Second, Ukraine must invigorate efforts to implement the «four-step transition». And last, Ukraine must categorically renounce the «third way».

For the next 20 years Ukraine can either join Europe through implementation of the «four-step transition», or decay somewhere between Europe and Eurasia in pursuit of her «third way». The latter presents a greater threat to Ukrainian independence, for such stagnation will inevitably lead to reintegration between Ukraine and Eurasia.

about ethnic cleanings, so that every nation will be able to choose without the interference of others what kind of life it wants to build for itself and its descendants. I would like to see a moral world, a world of human relations.

One can surely say that this sounds like utopia, that the strongest have always dominated the weakest, and that is how it will always be. Why? It was on the edge of the new millennium that the humankind created for the first time preconditions for building up a new type of interstate relations. All great empires disappeared under the pressure of contradictions built into them. The overwhelming majority of nations are able to realize their right to self-identification. And this fact creates conditions for the building up of democratic social relations in those countries.

Our common prospects in the new century are not all that bad. We are living in a fantastic world, which our parents could not even dream of. If we behave correctly, our children will live even better, longer and more freely, without fear or lack, in prosperity and justice.

Anatoly GUTSAL, Deputy Director of the National Institute of Ukrainian-Russian Relations

In my opinion, the condition and directions of development of the world's community will be defined by the dominion of the collective and traditional (conservative) elements in social relations against the background of innovation and technical progress.

The liberal-democratic paradigm of western society will play only a decorative role; it will be like an identification procedure for joining the «golden billion». It will serve as a formal pass, an ethical norm that defines, first of all, the level of acceptability for any given country's contact with the western world.

In the domestic life of the countries of the East, including Russia, liberalism and democracy will come down to simply virtual categories, appealed to by the so-called centrists in their inner «clarification of relations» and referrals to the West.

So what will be able really to change the liberal dogma in social construction? Corporatism. Ideas of corporatism are all-covering and are implemented in various forms: in regional integration, political unions, social partnership, strengthening of corporative elements in the economy.

Aleksander KWASNIEWSKI, President of Poland

The world of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is being formed in front of our eyes and with our participation. We believe that the new age began with the transformations of 1989-1991. At that time the Yalta division of the world into two opposite blocs was abrogated. It was then that the countries of Central and East Europe gained an opportunity for self-identification, joining the path of democracy and economic reform. It was then that the real prerequisites for the process of unification of the whole continent appeared, which define the new dimension of global cooperation, and dialogue between world centers of civilization.

The processes forming the 21<sup>st</sup> century resemble melted glass: they are partially transparent and let one guess the future form; but are at the same time flowing, changing, unstable.

In the new world, the danger of a global conflict will be reduced. However, there will be more international mutual dependence and cooperation and, we hope, solidarity. More and more the world is realizing that it has many aspects and many cultures. Due to the further deepening of democracy and the power of law, the protection of human rights, the space for human freedom will increase. On the other hand, we will be haunted by other threats: local conflicts, terrorism, loss of

control over weapons of mass destruction, extremism, instability of situations in many regions of the planet where the influence of the state power will not be of decisive character. The world of the 21<sup>st</sup> century will be a world of contrasts, imbalance, competition between the forces that build up and those that tear down. We are witnesses to the beginning of conflicts whose size and force can be only guessed.

We, Europeans, are mostly interested in the future of our continent. What will be the place of Europe in the world of the 21<sup>st</sup> century? In what direction will European transformation go? Here I am a cautious optimist. I believe Europe—if we manage to outline our chances and threats correctly—will have good prospects. Even recently it was predicted that the future century would belong first of all to Asia. The Asian crisis made us doubt those predictions. Today, the American economy is in the best condition; the latest technologies are born there. The new century will be the age of America, maybe of Asia, and without doubt, of Europe.

The process of European integration creates a great moving force and will become a factor of the civilization development. We can be participants in the European renaissance, in the invigoration of potential that is part of the riches of Europe. But

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The American dominion will increase, and impose its own norm of conduct—first and foremost economic—upon other countries, including demonstration of intolerance toward «unlike-minded». The USA is coming to the next turn of the spiral of reproduction of its historical share. But today, instead of black slaves they import while intellectuals. I do not exclude the possibility that with time, these processes may grow into a serious socio-cultural tension, some kind of a war between North and South.

Today's processes of European integration look mostly like the results of the post-war influence of the United States, first of all directed against the USSR in the cold war. It is only logical that NATO remains in the vanguard of spreading the Euro-Atlantic integration in the East, and the European Union is part of its «wagon train». That is why the destiny of Unified Europe will to a large degree depend upon the United States. Alienation from eastern neighbors is growing deeper in the most important parts of Western European civilization, and not as a matter of malicious intent.

Tadeusz Andrzej OLSZANSKI, political scientist, Poland

Ten years ago, the collapse of the so-called Socialist commonwealth meant the end not only of the «cold-war» confrontation between the two blocs. It was the end of a much larger confrontation that started in 1912-1914, in which two coalitions collided, first European, and later global. This was a military confrontation that can be called the Second Centenary War. Its final result was the destruction of the world's two-pole system and returning to the natural multi-pole system.

This, on the one hand, has led to unstable international relations, and on the other has slowed down the development of science. That is why the future world will be less secure, less stable politically. This instability will be the source of many threats, but also many chances that will enable societies to meet the challenges that they will face. For only multi-vector movement, competition, instability can lead us forward. The European civilization has always based itself upon such a shaky balance, or I should say, a shaky imbalance. Many authors state that the former totalitarian threat is now replaced with the «globalization» threat, which is linked with the formation of a world market, first of all—and one based on financial

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LEONID KUCHMA,  
PRESIDENT  
OF UKRAINE

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Europe should not stop halfway, should reject the temptation of selfishness and particularism, and should strive to level old ditches and counteract new split lines.

I look at the Polish-Ukrainian relations from the same point of view. We are building them, first of all, for the sake of the good of our states and nations, however, we should not lose sight of the European context of these relations. Poland and Ukraine, united by cooperation and strategic partnership, should play an important role in Europe. I believe those still unable to see it in full—for instance, some Western circles—will have to revise their point of view under the influence of developments in the next decade.

The road Poland and Ukraine will cover within the next 20 years depends first of all on us.

So, I am confident that the factors that will prompt the drawing closer of Poland and Ukraine will be social, economic, and civilization transformations in our countries. We can see proof of it even now.

We have reached some kind of maximum of the good political will declared at the top levels of the authorities of the both states. In order to effect the next significant steps in the drawing-close of our countries, we need the commitment of

societies, environments, local leaders and common people, Poles and Ukrainians.

I would not fear that Poland's decision to take upon herself the Schengen obligations might negatively affect the Polish-Ukrainian cooperation. Nothing has been decided here, and much depends on ourselves, in particular on the Ukrainian side. For Ukraine's decisions will be an argument for Poland in her talks with the European Union in order to reach a situation in which our eastern border becomes friendly and open to interaction. The introduction of visas will be the last step. But even if this step is taken, we want these visas to be cheap and easily accessible. No barriers can be put in the way of people who want and need contacts and cooperation. So there will be no barriers.

Poland will always watch the process of transformation in Ukraine with great respect and sympathy. Poland will always strengthen good-neighborly relations and strategic cooperation with Ukraine. Poland will always have a stake in Ukraine's participation in uniting Europe and in the growth of its significance there.

These are the basic and inviolable principles that will outline our common path, the path into the new age during the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

speculation—as well as the advantage of transnational concerns over countries, so-called turbo-capitalism. This threat, however, cannot be compared to the previous one. First and foremost, globalization and turbo-capitalism are processes, while totalitarianism was a project that was implemented according to a plan. It is obvious today that besides global there are intensive regional processes going on. In the future, simultaneously with the globalization of markets, a regionalization of social and political movements will also take place, leading up to emergence of new countries or autonomous units.

I do not exclude the possibility that the declared expansion of the European Union at the expense of Central-European countries of the «first group» will never take place. In some years, a number of hierarchic communities may already exist instead of the homogeneous European Union. The most stable of them («Euroland» – a currency union and possibly a political confederation) will more or less openly compete with the United States. The countries of today's European Union («Schengenland») will form a wider circle, and the next one, the so-called «outer Europe», will include the countries around the EU, starting with Poland and Slovenia, and ending maybe with Morocco, Israel, and Ukraine.

The United States will remain the main super-state of the world, with which «Euroland» and later perhaps China will compete. Russia will be unable to fight for the position of a super-state. As an optimistic variant, in about ten-twelve years, it will become stable and relatively independent, but weak. This will become possible under the conditions of deep decentralization of the Russian Federation. According to the pessimistic variant, China will dominate Russia.

Poland might have a chance to join the European Union. Ukraine has none. More likely, in 20 years these two countries will become elements of the «outer Europe», should such a unit be formed, or just space that will depend upon the EU for a long time. Even today Poland is a part of the latter. Only the process of «Slavic integration» may impede Ukraine's joining the EU. Unfortunately, this possibility cannot be excluded.

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